The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (IACtHR) advisory opinion on human rights and the climate emergency (AO-32/25) addresses numerous dimensions of the climate crisis, setting an important precedent for the protection of our planet. This post focuses on one particularly significant development: the IACtHR’s recognition of Nature as a subject of rights. We argue that the IACtHR’s pronouncements on this subject mark the advent of an ecocentric paradigm whose implications are likely to be far-reaching and transformative. 

Sowing the Seeds of the Rights of Nature

The recognition of Nature as a subject of rights is a development with deep roots in the Inter-American system. Indeed, the seed was first sown in its cases centered on Indigenous communities, where the IACtHR recognized their special relationship to the land, which is “not merely a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual element which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations” (Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, para. 149). 

These initial decisions by the IACtHR concretized important elements of the right to a healthy environment (R2HE) in the Inter-American system (Jiménez Guanipa & Barraco, pp. 245-248). They also introduced a more expansive understanding of humanity’s relationship with Nature: a relationship that cannot be boiled down to mere material extraction but instead has spiritual and intergenerational implications. 

Building on this foundation, the R2HE was first recognized in the IACtHR’s 23rd advisory opinion (AO-23/17) under Article 26 of the American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR) (paras. 56-57). There, the Court emphasised that the R2HE is an autonomous right, comprising two dimensions: (i) an individual dimension – “insofar as its violation may have a direct and an indirect impact on the individual owing to its connectivity to other rights” – and (ii) a collective dimension that understands the right as a “universal value that is owed to both present and future generations” (AO-23/17, para. 59). The Court further specified that, as an autonomous right that is a “fundamental right for the existence of humankind,” the R2HE protects “the components of the environment, such as forests, rivers and seas and others, as legal interests in themselves, even in the absence of certainty or evidence of risk to individuals” (AO-23/17, paras. 59, 62).

With the foregoing, the IACtHR took an important step in incorporating an ecocentric paradigm into the Inter-American system: the inclusion of a right whose protective scope extends to include more than human life and “protects nature and the environment, not only because of the benefits they provide to humanity or the effects that their degradation may have on other human rights […] but because of their importance to the other living organisms with which we share the planet that also merit protection in their own right” (AO-23/17, para. 62). At the time, however, the IACtHR did not explicitly recognize Nature as a subject of rights and merely noted the “tendency” to recognize its legal personality (ibid). 

 In the case of La Oroya population v. Peru, however, the IACtHR directly referred to ecocentrism when discussing the sub-rights to air and water free from pollution as substantive elements of the R2HE (paras. 119-125). More concretely, the Court differentiated the right to water as an autonomous right protected by Article 26 ACHR (Indigenous Communities of the Lhaka Honhat Association (Our Land) v. Argentina, para. 222) from the right to water as a substantive aspect of the R2HE. While the former adopts an anthropocentric vision that “protects [human] access to, use and enjoyment of water,” the latter is markedly “eco-centric” given that it “protects bodies of water as elements of the environment that have a value in themselves, as a universal resource, and because of their importance for other living organisms, including human beings” (La Oroya population v. Peru, para. 124).

In AO-32/25, the Court built upon this foundation and contextualized its reasoning in the inescapable reality of the climate emergency: recognizing ecosystemic stability as a baseline condition for planetary habitability (Chapter V & paras. 311-312). 

An Ecocentric Change in Denomination

A small, though notable, change made by the Court in AO-32/25 may be lost in translation to English speakers: The Court makes it a point to transition from ‘el derecho a un medio ambiente sano’, the term previously used by the Court and other sources of international law, to ‘el derecho a un ambiente sano’(AO-32/25, para. 271). While in English the denomination effectively stays the same – ‘the right to a healthy environment’ –, the conscious decision to omit the term ‘medio,’ which can be translated as a ‘means’ or even ‘tool,’ has profound implications for our understanding of this right. 

According to the IACtHR, the change has “the purpose of more accurately reflecting the conjunction of the individual and collective dimensions of the right” (AO-32/25, para. 271, Authors’ translation). In our estimation, the change also signals an important transition in the IACtHR’s understanding of the right’s essential nucleus: the environment is not a means (‘un medio’) for the fulfillment of human aims, but is an end in and of itself worthy of distinct and autonomous protection; an ecocentric core for the right which expands the Convention’s protective scope to include Nature itself.

The Bloom of Nature as a Subject of Rights

In AO-32/25, the seeds sown in prior case law finally bore fruit through the explicit recognition of Nature as a subject of rights. As the IACtHR has rightly acknowledged, the recognition of Nature as a subject of rights is not foreign to the Inter-American corpus juris, but “represents a contemporary manifestation of the principle of interdependence between human rights and the environment” (para. 282, Authors’ translation). 

Stressing the interdependency and complexity of the natural environment and its components as a carefully balanced ecological equilibrium, the IACtHR warns that harm to any of these components can cause negative cascading effects for all life (para. 279). On this basis, it asserts that “[r]ecognition of the rights of Nature to maintain its essential ecological processes contributes to the consolidation of a truly sustainable developmental model which respects planetary limits and guarantees the availability of vital resources for present and future generations” (para. 279, Authors’ translation). Further, the Court emphasises that “[r]ecognizing Nature as a subject of rights also implies foregrounding its structural role in the vital equilibrium of the conditions that make the habitability of the planet” (para. 280, Authors’ translation). 

This is the first time that an international court has explicitly recognized Nature as a subject of rights, marking a paradigm shift essential for the long-term integrity and functionality of ecosystems by bringing domestic developments to the international sphere and adding an additional layer of scrutiny to State conduct.

More than Words on a Page

The IACtHR went beyond rhetoric in protecting Nature as a subject of rights, indicating that States must “not only abstain from acting in a manner that causes significant environmental harm, but also have the positive obligation to adopt measures to guarantee the protection, restoration and regeneration of ecosystems” – measures that must be “compatible with the best available science and recognize the value of traditional, local and indigenous knowledge” and be guided by the principle of non-regression (para. 283, Authors’ translation). This interpretation is grounded in the general obligation to adapt domestic legal systems to international obligations (Art. 2 ACHR & Protocol), the principle of progressivity (Art. 26 ACHR & Art. 2 Protocol), the pro persona principle (Art. 29 ACHR), and the development of “structural principles” in international environmental law “oriented to preserving the integrity of ecosystems in the face of present and future threats” (paras. 281-282, Authors’ translation). 

The IACtHR made several bold pronouncements which, especially when read in light of the general obligation to adapt the domestic legal system (paras. 244-246), suggest that States should progressively incorporate Nature’s legal personality into their domestic systems. Indeed, the Court highlighted that in the context of the climate emergency, the effective defence of the R2HE requires progress towards a truly sustainable model, which can effectively be achieved through the recognition of Nature as a subject of rights (para. 316). To this end, the IACtHR refers to the extensive recognition of such status in national, regional, and international jurisprudence (paras. 284-286 see also UN Harmony with Nature), “which go beyond the traditional anthropocentric approach and recognise Nature and its components–including the climate system–as holders of autonomous legal protection” (para. 316, Authors’ translation).

In this sense, the IACtHR seems to be urging States to move towards incorporating “the protection of Nature, as a collective subject of public interest” into their domestic legal frameworks to advance a global regulatory system oriented toward sustainable development, consistent with the pro natura and pro persona principles (para. 281, Authors’ translation). This idea is reinforced when read in conjunction with the Court’s call to adopt procedural mechanisms that allow for collective, public, or popular standing requirements (para. 549). In doing so, the IACtHR operationalizes the collective dimension of the R2HE and the rights of Nature to make them justiciable before national courts – trees may indeed have standing in light of these developments. Additionally, as part of the IACtHR’s innovative approach to environmental democracy, it calls upon States to “promote mechanisms to integrate the interests of Nature and future generations into their climate action” (para. 469, Authors’ translation). 

The IACtHR’s indications on this front provide communities and areas impacted by the disastrous effects of climate change with the tools to base their arguments in domestic climate litigation on the damage suffered by the ecosystem itself (paras. 546-551, Calderón Gamboa, pp. 22-30). The rights of Nature thus appear to be an essential piece of the integrated and urgent response necessary to address the complex and multifaceted challenge posed by the triple planetary crisis the IACtHR had previously called for in its judgment concerning the U’wa Indigenous People (para. 304).  

Notably, the IACtHR did not undertake a detailed exploration of the specific rights held by Nature and limited itself to recognizing Nature’s legal personality. That said, IACtHR does include scattered references to Nature’s rights throughout its reasoning: for instance, the Court spoke of the “right of Nature to maintain its essential ecological processes” (para. 279) and forward an expansive understanding of the right to a healthy climate which “projects its effectiveness not only on current and future generations of human beings, but also on Nature, as the physical and biological basis of life” (para. 315). Though Nature’s legal personality could also be considered to fall under the protective scope of the R2HE, how exactly the rights of Nature relate to the R2HE is not entirely clear from the opinion and will, thus, likely form part of further deliberations. As David R. Boyd phrased it, the IACtHR’s conception of the rights of Nature is “implicit in, or linked to” the R2HE (see here). 

To deepen the IACtHR’s understanding of the rights of Nature, domestic practice will continue to be relevant. Indeed, in line with Calderón Gamboa, we would argue that Nature has at least the following rights: a right of respect to its existence; a right to maintain and regenerate its essential ecological processes; and procedural rights such as access to justice and eco-reparations (Calderón Gamboa, pp. 24-30).

In recognizing Nature as a subject of rights, the IACtHR takes a bold step in advancing climate protection. By integrating the rights of Nature paradigm, the Court calls on States to adopt a more holistic approach to climate policy, legislation, and action that duly reflects the “complex and interdependent” character of ecosystems, in which each component “plays an essential role in the stability and continuity of the whole” (para. 279, see also Vernaza & Cutié). 

The Split Vote

Though this recognition of Nature as a subject of rights is the product of a split vote (4-3), with Judges Hernández, Pérez Goldberg, and Sierra Porto dissenting, it is likely to inform the IACtHR’s jurisprudence for years to come. The IACtHR’s strong respect for the principle of non-regression and the progressive interpretation of the ACHR mandated by Article 29 make a reversal on this topic unlikely. 

Looking back on the Court’s prior case law, Lagos del Campo v. Peru stands out as another momentous but contentious moment for the Inter-American system: with the direct justiciability of Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights (ESCER) under Article 26 of the ACHR likewise causing a split vote (5-2) and setting off a wave of discussions in concurring and dissenting opinions. Despite the lack of unanimity, the IACtHR’s approach in that case has only been built upon and is, indeed, the foundation for the R2HE and the primary pathway for the direct justiciability of ESCER in the Inter-American system. The pending opinions of the judges announced in AO-32/25 (res. 20) are, however, sure to give important tools for discussion regarding future jurisprudence on Nature as a subject of rights.

Conclusion: The Dawn of a New Era

The IACtHR’s advisory opinion on the climate emergency has, once again, placed it at the vanguard of human rights protection. Advancing a profoundly climate justice-centred interpretation of international law, the IACtHR’s recognition of Nature as a subject of rights marks a sharp break with inherited legal understandings that have brought humanity to the brink of  ecological disaster.  In doing so, the IACtHR has managed to strike a delicate balance: one that recognizes the rights of Nature as complementary to human rights and integrates an expansive approach to the protection of life on earth into the Inter-American human rights framework, thus facilitating sustainable coexistence (Constitutional Court of Ecuador No. 1149-19-JP/21, para. 242).

Recognizing the rights of Nature asks humanity to reevaluate the relationship it maintains with its environment. Affirming that humans are an integral part of the natural world and its interconnected systems, the IACtHR embraces an Earth-centred approach (Gamboa & Nogueira), which maintains that we are not above the world that surrounds us; we are a part of it. 

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