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On 2 March, the Netherlands’ new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tom Berendsen, stated that he could have “understanding” for the American and Israeli attacks on Iran. When asked whether those attacks were contrary to international law, he replied: “That is not for me to assess.” He added: “This Government considers international law important,” but “at the same time, I also want to be honest that international law is not the only framework that you can apply to this situation. You must also be realistic given the murderous nature of the regime in Iran.” According to the minister, we must thus pursue a more realistic course in which there is only limited room for international law. Ultimately, he said, it is about the “Dutch interest abroad,” while we are “sailing through the fog of the new world order.” Such a relativization of international law, and its selective application, is troubling, not only from a moral perspective, but above all from a constitutional one.

Article 90: A Constitutional Mandate

Article 90 of the Dutch Constitution obliges the Netherlands Government to “promote the development of the international legal order.” This is not a political preference; it is a constitutional mandate.

During the constitutional revision of 1983, the government initially proposed deleting this provision. Strong resistance emerged from several political parties, including the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), which is a Christian democratic and conservative political party in the Netherlands, and the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (‘Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie’, VVD), a center-right conservative-liberal political party. Members of the CDA parliamentary group argued that the provision “had gained greatly in significance as a result of the international struggle, strongly supported by the Netherlands, in favor of human rights in the broadest sense of the word.” Members of the VVD argued that “maintaining such a provision would once again clearly demonstrate the great value that our country wishes to attach to an international order based on universally applicable legal norms.”

Prime Minister Dries van Agt (CDA), Minister of the Interior Hans Wiegel and Minister of Foreign Affairs Chris van der Klaauw (both VVD) ultimately accepted these objections. They wrote:

“Upon further consideration we believe we must accommodate these objections. In the effort to clarify and shorten the existing constitutional provisions on foreign relations, it is not appropriate to leave any room for the misunderstanding, nationally or internationally, that the tradition of the Netherlands to cooperate in promoting the international legal order would not be continued. We agree with the view that for this reason an explicit constitutional provision deserves preference.”

Article 90 was therefore retained. The ministers further clarified that “the concept ‘international legal order’ should be understood in the broad sense of an international order based on universally applicable legal norms.” They elaborated as follows:

“In our view, durable international peace […] is linked to the establishment of an international legal order. Since the Second World War, the Government has repeatedly expressed the conviction that an international system of fully sovereign states no longer fits the problems with which the present world is confronted and that it is therefore desirable to transform this system into a new world order in which national interests can, where necessary, be subordinated to more comprehensive interests. The provision incorporated in the Constitution in 1953 concerning the promotion of the development of the international legal order, against the background of this conviction (which is widely shared in our country), therefore primarily expresses that in the Dutch constitutional order national sovereignty is not regarded as an absolute norm. At the same time, in our opinion, striving for an international order based on universally applicable legal norms also includes promoting the universal realization of human rights, in the broadest sense of the word, that is to say both civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. On that basis, the promotion of the welfare of the world population may also be understood to fall within it. We therefore believe that by maintaining [Article 90 of the Constitution] it is also expressed that global solidarity […] is a permanent objective of government policy.”

A Warning from the Advisory Council on International Affairs

In recent years, the Netherlands Government appears to have taken this constitutional duty less seriously. The Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) observed as much in its advisory letter of 23 October 2024, calling for a more active Dutch commitment to promoting and ensuring compliance with international law in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The AIV noted:

“The Netherlands has, over the course of its history, built a reputation when it comes to issues of international law. As the host country of the ICJ and the ICC, the Netherlands is also expected to play an active role in promoting and complying with international law. This role is also enshrined in our Constitution, the underlying rationale being that this is also a matter of direct concern to the Netherlands.”

The AIV also warned against “double standards”:

“The AIV would underscore the risks associated with applying double standards in promoting respect for human rights and compliance with international law in general. The inconsistent invocation and application of rules of international law contribute significantly to the undermining and politicization of that body of law, and undercut the overarching idea that international law applies, and is applied equally, to all states. Over the past year, inconsistency in the invocation and application of international law by Europe and European states has been repeatedly raised in the international political arena, including by UN Secretary-General António Guterres. The efforts that the Netherlands and Europe have made to create accountability mechanisms in the war in Ukraine, for example, find no equivalent when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unbalanced enforcement fuels anti-Europeanism and anti-Americanism in many countries of the Global South.”

The Maduro Abduction and Dutch Silence

Let us look at the most recent developments. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs David van Weel (VVD) refused to condemn the violent abduction of the Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro by the United States, the unlawfulness of which is evident. Don Ceder (Member of Parliament of the ChristenUnie), during a consultation of 8 January 2026, put the following question to the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

“My question is what it means for Article 90 [of the Constitution] that we are called upon to promote the international legal order. Does that legal order still exist? What does promoting it look like according to the minister?”

The answer of Minister Van Weel was as follows:

“There is a difference between promoting, making statements and judging; and there is also a difference in the way in which you do it. I see myself as a realpolitiker, in the sense that I look at the world as it is and not necessarily at the world as I would like it to be. Within the world as it is, I look at how I can make a difference in order to bring the world a little closer to how I would like the world to be. That very often requires diplomacy behind the scenes. That very often requires acting together with others, so as not to stand alone and thereby reduce your impact. By definition, that comes across as less spectacular [than making public statements], but I do believe that with my tangible contribution I do indeed fulfil the promise of Article 90 [of the Constitution]. With full conviction.”

The minister thus argued that as a realist within the existing world order he could achieve more through diplomacy behind the scenes than through public condemnations. A realpolitik interpretation that primarily focuses on quiet diplomacy and the direct national interest, in my view, sits uneasily with the idealistic-cosmopolitan vision that underlies Article 90 of the Constitution.

The Iran War and Dutch “Realism”

His successor, Tom Berendsen (CDA), goes one step further by emphasizing that applying only the international legal framework is not realistic when dealing with a murderous regime such as that of Iran. When responding to questions in the Dutch Parliament on 3 March, he emphasized once again that:

“[…] this Government stands for international law. We want to promote the international legal order, and we will do everything we can to use our position in the world to ensure that we have a world order based on international law. At the same time, we must be realistic. We see that international law as we envision it is being pushed aside by various major powers. And we will have to have a discussion together about how we as the Netherlands will navigate within that new world order in the future. At the same time, I continue to state that given the maliciousness of the Iranian regime the Netherlands Government has understanding that Israel and the US felt compelled to intervene.”

It is difficult to reconcile this approach, in which the relevance of international law is explicitly called into question and in which a selective application of it is advocated, with the constitutional duty under Article 90 of the Constitution, which requires that the Netherlands present itself as a defender of the international legal order – especially when this is difficult to do.

Conclusion

The fundamental question is therefore straightforward: does international law remain the foundation of Dutch foreign policy, or has it become merely one decision-making framework among many others? The Netherlands’ Constitution leaves little room for ambiguity. It would be welcome if today’s political leaders in the Netherlands drew renewed inspiration from the constitutional idealism articulated by their predecessors.

The post The Iran War and the Dutch Retreat from International Law appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Mit Beschluss vom 26. Januar 2026 hat das Bundesverfassungsgericht eine Verfassungsbeschwerde nicht zur Entscheidung angenommen, die sich gegen das Rentenpaket 2025 richtete: Ein Student sah sich in seinen Grundrechten verletzt, weil er Beiträge in die gesetzliche Rentenversicherung einzahle, ohne später mit gleichwertigen Leistungen rechnen zu können. Was wie eine Randnotiz aus dem Gerichtsalltag wirkt, ist für die Grundrechtsdogmatik aufschlussreich: Das BVerfG präzisiert im Nichtannahmebeschluss sein Verständnis der intertemporalen Freiheitssicherung aus dem Klimabeschluss von 2021 und zeigt zugleich, dass die dort aufgestellten Kriterien tragen.

Die eingriffsähnliche Vorwirkung

In seinem bahnbrechenden Beschluss von 2021 hatte der Erste Senat zu entscheiden, ob die staatlichen Klimaschutzmaßnahmen genügen, um die Grundrechte der Beschwerdeführenden hinreichend vor den Auswirkungen des Klimawandels zu schützen. Die Verfassungsbeschwerde rügte insbesondere, dass die Regelungen des Klimaschutzgesetzes (KSG) zur Reduktion von Treibhausgasen nicht ausreichten, um das CO2-Restbudget, das einer Temperaturschwelle von 1,5 °C entspricht, einzuhalten.

Das BVerfG erkannte hierbei zwar eine intergenerationelle (!) Schutzverpflichtung aus Art. 2 Abs. 2 S. 1 GG an (Rn. 146) – stellte jedoch keine Verletzung der grundrechtlichen Schutzpflichten fest, da die Schutzvorkehrungen nicht offensichtlich ungeeignet waren (Rn. 153 ff.). Erstaunlicherweise ließ es der Senat jedoch dabei nicht bewenden, sondern wählte einen abwehrrechtlichen Ansatz: Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG schützt alle Verhaltensweisen des täglichen Lebens, die mit Emissionen verbunden sind. Unter Rückgriff auf diese allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit nahm der Senat eine eingriffsähnliche Vorwirkung gegenwärtiger politischer Entscheidungen auf die künftige Freiheitsausübung an. Die Idee: Jede CO2-Emissionsmenge, die heute durch das Klimaschutzgesetz zugelassen werde, verkleinere das verbleibende Restbudget weitestgehend unwiederbringlich – das setze den CO2-relevanten Freiheitsgebrauch stärkeren verfassungsrechtlich gebotenen Restriktionen in der Zukunft aus (Rn. 184 ff.). Diese stärkeren Restriktionen folgen aus der sowohl faktischen (das CO2-Budget wird kleiner) als auch rechtlichen Vorwirkung. So verlange das Verfassungsrecht selbst – in Gestalt von Art. 20a GG und den grundrechtlichen Schutzpflichten – mit dem fortschreitenden Verbrauch des Emissionsbudgets, weitere CO2-relevante Freiheitsausübung zu unterbinden.

Daraufhin prüfte der Senat, ob die entsprechenden Regelungen des KSG mit dem Schutz der natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen aus Art. 20a GG sowie dem Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz vereinbar sind (Rn. 195 ff.). Dabei wog er zwischen gegenwärtiger und künftiger Freiheitsausübung bereits lebender Generationen ab. Das Gericht betonte insbesondere, dass es einer Generation nicht zugestanden werden dürfe, unter vergleichsweise milder Reduktionslast große Teile des Restbudgets zu verbrauchen, wenn dies nachfolgende Generationen zu einer „Vollbremsung“ zwingt (Rn. 192). Genau hierin liegt die dogmatische Konsequenz intertemporaler Freiheitssicherung: Der CO₂-Ausstoß bestimmt den künftigen Freiheitsraum – wer heute mehr emittiert, verengt die Freiheit von morgen.

Erweiterung auf andere politische Fragen

Bereits unmittelbar nach dem Klimabeschluss wurde lebhaft diskutiert, ob sich die intertemporale Freiheitssicherung auch auf andere Kontexte übertragen ließe: von der Staatsverschuldung, über die Biodiversitätskrise und die Verteidigungspolitik bis zur Krankenhausbettenzuteilung. Die verschiedenen Fragen eint, dass sie jeweils gesellschaftliche Herausforderungen betreffen, die eine kurzfristig orientierte Tagespolitik nur schwer adressieren kann. Doch genau hier zieht Karlsruhe nun eine Linie. Nicht jede politische Entscheidung begründet bereits eine eingriffsähnliche Vorwirkung auf künftige Freiheiten. So offen die Konturen des Klimabeschlusses zunächst wirkten – der Nichtannahmebeschluss zum Rentenpaket zeigt, dass die dort entwickelten Kriterien zur Abgrenzung taugen.

Anwendbarkeit auf die gesetzliche Rentenversicherung

Mit seiner Verfassungsbeschwerde rügte der Beschwerdeführer die gesetzliche Verlängerung des mindestens zu erreichenden Sicherungsniveaus von 48 % bis zum Jahr 2031. Das Sicherungsniveau beschreibt das Verhältnis der Rente eines Durchschnittsverdieners nach 45 Arbeitsjahren zum aktuellen Durchschnittseinkommen (§154a SGB VI). Das Rentenpaket 2025 schrieb diese Haltelinie fort, ohne zugleich die bisherige Obergrenze für den Beitragssatz in gleicher Weise zu verlängern (sog. doppelte Haltelinie). Darüber hinaus rügte der Beschwerdeführer die zusätzlich vorgesehenen Leistungserweiterungen für Kindererziehungszeiten. Der derzeit studierende Beschwerdeführer sah sich in seinen Rechten beeinträchtigt, da er gegenwärtig in die gesetzliche Rentenversicherung einzahle, ohne künftige gleichwertige Leistungen erwarten zu können.

Die 3. Kammer des Ersten Senats nahm die Verfassungsbeschwerde wegen offensichtlicher Unzulässigkeit nicht zur Entscheidung an. Das Gericht entschied zwar allein, dass der Beschwerdeführer eine eingriffsähnliche Vorwirkung nicht hinreichend dargelegt habe (Rn. 8). Die Entscheidung weist aber darüber hinaus: Sie zeigt den grundsätzlichen Unterschied zwischen dem Klimawandel und sozialen Sicherungssystemen auf. Die Kammer argumentiert, dass nicht deutlich werde,

„weshalb ein gegenwärtiger oder künftiger Beitragszahler im System der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung mit einer Person gleich steht, die sich gegen einen frühzeitigen Verbrauch des verbleibenden CO 2 -Restbudgets wehrt“ (Rn. 8).

Um das Argument nachvollziehen zu können, lohnt sich ein Blick auf die gesetzliche Konstruktion der Rentenversicherung. Die gesetzliche Rentenversicherung ist als Umlageverfahren ausgestaltet. Gemäß § 153 Abs. 1 SGB VI werden die jährlichen Ausgaben grundsätzlich durch die Einnahmen desselben Jahres gedeckt. Zwar liegt dem Umlageverfahren der Gedanke eines Generationenvertrages zugrunde: Wer heute einzahlt, vertraut darauf, später Leistungen zu erhalten. Jedoch fehlt es sowohl an einer verfassungsrechtlichen als auch an einer tatsächlichen Vorwirkung auf die künftige Freiheit des Einzelnen, wie sie eine eingriffsähnliche Vorwirkung voraussetzt.

Rechtlich folgt der Konnex maßgeblich aus der doppelten Haltelinie, also der Kombination aus der Festsetzung des Sicherungsniveaus für Leistungsbeziehende und des Beitragsniveaus für die Versicherten. In grundrechtlicher Hinsicht könnte der Staat die Ansprüche auf ein menschenwürdiges Existenzminimum aus Art. 1 Abs. 1 in Verbindung mit Art. 20 Abs. 1 GG auch durch anderweitige soziale Leistungen erfüllen. Das gilt auch für Ansprüche aus dem Sozialstaatsprinzip. Entscheidender sind vielmehr die durch die Beitragspflicht betroffene allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit sowie die Eigentumsgarantie aus Art. 14 Abs. 1 S. 1 GG. Allerdings verfügt der Staat auch in eigentumsrechtlicher Sicht über einen weiten Gestaltungsspielraum, der ihn dazu berechtigt, Leistungen insbesondere aus Solidaritätsgründen zu kürzen oder umzugestalten (BVerfG, 1 BvR 824/03 Rn. 54 ff.). Zudem schützt Art. 14 Abs. 1 S. 1 GG keine Renditeerwartungen (BVerfG, 1 BvR 1122/13, Rn. 9). Dieser weite Spielraum steht der Annahme entgegen, dass das Verfassungsrecht verpflichte, die Sozialversicherungssysteme auf eine bestimmte Art und Weise auszugestalten.

Auch in tatsächlicher Hinsicht unterscheiden sich soziale Sicherungssysteme maßgeblich vom Klimawandel. Zwar führt die demografische Entwicklung zu größeren Herausforderungen für das Rentensystem. Allerdings ist diese Entwicklung – anders als der Klimawandel – nicht weitestgehend unumkehrbar. So gibt es für die gesetzliche Rentenversicherung verschiedenste Reformmöglichkeiten, etwa eine parallel zur Steigerung der Lebenserwartung folgende Erhöhung des Renteneintrittsalters (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Rn. 403 ff.) Nicht zuletzt besteht auch die Möglichkeit, die Bundeszuschüsse zur gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung weiter zu steigern. Somit fehlt es auch tatsächlich an einer weitestgehend unumkehrbaren Entwicklung. Gerade diese Reformoffenheit betont auch die Kammer in ihrem Beschluss (Rn. 8).

Begrenzung auf die natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen

Der Nichtannahmebeschluss macht deutlich, was im Klimabeschluss bereits angelegt war: Die intertemporale Freiheitssicherung ist auf die natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen beschränkt – nämlich dort, wo irreversible Entwicklungen die künftige Freiheit strukturell verengen. In seinem aktuellen Beschluss fordert das BVerfG eine Prognose der weitestgehenden Unumkehrbarkeit der tatsächlichen Entwicklungen – daran fehlt es im Kontext von sozialen Systemen wie der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung.

Dass der Klimabeschluss eine Sonderdogmatik begründet hat, wie etwa Möllers und Weinberg anmerken, lässt sich nicht von der Hand weisen. Doch diese Sonderstellung erklärt sich aus der grundlegenden Bedeutung der natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen, die eines besonderen Schutzes bedürfen. Die engen Voraussetzungen der intertemporalen Freiheitssicherung ermöglichen es, zukünftige Auswirkungen gegenwärtiger Entscheidungen zu berücksichtigen, ohne den Eingriffsbegriff vollständig aufzulösen und den Gesetzgeber in seinem Handlungsspielraum übermäßig einzuengen.

Für die anderen diskutierten Anwendungsfelder bedeutet das: Wo es an einer tatsächlich weitgehend unumkehrbaren Entwicklung fehlt – typischerweise in Bereichen, die politisch korrigier- und reformierbar bleiben –, findet die intertemporale Freiheitssicherung keine Anwendung. Insbesondere bei der Staatsverschuldung und der entsprechenden Schuldenbremse fehlt es an einer vergleichbaren Zwangsläufigkeit: Die langfristigen Effekte lassen sich hier nicht mit der Prognosesicherheit des CO₂-Restbudgets bestimmen – und der Gesetzgeber kann durch politische Entscheidungen rechtzeitig gegensteuern.

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In January 2026, president Karol Nawrocki vetoed the draft law set to adapt Polish law to the Digital Services Act (DSA), further prolonging the country’s delay in DSA’s implementation. The censorship concerns he invoked are unconvincing and reveal a limited understanding of the realities of today’s online environment. Nearly a year after J.D. Vance’s infamous Munich Security Conference address, in which he accused EU Commissioners of suppressing free speech, the narrative still has an impact on Poland. The Polish President has embraced a free speech paradigm prevalent in the American political discourse – one that is ill-suited to the European legal and institutional framework. The consequences are substantial, as platform users are deprived of important safeguards, making it essential that some version of legislation aligning the Polish legal framework with the DSA be adopted as a matter of urgency.

Veto this, veto that

This veto was somewhat anticipated. In the first six months of his presidency, Nawrocki has already vetoed 23 laws – more than his predecessor, Andrzej Duda, did in his ten years in office. In the final days before his decision, over 100 experts appealed to the First Lady to urge the President to sign the bill, with children’s online safety being the dominant argument in the public debate – yet even that appeal had no effect. The reasons the President gave for the veto feel more declaratory than explanatory: he said that he believes that the notice and action mechanism for the removal of illegal content established in the draft law (Article 1(5), intended to ensure compliance with Article 16 of the DSA) interfered excessively with the freedom of expression, stating that “the state should guarantee freedom, not regulate it.”

This argument is unpersuasive. The category of content covered by this provision is defined very narrowly and explicitly refers to provisions of other statutes, in particular the Criminal Code, intellectual property law, and industrial property law. As a result, such content is already prohibited under Polish law, and a person publishing it would in any event be committing an offence.

What the DSA does, however, is to make platforms react quicker to notices about illegal content by establishing a structured notice-and-action mechanism under Article 16 of the DSA. Such a notice can be submitted, by the police or by users themselves. So, imagine that someone – whether a law enforcement authority or an ordinary user – wants to have content amounting to child sexual abuse, content inciting racial hatred, or content promoting suicide, taken down; this would be the procedure to use. Additionally, it would arguably be much faster than going through a standard criminal process. One might say these are extreme examples – but this is exactly the type of situation the law is meant to address. While this procedure could, of course, be abused, given the narrow scope of the law, such abuse appears rather unlikely. At the same time the draft law provides for an appeal mechanism that would constitute an effective remedy against the removal of content falling outside the scope of the Act. The bottom line is that the notice-and-action mechanism is a core element of the DSA. One may therefore wonder how the President expects Polish law to be aligned with the requirements of the DSA while excluding that mechanism.

On a related note, when it comes to the abusive removal of online content, the greatest threat does not stem from individual users or even public authorities, but from the platforms themselves. According to a report by the Appeals Centre Europe – a dispute settlement body established under the DSA – more than 75% of content moderation decisions reviewed on appeal were overturned. These wrongful removals also affect important voices in public debate, including journalistic content. The seriousness of the problem is further reflected in the Commission’s recent adoption of guidelines to protect media content on online platforms. These safeguards require Very Large Platforms to notify media providers in advance of any intended removal of journalistic content and to clearly state the reasons for that decision. Responding to accusations that the DSA constitutes a tool of censorship, a Commission spokesperson, Thomas Regnier, went so far as to argue that its purpose is, in fact, to curb unjustified platform censorship, precisely by enabling users, including journalists, to appeal content removal decisions.

Returning to the Polish context, Poland remains one of the last Member States yet to align its legal framework with the standards stemming from the DSA, and the Commission has already initiated infringement proceedings in 2025. In this context, the President’s veto suggests that meaningful regulation of the digital environment – and broader reforms concerning freedom of expression – are unlikely to materialise anytime soon.

Uncle Sam

The President’s veto does not occur in isolation. It takes place against the backdrop of a growing transatlantic rift over the regulation of online content. The United States – particularly under renewed political pressure from both Congress and the President – has begun framing the EU’s digital regulation as a threat to American free speech.

Among Trump’s first executive orders was one titled “Restoring Freedom of Speech and Ending Federal Censorship”, signalling alignment with the broader Republican position on content moderation. The administration has also issued a memorandum on “defending U.S. companies from foreign extortion, unfair fines and penalties”, which takes direct aim at the DSA. The memorandum envisages retaliatory measures against countries that impose additional charges, including regulatory penalties, on American companies. A report published in February 2026 by the US House Judiciary Committee accused the European Commission of using the DSA and the DSA related Strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation to coerce American technology companies into restricting lawful political expression. While the report’s conclusions are far-reaching – and its characterisation of EU regulation as censorship is very much disputed – the political signal is clear: American policymakers increasingly view European content moderation rules as an assertion of extraterritorial regulatory power that clashes with First Amendment values.

This framing has real consequences for the Polish debate. The rhetoric of the veto – the invocation of freedom of expression as a shield against any form of state-mandated content regulation – echoes the arguments now being made in the US. Yet the analogy is misleading. The DSA does not define what constitutes illegal content; it defers to national law on that question. Its primary function is to impose procedural obligations on platforms: to act on notifications of illegal content, to provide transparent moderation decisions, and to allow users to challenge those decisions. In other words, it is as much a tool for protecting speech – by giving users recourse against arbitrary platform decisions – as it is for limiting it.

It’s an AI’s world

This dimension is all the more pressing in light of the growing role of artificial intelligence in generating and amplifying disinformation as well as illegal content. AI-generated content – from deepfakes to synthetic text – is increasingly difficult to distinguish from authentic material and is being deployed at scale by state and non-state actors alike. In late December 2025, xAI’s chatbot Grok – integrated directly into Elon Musk’s X platform – has generated sexualised images of minors after users exploited its image-editing feature, prompting investigations by the European Commission, the UK’s Ofcom, and regulators in Australia and Brazil. This illustrates not only how quickly AI tools can be weaponised to produce illegal content, but also the inadequacy of relying on platforms’ self-regulation to prevent it, especially since platforms themselves rely on algorithmic systems that tend to amplify emotionally charged and sensational content, often at the expense of accuracy. In such an environment, the absence of a functioning regulatory framework that is the national implementation of the DSA leaves users, and children in particular, exposed.

Thus, the practical implications for Polish internet users are significant. Without the implementing legislation, Poland lacks a fully empowered Digital Services Coordinator capable of accepting complaints, certifying out-of-court dispute resolution bodies, or designating trusted flaggers. Polish users who are wrongly blocked by platforms have no rapid, accessible mechanism for independent review – a situation starkly illustrated by the long-running SIN v. Facebook litigation, in which a harm reduction organisation had to resort to civil proceedings lasting years in order to challenge the arbitrary removal of its educational content. The DSA’s out-of-court dispute resolution bodies were designed precisely to avoid this kind of procedural burden, yet without transposition they remain unavailable in Poland.

The veto also deprives Polish users of a number of other protections that the implementing law would have introduced: the possibility to complain to a national authority about platforms admitting children under the age of 13, the ability to block content depicting child sexual abuse through an expedited administrative procedure with full judicial review, and the creation of a mechanism for the rapid restoration of content that has been unjustly removed by platforms.

President’s decision leaves disappointment but little surprise. Given his track record in exercising his veto power, as well as his clearly expressed alignment with U.S. free speech narratives, the veto was easily foreseeable. Moreover, the President’s reasoning appears to draw on a vision of the internet from the early 2000s – a free and open agora of unrestricted speech – that bears little resemblance to the commercially driven, algorithmically curated digital environment of today. To quote Brave New World, “ending is better than mending.” Still, one may hope that the veto will not mark the end of efforts to align Polish law with the DSA, and that the legislation, once amended, will ultimately be adopted.

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