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Wie viel Platz bleibt auf der Erde für zusätzliche Wälder? Eine Fläche, so gross wie die USA, sagten ETH-Forscher und sorgten für Euphorie. Eine neue Studie zeichnet ein ganz anderes Bild.

Der Abstrich ist Teil der gynäkologischen Vorsorge und wichtig für die Früherkennung von Krebs. Ist er auffällig, ist das aber nicht zwingend ein Grund zur Sorge, wie eine Gynäkologin erklärt.

Die USA erfanden im geheimen Manhattan Project die Atombombe – und warfen sie gleich zweimal über Japan ab. In Los Alamos wird das bis heute als Segen für die Menschheit präsentiert. Über die Opfer schweigt man sich aus.

In Europa wackelt die Unterstützung für die Netto-Null-Ziele. Dieser Stimmungswechsel sollte genutzt werden. Nicht um die Klimaziele über Bord zu werfen. Sondern um die Klimapolitik neu auszurichten.

Wenn massereiche Sterne kollabieren, können Schwarze Löcher entstehen. Es geht aber auch anders. Das legt ein in den USA gemessenes Signal von Gravitationswellen nahe.

As the United States Supreme Court enters its summer recess and concludes its first months of engagement with the Trump Administration’s program of “radical constitutionalism”, the progressive opposition is debating the right strategy for the conflict’s next phase. Much of this debate has focused on deep grievances with the Court itself. Many progressives view its conservative composition as the illegitimate product of Donald Trump’s manipulation of the appointments process to mold a conservative majority. For these critics, this coup of sorts continues with this majority, swayed by a well-funded right-wing movement, disregarding precedent and principled reasoning to fulfill a hyper-conservative agenda on important and divisive constitutional issues. And yet in tension with this critique is the “constitutional moment” in which the country finds itself as Trump presses an extraordinary MAGA agenda, including sweeping claims of executive authority to advance his particular brand of hard-right politics. The Court is inescapably the forum for resolution of constitutional conflict, and so progressives have nowhere else to turn. And it is in the background of much progressive thought over decades that the Court should play this role – that it is there, before the nine Justices and not in the messy world of everyday politics, that these questions should be decided.

This is the conflict – a “no win” – in which progressives experience the Court’s current engagements with these issues. Voices within this community now counsel caution, grounded in realism, in how much engagement by the Court progressives themselves should invite, as in the choice of cases they bring before it. There is often a choice: The Court cannot reach into the welter of lower court litigation and pick the issues they wish to decide (though it can reframe questions presented to it by parties). Where progressives have some control over the cases the Court will hear, say, on appeal from a lower court decision, they should stay their hand. The time has come, these commentators have suggested on this blog, for progressives to stop banging their heads against the SCOTUS wall and adopt strategies of political action as the primary line of defense against the promulgation of the Trump agenda.

This proposed program does not adequately account for the complexity of the Court’s response to the Trump era. The complexities are of various kinds, but most prominent for purposes here are 1) the Roberts Court is conservative but not a “Trump” Court, 2) the conservatism of the Court plays out very differently across two categories of cases, and it is particularly in encounters with Trump’s quest for presidential supremacism that the Court may prove over time unfriendly, in ways that matter, to his designs.

In Trump 1.0, Trump made his appointments largely through a selection process controlled by a White House counsel consulting closely with Federalist Society representatives, which embraces “conservative and libertarian” legal principles and, notably, the principle that “the separation of governmental powers is central to our Constitution.” The Justices who emerged from this process passed muster in Federalist Society terms but not in MAGA terms, which are perhaps best defined by the “radical constitutionalism” articulated by the Trump 2.0 Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Russell Vought, and grounded in a sweeping view of presidential power. Trump now realizes that this is so and has pronounced himself betrayed. “I am so disappointed in The Federalist Society because of the bad advice they gave me on numerous Judicial Nominations,” the president raged on Truth Social. “This is something that cannot be forgotten!”

It is in the sphere of Trump’s pursuit of a supremely powerful presidency, and the means by which he and his lawyers seek to achieve it, that he may find the Court less reliable in its support for his constitutional goals. In fact, there is a case to be made that the Court is emerging from the first skirmishes in this battle with its own power, not the president’s, enhanced. As Jack Goldsmith has written, the Court was the clear winner in the recent “birthright citizenship” case which, at this stage, resolved only the question of whether lower courts could issue relief in the form universal injunctions effective on a nationwide basis. The Court quite intentionally extracted from the administration’s solicitor general a concession, duly noted in its ruling, that the executive would respect throughout the country not just the Court’s judgment in a particular case, binding on the parties before it, but also its “opinions,” which means it will follow its legal pronouncements in other contexts.

We will see how much weight this concession carries over time, but it is a significant move by the Court, and not one that the radical constitutionalism theorists would in principle be keen on. Court critics often respond to this claim by pointing to the Court’s famous decision last year in Trump v. United States on former presidents’ immunity from criminal prosecution and asking: How much more protective of Donald Trump’s interests could this Court possibly be?

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Am Lehrstuhl für Bürgerliches Recht, Internationales und Europäisches Privatrecht, Zivilprozessrecht und Rechtsvergleichung der Universität Bremen ist zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine Stelle als wissenschaftliche:r Mitarbeiter:in (w/m/d) (Entgeltgruppe 13 TV-L mit 50% der wöchentlichen Arbeitszeit, d.h. 19,6 Wstd.) zu besetzen. Wenn Sie sich mit diesen Lehr- und Forschungsgebieten identifizieren können oder sich auch nur allgemein für das Zivilrecht interessieren und ggf. promovieren und auch eigene Lehrerfahrungen sammeln möchten, freut sich Prof. Dr. Rieländer auf Ihre Bewerbung!

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This argument can be taken too far. I entirely agree with critics who are very troubled by aspects of this opinion, including its holding that a president’s official actions may not even be introduced into evidence in a trial for alleged misconduct for which he cannot claim immunity. (For that matter, I have strongly disagreed with the executive branch opinions that have held that presidents enjoy full immunity while in office.) But it was not at all surprising that the Court held that, as a doctrinal matter, former presidents enjoyed a significant measure of immunity. The (unfortunate) logic across administrations supporting full immunity for incumbents would necessarily apply in some ways to prosecutions initiated after their terms ended. And it bears noting that, while contesting Trump’s claims of absolute immunity for a former president’s official acts, the Biden Administration endorsed the proposition that the criminal laws could not be applied to “core” presidential functions. Setting aside its immediate and rightly controversial impact on the Jan. 6 Trump prosecution, the constitutional question before the Court was complex and, in key respects, its future application in immunizing wrongful presidential conduct remains uncertain.

I do not see this decision, or others in which the administration prevailed during the most recent Term, as predictive of what the Court will do when finally ruling on the constitutionality of the birthright citizenship executive order, or the authority Trump claims for deportations under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA). The Court has insisted on due process and adequate notice in the case of the deportation of Venezuelans alleged to be cartel members. It has barred the removal from the country of a class of detainees under the AEA while appellate review is pending, after halting deportations in that case a month earlier in the early hours of the morning, and upheld a lower court order that the government “facilitate” the return of a deportee the administration had conceded was mistakenly removed from the country. On these issues (if not on others), the Court signaled that it will pay attention to what the administration does as well as what it claims it is doing. It is not so far clear that it will go as far as Trump and his radical constitutional theorists would want in advancing control of independent administrative agencies. The Court has already flinched in a preliminary order at extending broad presidential removal authority as far as the Federal Reserve. Related concerns may give the Court pause before it provides presidents with full control over agencies with politically charged missions, such as the Federal Election Commission (campaign finance) and the Election Assistance Commission (election administration), that Congress structured to ensure – for obvious reasons – that no one political party could direct their operations.

Again, time will have to pass, and perhaps a lot of time, before this argument about the Court can be settled one way or the other. And the signs are not by any means all positive. The orders staying lower court injunctions against mass firings at the Department of Education and against the implementation of an executive order directing massive personnel reductions on an executive branch-wide basis are troubling. But there is yet no final resolution of these issues. The Justices are swamped with cases and making decisions by interim order. In some of those cases, the Court may be signaling where it will end up once – or if – it grants full review of the appeals from lower court decisions. In other cases, any such signal may be hard to detect. The challenges it faces are truly – to deploy an overused term, and yet accurately – unprecedented, which means that there is little to support predictions about ultimate outcomes.

What is more certain is that on many constitutional issues progressives care about – such as LGBTQ and reproductive rights, or Establishment Clause matters – the Court majority will be conservative. That conservatism in various forms is precisely what a Republican administration, working with Federalist Society support and a Republican Senate – wanted, and it is what they got. This is where realistic expectations that determine sound case-selection strategies make perfect sense. But in the defense against the basic lawlessness of this administration that drives its “radical constitutionalist” view of presidential power, the Court’s role is unavoidable. Moreover, the available body of evidence provides no reason to think that it will rule as this president’s always dependable ally.

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There is also this decisive and perhaps obvious consideration favoring ongoing progressive engagement with the Court. The defense against presidential supremacism and the progressive concern with the substantive direction of the constitutional law are not severable. Executives empowered to rule by executive order and emergency decree can – and indeed strive to – enact their constitutional agendas without having to worry as much about the courts. We have seen in a world of “separation of parties, not powers” that Congress may not impose much in the way of constraints. In this sense, when thinking about resort to the courts, progressives are not choosing between constitutional issues of presidential power and all others. Their substantive constitutional commitments hinge on a successful defense against presidential supremacy in moving policies that they abhor. That is, unless there is any thought that Democrats would want to take this model of supreme executive power on as their own, when their next turn in the Oval Office comes about. Perish that thought.

As for the argument that progressives should expect less from the courts and more from strategies of political action directed toward winning elections and shaping public opinion: well, yes, and not just as an answer to disappointments with this Court, but at all times.

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Editor’s Pick

by TILL STADTBÄUMER

Do you know that vague feeling that everyday things are gradually getting worse? Electronic products may be more efficient and energy-saving, but now they have touchscreens instead of buttons, everything has its own app, and devices are constantly competing for our attention (just think of the fully automatic coffee machine that endlessly begs to be cleaned). This simultaneity of progress and decline is the focus of Gabriel Yoran’s “Die Verkrempelung der Welt”. It is about more than just the “they-don’t-make-’em-like-that-no-more”-feeling. It is about asking why everyday things are not as good as they could be, about what makes a product “good” and sustainable in the first place, and why we buy the things we are buying. A great book – and guaranteed to come without a corresponding app.

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The Week on Verfassungsblog

summarised by CHARLOTTE HERBERT

A politicized constitutional court and fierce battles over judicial appointments. What has long been familiar in the United States seemed largely foreign to German constitutional culture. How quickly and drastically things can change is shown by the failed appointment of three judges to Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court. At the center is Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf, a professor of public law, not previously known for very left-wing positions. After a modified Wikipedia entry and an unprecedented campaign, Brosius-Gersdorf faced numerous attacks on her character and academic work.

This week, over 300 legal scholars issued a widely noted statement (GE) arguing that these attacks not only go too far, but also threaten democratic order.

KLAUS FERDINAND GÄRDITZ (GE) considers the debate surrounding Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf “erratic.” He sees it as a prime example of how judicial appointments should not be done.

VICTOR LOXEN (GE) examines the debate around Brosius-Gersdorf, focusing on the central role of human dignity. The fact that the discourse has derailed is no coincidence, given the German view of dignity as a “value.”

At the European level, ISABELLA RISINI (EN) considers last week’s judgment in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia to be one of the most significant in the ECtHR’s history. Russia is held responsible in the ruling for the downing of flight MH17 and numerous systematic human rights violations in Ukraine. The ECtHR’s findings on the relationship between humanitarian law and human rights, in particular, are considered groundbreaking.

Another groundbreaking ECtHR ruling came in sports law. In the Caster Semenya case, the Court held Switzerland responsible for violating the right to a fair trial. This sends a strong message to the Swiss Federal Court and the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), says ANTOINE DUVAL (EN).

Another ECtHR judgment is discussed by TILMAN HOPPE (EN): according to the Court, public officials who accumulate unexplained wealth must expect the confiscation of their assets – even without a concrete criminal conviction.

Legal questions were also front and center in EU foreign relations this week. At the late June meeting of EU foreign ministers, no agreement was reached on the future of the Association Agreement with Israel. ANŽE MEDIŽEVEC (GE) refers to the ECJ’s 2024 Western Sahara ruling, which emphasized the EU’s obligations under international law – suggesting that the agreement with Israel should be suspended.

Meanwhile, the High Court in London ruled that the UK may continue issuing licenses for F-35 fighter jet components – even if these might reach Israel through spare parts stockpiles. According to GALINA CORNELISSE (EN), the decision raises pertinent questions regarding the compatibility of UK arms exports with the Arms Trade Treaty and other key provisions of international law.

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An der Rechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Wien ist eine Universitätsprofessur für Rechtsethik und Rechtsphilosophie zu besetzen. Bewerber*innen sollen über ausgezeichnete akademische Qualifikationen in der Rechtsphilosophie und im Recht der Europäischen Union sowie in den Überschneidungsbereichen dieser beiden Fächer verfügen. Erwünscht sind gleichwertige Ausweise in Rechtsphilosophie und Europarecht und die damit verbundene Befähigung, beide Fächer vollumfänglich in Forschung und Lehre zu vertreten. Nähere Informationen entnehmen Sie bitte der Ausschreibung.
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In Colombia, worrying constitutional developments are underway. On 11 June, President Petro announced a national referendum on social reforms by decree – after the Senate rejected the proposal. VICENTE F. BENÍTEZ-R. and FABIO ENRIQUE PULIDO ORTIZ (EN) view this as a turn toward an increasingly Schmittian conception of democratic power.

Turkey is also undergoing a profound transformation – but one driven by “old men,” writes DORUK ERHAN (EN). Those who might truly represent generational change are still being silenced, he warns.

PETER ČUROŠ (EN) highlights how authoritarian governments can be surprisingly adaptive: in Slovakia, a well-argued NGO critique of a Foreign Agents Registration Bill might ironically increase its chances of surviving judicial review – and thus facilitate its adoption.

At the end of June, Spain’s Constitutional Court upheld the Catalan amnesty law. JOSEP M. TIRAPU-SANUY (EN) analyses the ruling and sees it less as a decision of principle and more as a pragmatic solution.

In Denmark, the Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision in mid-June on the principle of non-penalization of refugees enshrined in Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. ASTA S. STAGE JARLNER and SARAH SCOTT FORD (EN) welcome the end of a long-standing unlawful practice but criticize the lack of adequate information provided to refugees about their rights.

In the digital realm, the European Commission published its final version of the Code of Practice for General Purpose AI (GPAI) last week. GUSTAVO GIL GASIOLA (EN) examines whether this is the right step toward effective regulation of such AI models.

Much is also happening in the field of AI and copyright. In late May, the CJEU received its first referral concerning chatbots and copyright. PHILIPP HACKER (GE) analyses the case, outlines possible answers, and argues that the outcome could fundamentally shape the future of AI development.

JAN-OLE HARFST, TOBIAS MAST and WOLFGANG SCHULZ (EN) remain skeptical about the enforcement of the Digital Services Act. Recent EU–US trade talks, they argue, suggest that the Commission may be neglecting key enforcement tasks. They call for a reconsideration of the Commission’s role in enforcement.

How far should corporate control over critical infrastructure go? ALINA UTRATA (EN) argues that our dependence on Starlink and cloud providers reveals the political power of corporations. In her view, these companies must be treated as political actors – just like states.

We also continued our symposium on “Human Rights Protection in the Climate Emergency: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion No. 32” (EN): DAVID R. BOYD (EN) analyses the role of the right to a healthy environment. MARKUS GEHRING (EN) explains why the legal consequences of the recognition as jus cogens of the obligation not to create irreversible damage to the climate and the global environment are profound. MARIA ANTONIA TIGRE, DINA LUPIN, and NATALIA URZOLA GUTIÉRREZ (EN) highlight the Advisory Opinion’s particular focus on gender-specific aspects of the climate crisis.

Finally, our symposium on “Animal Rights: The Role of the EU Charter” (EN) concluded with a contribution from ESTER HERLIN-KARNELL (EN). She sees a need for reform regarding the widely differing veterinary costs across Europe – for the sake of fundamental rights and sustainability.

That’s it for this week. After the weekend, temperatures in Germany are expected to cool down a bit.

A cool-down sounds like a good idea — for the weather, and for everything else too.

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Take care and all the best!

Yours,

the Verfassungsblog Team

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The post Progressives and the Supreme Court appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Am Lehrstuhl für Bürgerliches Recht, Internationales und Europäisches Privatrecht, Zivilprozessrecht und Rechtsvergleichung der Universität Bremen ist zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine Stelle als wissenschaftliche:r Mitarbeiter:in (w/m/d) (Entgeltgruppe 13 TV-L mit 50% der wöchentlichen Arbeitszeit, d.h. 19,6 Wstd.) zu besetzen. Wenn Sie sich mit diesen Lehr- und Forschungsgebieten identifizieren können oder sich auch nur allgemein für das Zivilrecht interessieren und ggf. promovieren und auch eigene Lehrerfahrungen sammeln möchten, freut sich Prof. Dr. Rieländer auf Ihre Bewerbung!

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Spotlight: US Democracy Under Threat

The US is facing a deep constitutional crisis.
Keeping up with recent developments isn’t always easy.
Our Spotlight Section, “US Democracy Under Threat,” brings together insights from leading legal scholars.
Open access, timely, and read by a global audience.

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Es gibt einen entscheidenden, wenn auch zunächst naheliegenden Grund, warum Progressive den Dialog mit dem Gericht nicht scheuen sollten: Die Verteidigung gegen präsidentiellen Suprematismus und die progressive Sorge an der inhaltlichen Entwicklung des Verfassungsrechts lassen sich nicht voneinander trennen. Exekutiven, die durch Executive Orders und Notverordnungen regieren, gelingt es – und sie bemühen sich gezielt darum –, ihre verfassungsrechtlichen Ziele um- und durchzusetzen, ohne dabei allzu große Rücksicht auf die Gerichte nehmen zu müssen. In einem System, das weniger durch eine Trennung der Gewalten als durch eine Trennung der Parteien bestimmt ist, hat sich gezeigt, dass der Kongress kaum in der Lage ist, der Exekutive wirksam Schranken zu setzen. Wenn Progressive also über die Anrufung der Gerichte nachdenken, stehen sie nicht vor der Wahl zwischen verfassungsrechtlichen Fragen präsidentieller Macht und allen anderen Anliegen. Ihre grundlegenden Überzeugungen hängen entscheidend davon ab, ob es gelingt, eine präsidentielle Vorherrschaft einzudämmen, die politische Programme vorantreibt, die sie entschieden ablehnen. Es sei denn, jemand käme auf die Idee, die Demokrat*innen könnten dieses Modell der präsidentiellen Allmacht übernehmen, wenn sie das nächste Mal ins Weiße Haus einziehen. Ein Gedanke, den man besser ganz schnell wieder verwirft.

Was das Argument betrifft, Progressive sollten ihre Erwartungen eher auf politische Strategien richten – auf den Kampf um Wahlen und die öffentliche Meinung – statt auf die Gerichte: Ja, unbedingt. Und das nicht nur aus Enttäuschung über den heutigen Supreme Court, sondern grundsätzlich – und zu jeder Zeit.

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Editor’s Pick

von TILL STADTBÄUMER

Kennen Sie dieses diffuse Gefühl, dass die Dinge des Alltags immer schlechter werden? Elektroprodukte werden zwar effizienter und sparsamer, haben nun aber einen Touchscreen statt Knöpfe, alles hat eine eigene App, die Geräte kämpfen unaufhörlich um unsere Aufmerksamkeit (denken Sie nur an den Kaffee-Vollautomaten, der ständig um seine Reinigung bittet). Diese Gleichzeitigkeit von Fort- und Rückschritt beschreibt Gabriel Yoran in „Die Verkrempelung der Welt“.  Dabei geht es um mehr als um die Feststellung, dass „früher alles besser“ war. Es geht um die Frage, warum die Dinge des Alltags nicht mehr so gut sind, wie sie sein könnten, was ein „gutes“ Produkt und Nachhaltigkeit eigentlich ausmacht und warum wir kaufen, was wir kaufen. Ein tolles Buch – ganz ohne zugehörige App und krempelfrei.

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Die Woche auf dem Verfassungsblog

zusammengefasst von CHARLOTTE HERBERT

Ein politisiertes Verfassungsgericht und harte Kämpfe um richterliche Neuernennungen. Was wir aus den Vereinigten Staaten schon länger kennen, schien der deutschen Verfassungskultur überwiegend fremd zu sein. Wie schnell und drastisch sich die Dinge ändern können, zeigen die Vorgänge rund um die gescheiterte Wahl dreier Richter*innen an das Bundesverfassungsgericht. Im Fokus steht dabei Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf, eine Professorin für Öffentliches Recht, die bislang nicht den Ruf hatte, politisch besonders weit links zu stehen. Einen geänderten Wikipedia-Eintrag und eine beispiellose Kampagne später sah sich Brosius-Gersdorf zahlreichen Angriffen auf ihre Person und ihr wissenschaftliches Werk ausgesetzt.

Dass diese Angriffe nicht nur zu weit gehen, sondern auch geeignet sind, die demokratische Ordnung zu beschädigen, haben diese Woche bei uns über 300 Rechtswissenschaftler*innen in einer viel beachteten Stellungnahme ausgeführt.

Für „irrlichternd“ hält auch KLAUS FERDINAND GÄRDITZ (DE) den Umgang mit Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf, der als kumuliertes Anschauungsmaterial dafür diene, wie Richterwahlen nicht ablaufen sollten.

Auch VICTOR LOXEN (DE) hat sich mit der Debatte rund um Brosius-Gersdorf beschäftigt und sich dabei die zentrale Rolle der Menschenwürde angeschaut. Dass der Diskurs so entglitten ist, sei mit Blick auf das deutsche Verständnis der Menschenwürde als „Wert“ kein Zufall.

Auf europäischer Ebene wurde in der Rechtssache Ukraine und Niederlande gegen Russland vergangene Woche wohl eines der wichtigsten Urteile in der Geschichte des EGMR gefällt, meint ISABELLA RISINI (EN). Russland wird darin für den Abschuss von Flug MH17 und zahlreiche systematische Menschenrechtsverletzungen in der Ukraine verantwortlich gemacht. Insbesondere die Feststellungen des EGMR zum Verhältnis von humanitärem Völkerrecht und Menschenrechten seien bahnbrechend.

Ein weiteres bahnbrechendes Urteil des EGMR gab es im Bereich des Sportrechts. Im Fall Caster Semenya verurteilte das Gericht die Schweiz wegen Verstößen gegen das Recht auf ein faires Verfahren. Ein deutliches Signal an das schweizerische Bundesgericht und den internationalen Sportschiedsgerichtshof (CAS), meint ANTOINE DUVAL (EN).

Ein weiteres Urteil des EGMR hat TILMAN HOPPE (EN) eingeordnet: Amtsträger*innen, die unerklärlichen Reichtum anhäufen, hätten demnach mit der Einziehung ihres Vermögens zu rechnen – auch ohne konkreten Straftatnachweis.

Nicht nur innerhalb Europas, sondern auch in den europäischen Außenbeziehungen standen diese Woche weitere rechtliche Fragen im Fokus. Beim Treffen der EU-Außenminister*innen Ende Juni blieb eine Einigung über die Zukunft des Assoziierungsabkommens mit Israel (AA EU–Israel) aus. ANŽE MEDIŽEVEC (DE) verweist auf das Westsahara-Urteil des EuGH aus dem Jahr 2024, das die völkerrechtlichen Verpflichtungen der EU betone und damit nahelege, dass das Abkommen mit Israel ausgesetzt werden müsse.

Auch der High Court in London befasste sich mit Israel. Er entschied, dass das Vereinigte Königreich weiterhin Lizenzen für Bauteile des F-35-Kampfjets ausstellen dürfe – auch wenn diese über ein Ersatzteillager nach Israel gelangen könnten. GALINA CORNELISSE (EN) sieht offene Fragen zur Vereinbarkeit britischer Rüstungsexporte mit dem Waffenhandelsvertrag und anderen völkerrechtlichen Verpflichtungen.

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An der Rechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Wien ist eine Universitätsprofessur für Rechtsethik und Rechtsphilosophie zu besetzen. Bewerber*innen sollen über ausgezeichnete akademische Qualifikationen in der Rechtsphilosophie und im Recht der Europäischen Union sowie in den Überschneidungsbereichen dieser beiden Fächer verfügen. Erwünscht sind gleichwertige Ausweise in Rechtsphilosophie und Europarecht und die damit verbundene Befähigung, beide Fächer vollumfänglich in Forschung und Lehre zu vertreten. Nähere Informationen entnehmen Sie bitte der Ausschreibung.
Die Bewerbungsfrist läuft bis 17. September 2025.

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Problematische verfassungsrechtliche Entwicklungen lassen sich derzeit in Kolumbien beobachten: Mitte Juni setzte Präsident Petro per Dekret eine nationale Volksbefragung zu sozialen Reformen an – nachdem der Senat diese abgelehnt hatte. VICENTE F. BENÍTEZ-R. und FABIO ENRIQUE PULIDO ORTIZ (EN) sehen darin eine Wende hin zu einem zunehmend schmittianischen Machtverständnis.

Einen tiefgreifenden Umbruch erlebe aktuell auch die Türkei. Getragen werde er jedoch von alten Männern, meint DORUK ERHAN (EN). Er warnt: Diejenigen, die tatsächlich für einen Generationenwechsel stünden, würden weiter zum Schweigen gebracht.

Wie lernfähig autoritäre Regierungen sein können, zeigt PETER ČUROŠ (EN) am Beispiel der Slowakei: Dort könnte ausgerechnet die juristisch fundierte Kritik von NGOs an einem Gesetzesentwurf zur Registrierung ausländischer Agenten (Foreign Agents Registration Bill) dessen Chancen vor Gericht unbeabsichtigt erhöhen – und seine Umsetzung damit sogar begünstigen.

Ende Juni erklärte der spanische Verfassungsgerichtshof das katalanische Amnestiegesetz für verfassungsgemäß. JOSEP M. TIRAPU-SANUY (EN) analysiert die Entscheidung und sieht darin weniger ein Prinzipienurteil als eine pragmatische Lösung.

In Dänemark erging Mitte Juni ein wegweisendes Urteil des Obersten Gerichtshofs zum Grundsatz der Nichtbestrafung von Geflüchteten, der in Artikel 31 der Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention verankert ist. ASTA S. STAGE JARLNER und SARAH SCOTT FORD (EN) begrüßen zwar das Ende einer langjährigen rechtswidrigen Praxis, kritisieren aber die unzureichende Aufklärung Betroffener über ihre Rechte.

Im digitalen Raum hat die Europäische Kommission vergangene Woche die finale Version ihres Verhaltenskodex für KI für allgemeine Zwecke (GPAI) veröffentlicht. GUSTAVO GIL GASIOLA (EN) analysiert, ob das der richtige Weg zu einer effektiven Regulierung von solchen KI-Modellen ist.

Auch im Bereich KI und Urheberrecht ist viel in Bewegung. Der EuGH erhielt Ende Mai seine erste Vorlage zu Chatbots und Urheberrecht. PHILIPP HACKER (DE) untersucht den Fall, skizziert mögliche Antworten und meint: Der Fall könne die Zukunft der KI-Entwicklung maßgeblich verändern.

Wenig überzeugt zeigen sich JAN-OLE HARFST, TOBIAS MAST und WOLFGANG SCHULZ (EN) mit Blick auf die Durchsetzung des Digital Services Act. Die jüngsten EU-US-Handelsgespräche ließen befürchten, dass die Kommission zentrale Durchsetzungsaufgaben vernachlässige. Ihre Forderung: Die Rolle der Kommission bei der Durchsetzung zu überdenken.

Wie weit die Kontrolle von Unternehmen über kritische Infrastrukturen gehen dürfe, fragt ALINA UTRATA (EN). Sie meint: Die Abhängigkeit von Starlink und Cloud-Anbietern lege die politische Macht von Konzernen offen – diese seien daher wie Staaten als politische Akteure zu behandeln.

Wir haben diese Woche außerdem das Symposium „Human Rights Protection in the Climate Emergency: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion No. 32“ (EN) fortgesetzt:

DAVID R. BOYD (EN), ehemaliger UN-Sonderberichterstatter, beleuchtet das Recht auf eine saubere Umwelt. MARKUS GEHRING (EN) hält insbesondere die Aussagen des Gerichts zu Jus Cogens für wegweisend. MARIA ANTONIA TIGRE, DINA LUPIN und NATALIA URZOLA GUTIÉRREZ (EN) betonen den besonderen Fokus des Gutachtens auf geschlechtsspezifische Aspekte der Klimakrise.

Schließlich ging unser Symposium zu Animal Rights: The Role of the EU Charter (EN) mit einem Text von ESTER HERLIN-KARNELL (EN) zu Ende. Sie sieht Reformbedarf bei den stark variierenden Tierarztkosten in Europa – im Sinne von Grundrechten und Nachhaltigkeit.

So endet auch diese Woche. Nach dem Wochenende soll es sich in Deutschland etwas abkühlen. Das können wir gut gebrauchen, nicht nur mit Blick auf das Wetter.

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Das war’s für diese Woche.

Ihnen alles Gute!

Ihr

Verfassungsblog-Team

 

Wenn Sie das wöchentliche Editorial als E-Mail zugesandt bekommen wollen, können Sie es hier bestellen.

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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (IACtHR) advisory opinion on human rights and the climate emergency (AO-32/25) addresses numerous dimensions of the climate crisis, setting an important precedent for the protection of our planet. This post focuses on one particularly significant development: the IACtHR’s recognition of Nature as a subject of rights. We argue that the IACtHR’s pronouncements on this subject mark the advent of an ecocentric paradigm whose implications are likely to be far-reaching and transformative. 

Sowing the Seeds of the Rights of Nature

The recognition of Nature as a subject of rights is a development with deep roots in the Inter-American system. Indeed, the seed was first sown in its cases centered on Indigenous communities, where the IACtHR recognized their special relationship to the land, which is “not merely a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual element which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations” (Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, para. 149). 

These initial decisions by the IACtHR concretized important elements of the right to a healthy environment (R2HE) in the Inter-American system (Jiménez Guanipa & Barraco, pp. 245-248). They also introduced a more expansive understanding of humanity’s relationship with Nature: a relationship that cannot be boiled down to mere material extraction but instead has spiritual and intergenerational implications. 

Building on this foundation, the R2HE was first recognized in the IACtHR’s 23rd advisory opinion (AO-23/17) under Article 26 of the American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR) (paras. 56-57). There, the Court emphasised that the R2HE is an autonomous right, comprising two dimensions: (i) an individual dimension – “insofar as its violation may have a direct and an indirect impact on the individual owing to its connectivity to other rights” – and (ii) a collective dimension that understands the right as a “universal value that is owed to both present and future generations” (AO-23/17, para. 59). The Court further specified that, as an autonomous right that is a “fundamental right for the existence of humankind,” the R2HE protects “the components of the environment, such as forests, rivers and seas and others, as legal interests in themselves, even in the absence of certainty or evidence of risk to individuals” (AO-23/17, paras. 59, 62).

With the foregoing, the IACtHR took an important step in incorporating an ecocentric paradigm into the Inter-American system: the inclusion of a right whose protective scope extends to include more than human life and “protects nature and the environment, not only because of the benefits they provide to humanity or the effects that their degradation may have on other human rights […] but because of their importance to the other living organisms with which we share the planet that also merit protection in their own right” (AO-23/17, para. 62). At the time, however, the IACtHR did not explicitly recognize Nature as a subject of rights and merely noted the “tendency” to recognize its legal personality (ibid). 

 In the case of La Oroya population v. Peru, however, the IACtHR directly referred to ecocentrism when discussing the sub-rights to air and water free from pollution as substantive elements of the R2HE (paras. 119-125). More concretely, the Court differentiated the right to water as an autonomous right protected by Article 26 ACHR (Indigenous Communities of the Lhaka Honhat Association (Our Land) v. Argentina, para. 222) from the right to water as a substantive aspect of the R2HE. While the former adopts an anthropocentric vision that “protects [human] access to, use and enjoyment of water,” the latter is markedly “eco-centric” given that it “protects bodies of water as elements of the environment that have a value in themselves, as a universal resource, and because of their importance for other living organisms, including human beings” (La Oroya population v. Peru, para. 124).

In AO-32/25, the Court built upon this foundation and contextualized its reasoning in the inescapable reality of the climate emergency: recognizing ecosystemic stability as a baseline condition for planetary habitability (Chapter V & paras. 311-312). 

An Ecocentric Change in Denomination

A small, though notable, change made by the Court in AO-32/25 may be lost in translation to English speakers: The Court makes it a point to transition from ‘el derecho a un medio ambiente sano’, the term previously used by the Court and other sources of international law, to ‘el derecho a un ambiente sano’(AO-32/25, para. 271). While in English the denomination effectively stays the same – ‘the right to a healthy environment’ –, the conscious decision to omit the term ‘medio,’ which can be translated as a ‘means’ or even ‘tool,’ has profound implications for our understanding of this right. 

According to the IACtHR, the change has “the purpose of more accurately reflecting the conjunction of the individual and collective dimensions of the right” (AO-32/25, para. 271, Authors’ translation). In our estimation, the change also signals an important transition in the IACtHR’s understanding of the right’s essential nucleus: the environment is not a means (‘un medio’) for the fulfillment of human aims, but is an end in and of itself worthy of distinct and autonomous protection; an ecocentric core for the right which expands the Convention’s protective scope to include Nature itself.

The Bloom of Nature as a Subject of Rights

In AO-32/25, the seeds sown in prior case law finally bore fruit through the explicit recognition of Nature as a subject of rights. As the IACtHR has rightly acknowledged, the recognition of Nature as a subject of rights is not foreign to the Inter-American corpus juris, but “represents a contemporary manifestation of the principle of interdependence between human rights and the environment” (para. 282, Authors’ translation). 

Stressing the interdependency and complexity of the natural environment and its components as a carefully balanced ecological equilibrium, the IACtHR warns that harm to any of these components can cause negative cascading effects for all life (para. 279). On this basis, it asserts that “[r]ecognition of the rights of Nature to maintain its essential ecological processes contributes to the consolidation of a truly sustainable developmental model which respects planetary limits and guarantees the availability of vital resources for present and future generations” (para. 279, Authors’ translation). Further, the Court emphasises that “[r]ecognizing Nature as a subject of rights also implies foregrounding its structural role in the vital equilibrium of the conditions that make the habitability of the planet” (para. 280, Authors’ translation). 

This is the first time that an international court has explicitly recognized Nature as a subject of rights, marking a paradigm shift essential for the long-term integrity and functionality of ecosystems by bringing domestic developments to the international sphere and adding an additional layer of scrutiny to State conduct.

More than Words on a Page

The IACtHR went beyond rhetoric in protecting Nature as a subject of rights, indicating that States must “not only abstain from acting in a manner that causes significant environmental harm, but also have the positive obligation to adopt measures to guarantee the protection, restoration and regeneration of ecosystems” – measures that must be “compatible with the best available science and recognize the value of traditional, local and indigenous knowledge” and be guided by the principle of non-regression (para. 283, Authors’ translation). This interpretation is grounded in the general obligation to adapt domestic legal systems to international obligations (Art. 2 ACHR & Protocol), the principle of progressivity (Art. 26 ACHR & Art. 2 Protocol), the pro persona principle (Art. 29 ACHR), and the development of “structural principles” in international environmental law “oriented to preserving the integrity of ecosystems in the face of present and future threats” (paras. 281-282, Authors’ translation). 

The IACtHR made several bold pronouncements which, especially when read in light of the general obligation to adapt the domestic legal system (paras. 244-246), suggest that States should progressively incorporate Nature’s legal personality into their domestic systems. Indeed, the Court highlighted that in the context of the climate emergency, the effective defence of the R2HE requires progress towards a truly sustainable model, which can effectively be achieved through the recognition of Nature as a subject of rights (para. 316). To this end, the IACtHR refers to the extensive recognition of such status in national, regional, and international jurisprudence (paras. 284-286 see also UN Harmony with Nature), “which go beyond the traditional anthropocentric approach and recognise Nature and its components–including the climate system–as holders of autonomous legal protection” (para. 316, Authors’ translation).

In this sense, the IACtHR seems to be urging States to move towards incorporating “the protection of Nature, as a collective subject of public interest” into their domestic legal frameworks to advance a global regulatory system oriented toward sustainable development, consistent with the pro natura and pro persona principles (para. 281, Authors’ translation). This idea is reinforced when read in conjunction with the Court’s call to adopt procedural mechanisms that allow for collective, public, or popular standing requirements (para. 549). In doing so, the IACtHR operationalizes the collective dimension of the R2HE and the rights of Nature to make them justiciable before national courts – trees may indeed have standing in light of these developments. Additionally, as part of the IACtHR’s innovative approach to environmental democracy, it calls upon States to “promote mechanisms to integrate the interests of Nature and future generations into their climate action” (para. 469, Authors’ translation). 

The IACtHR’s indications on this front provide communities and areas impacted by the disastrous effects of climate change with the tools to base their arguments in domestic climate litigation on the damage suffered by the ecosystem itself (paras. 546-551, Calderón Gamboa, pp. 22-30). The rights of Nature thus appear to be an essential piece of the integrated and urgent response necessary to address the complex and multifaceted challenge posed by the triple planetary crisis the IACtHR had previously called for in its judgment concerning the U’wa Indigenous People (para. 304).  

Notably, the IACtHR did not undertake a detailed exploration of the specific rights held by Nature and limited itself to recognizing Nature’s legal personality. That said, IACtHR does include scattered references to Nature’s rights throughout its reasoning: for instance, the Court spoke of the “right of Nature to maintain its essential ecological processes” (para. 279) and forward an expansive understanding of the right to a healthy climate which “projects its effectiveness not only on current and future generations of human beings, but also on Nature, as the physical and biological basis of life” (para. 315). Though Nature’s legal personality could also be considered to fall under the protective scope of the R2HE, how exactly the rights of Nature relate to the R2HE is not entirely clear from the opinion and will, thus, likely form part of further deliberations. As David R. Boyd phrased it, the IACtHR’s conception of the rights of Nature is “implicit in, or linked to” the R2HE (see here). 

To deepen the IACtHR’s understanding of the rights of Nature, domestic practice will continue to be relevant. Indeed, in line with Calderón Gamboa, we would argue that Nature has at least the following rights: a right of respect to its existence; a right to maintain and regenerate its essential ecological processes; and procedural rights such as access to justice and eco-reparations (Calderón Gamboa, pp. 24-30).

In recognizing Nature as a subject of rights, the IACtHR takes a bold step in advancing climate protection. By integrating the rights of Nature paradigm, the Court calls on States to adopt a more holistic approach to climate policy, legislation, and action that duly reflects the “complex and interdependent” character of ecosystems, in which each component “plays an essential role in the stability and continuity of the whole” (para. 279, see also Vernaza & Cutié). 

The Split Vote

Though this recognition of Nature as a subject of rights is the product of a split vote (4-3), with Judges Hernández, Pérez Goldberg, and Sierra Porto dissenting, it is likely to inform the IACtHR’s jurisprudence for years to come. The IACtHR’s strong respect for the principle of non-regression and the progressive interpretation of the ACHR mandated by Article 29 make a reversal on this topic unlikely. 

Looking back on the Court’s prior case law, Lagos del Campo v. Peru stands out as another momentous but contentious moment for the Inter-American system: with the direct justiciability of Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights (ESCER) under Article 26 of the ACHR likewise causing a split vote (5-2) and setting off a wave of discussions in concurring and dissenting opinions. Despite the lack of unanimity, the IACtHR’s approach in that case has only been built upon and is, indeed, the foundation for the R2HE and the primary pathway for the direct justiciability of ESCER in the Inter-American system. The pending opinions of the judges announced in AO-32/25 (res. 20) are, however, sure to give important tools for discussion regarding future jurisprudence on Nature as a subject of rights.

Conclusion: The Dawn of a New Era

The IACtHR’s advisory opinion on the climate emergency has, once again, placed it at the vanguard of human rights protection. Advancing a profoundly climate justice-centred interpretation of international law, the IACtHR’s recognition of Nature as a subject of rights marks a sharp break with inherited legal understandings that have brought humanity to the brink of  ecological disaster.  In doing so, the IACtHR has managed to strike a delicate balance: one that recognizes the rights of Nature as complementary to human rights and integrates an expansive approach to the protection of life on earth into the Inter-American human rights framework, thus facilitating sustainable coexistence (Constitutional Court of Ecuador No. 1149-19-JP/21, para. 242).

Recognizing the rights of Nature asks humanity to reevaluate the relationship it maintains with its environment. Affirming that humans are an integral part of the natural world and its interconnected systems, the IACtHR embraces an Earth-centred approach (Gamboa & Nogueira), which maintains that we are not above the world that surrounds us; we are a part of it. 

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