🍻 Selber Bier Brauen

The unexpected happened: the hybrid regime in Hungary was swept away by elections that produced a constitution-making majority for a barely two-year-old opposition party. The magnitude of the win creates the impression of a constitutional moment. The new governing party will have 141 of 199 seats in Parliament, well above the 133 seats representing the two-thirds majority necessary for changing the Fundamental Law, and 6 more than the record of Fidesz held in this electoral system. Never since the fall of communism has participation been this high (nearly 80%, compared to the previous record of 72%), never in the democratic history of the country has any party received this many votes (3.3 million out of 7.6 million eligible voters) and never was the participation of young voters as high as this year. This was against a regime that had almost infinite resources and used its own Fundamental Law of 2011 as an instrument of everyday party politics.

Nevertheless, the impression of a constitutional moment is misleading. Certainly, the constitutional order must be repaired. Unnecessary obstacles to democratic decision-making must be eliminated, the independence of courts and important control institutions must be restored, unjustifiable limitations on fundamental rights must be lifted and the ideological contents of the Fundamental Law must be cut back. Yet it would be a mistake to unilaterally enact a new constitution, just like Fidesz did after its landslide victory over a collapsing socialist-liberal coalition in 2010. Even in the face of the catharsis of 12 April 2026 and the unprecedented authorisation for the new governing party, adopting a new constitution without a thorough and inclusive process would easily make that constitution a target for the parties of the opposition. This could seriously undermine its durability.

Hence a two-step approach seems appropriate: first, a quick constitutional repair needs to fix those elements of the Fundamental Law that are in breach of the common European values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In a second step, the momentum of the 2026 parliamentary elections could be used to start a bona fide inclusive constitution-making process allowing for sufficient discussion on the issues of a new constitution. What exactly this inclusive constitution-making process should look like remains to be decided; the Irish example certainly looks promising. Yet one thing is beyond doubt: whereas referenda on specific subject matters after thorough consultations are an appealing idea, putting the whole text of a new constitution to referendum would pose a disproportionately high risk. Even the best constitutional text could go down simply because in the age of social media the outcome of referenda does not depend on content if the subject matter is as complex as a constitution.

Needs and limits

The burning question is therefore what could be and what should be included in a quick constitutional repair. At first glance, the answer to the first question seems easy: legally speaking, anything could be changed as the constituent power is legally unlimited, at least domestically. Exactly this seemingly unlimited nature of the constituent power triggered the quest for binding standards and effective mechanisms at the European level when Hungarian constitutionalism seemed to be leaving the mainstream path. Indeed, there are limits on a constitution-making majority. Some of these limits are soft, that is, their crossing does not result in formal illegality, yet they are powerful arguments. They include the common heritage of constitutional democracies (“we do not do this”) and the need to avoid bad precedents for the future (“think how the next would-be autocrat could use this”). Yet there are hard legal limits as well: Article 19 (1) TEU and – as we know since last Tuesday – the values in Article 2 TEU may render certain constitutional contents illegal under EU law. A constitutional repair in a member state of the European Union has to respect these boundaries, if only for practical reasons that follow from the various conditionality mechanisms.

As regards the question of what should change, the Fundamental Law contains numerous provisions of concern, the vast majority of which have become part of the Fundamental Law through various amendments. Furthermore, however, in many cases the obstacle to the democratic functioning of the state is not the specific legislation but the actions of officials appointed on the basis of loyalty. In many cases, therefore, the problem lies not with the institutions or their powers, but with the specific manner in which those powers are exercised.

The amendments required to rectify the problematic provisions of the Fundamental Law can essentially be divided into three main groups: the first group comprises those amendments which enable the new democratic majority to exercise public power effectively and efficiently, whilst at the same time restoring the rule-of-law functioning of independent institutions. This group includes, for example, the issue of cardinal laws and the restoration of the independence of constitutional adjudication and of the judiciary. The second group comprises those amendments which remove restrictions on fundamental rights that are not accepted in European constitutional democracies, such as the possibility of suspending citizenship under Article G(3) of the Fundamental Law, the definition of family in Article L of the Fundamental Law or the rule set out in Article XVI(1) of the Fundamental Law, which places the very broadly defined rights of children above all other fundamental rights (ad absurdum, even the prohibition of torture). The third group consists of constitutional provisions of an ideological nature but with normative effect, such as the preamble referred to as the national avowal of faith and the elevation of this to a standard of interpretation in Article R(3).

The task is thus to find solutions that respond to the needs of constitutional repair. Those solutions shall respect well-established traditions of constitutional democracies, do not create dangerous precedents, and be in conformity with common European standards.

All this has to be done in the context of dismantling a hybrid regime. We are certainly not talking about an ordinary constitutional amendment process, nor can we assume that the precedents of dismantling fully-fledged dictatorships are automatically relevant. This requires modifying the traditional theory of transitional justice.

Here are some of the most important institutional issues that might require consideration also on the basis of the above-described limits.

The stability of the constitution: the electoral system

The Fundamental Law can be amended with a two-thirds majority in the unicameral Parliament. In parallel, the current electoral system has thus far always yielded a two-thirds majority for the winner (2014, 2018 and 2022 for Fidesz, 2026 for the opposition). The Fundamental Law thus never truly functioned as a paramount law. This combination allowed for fifteen amendments in fifteen years. The restoration of constitutional democracy means restoring the stability of the constitution.

One way to go about this is to make constitutional amendments more difficult. Yet in the above described two steps approach for a new constitution-making, such hardening of the current Fundamental Law does not seem useful.

What can and must be changed swiftly is the electoral system. Naturally, a comprehensive electoral reform goes beyond the scope of a constitutional repair, even if the reform were to consist of the introduction of a proportional electoral system. Yet a quick fix can and shall include the abolition of winner compensation, without which there would not have been a two-thirds majority in 2014, 2018 and 2022. This amendment can be implemented at the statutory level. At the same time, it is necessary to enshrine in the Fundamental Law clear guarantees against such grave violations of the equality of the vote.

Besides, party financing and the use of public money for campaign purposes must be revisited. In view of the abuse of public funds for campaigning a constitutional guarantee is needed to outlaw the use of budgetary resources for party-political messages.

Radically narrowing the scope of cardinal laws

A closely related question is the issue of cardinal laws. Restoring the democratic functioning of the state requires, above all, addressing this issue.

Although the term ‘cardinal laws’ is archaic, and there are similar instruments in other democratic countries, the legal institution itself is a specific product of the collapse of socialism: originally termed ‘constitutional laws’ and requiring a two-thirds majority for adoption, these acts functioned during the transitional period as quasi-supplements to the Constitution, ensuring that rules which were not formally part of the Constitution nevertheless possessed constitutional status. At the same time, rules adopted by a qualified majority restrict the democratic majority of the day from exercising public power in accordance with its democratic mandate.

Currently, the Fundamental Law prescribes cardinal-law regulation in 38 areas, and on this basis, some laws are in total classified as cardinal, whilst an even greater number of laws are classified partly as cardinal. The extent of fundamental legislation is illustrated by the fact that the list of fundamental laws enacted since the adoption of the Fundamental Law runs to 69 pages in the document available on the National Assembly’s website.

Therefore, as part of a constitutional repair, the scope of matters falling under cardinal legislation must first and foremost be radically reduced: only those subject matters that are absolutely essential for the functioning of constitutional democracy shall be subject to this higher majority. The laws on the electoral system, the municipalities, the Constitutional Court, and the organisation of the judiciary could be examples for this.

Restoring the effective and independent functioning of the Constitutional Court

The restoration of the effective and independent functioning of constitutional adjudication is necessary both to ensure the constitutional functioning of all legislative power and to prevent the Constitutional Court from unjustifiably blocking legislation for party-political reasons.

With regard to the Constitutional Court, the problem lies mostly not with the rules governing its jurisdiction and procedures but with the fact that currently 11 of the 15 judges were appointed only by the government majority, without the consent of the opposition, and at the same time the age limit of 70 for constitutional judges was abolished for political and personal reasons.

A comprehensive reform would certainly be more effective, whereby the Fundamental Law would set the number of Constitutional Court judges at 11, would provide for the termination of the mandates of all incumbent constitutional judges after a certain transitional period and, at the same time, would lay down electoral rules for the election of constitutional judges that would require a consensus between the governing parties, which hold a two-thirds majority, and the opposition. There is the possibility, however, that such a regulation would be used by the new opposition (Fidesz) to obstruct the election of justices.

As part of a constitutional repair, therefore, the reintroduction of the 70-year age limit for constitutional judges could be a solution, at the level of the Fundamental Law, with effect extending to judges currently in office. As a result of this measure, out of the 15 judges 4 new judges would be elected by the new government, whereas 7 judges who had been appointed by Fidesz would remain on the Court, together with further 4 judges who had been appointed by Fidesz with the consent of the opposition. Such an amendment could not be interpreted as court packing or takeover and would not necessarily be regarded as a disproportionate restriction on judicial independence, given that this age limit is typically applied in Western European constitutional courts. The previous, politically motivated ad hominem abolition of the age limit would also justify its application to sitting judges.

Naturally, common European standards on judicial independence both under the ECHR (as articulated by the ECtHR and the Venice Commission) and EU law protect judges against early dismissal. Whilst this guarantee is not wholly absolute, there can only be exceptions to that principle if they are warranted by legitimate and compelling grounds, subject to the principle of proportionality. Arguably, creating a truly independent Constitutional Court is such a legitimate and compelling reason, and the circumstances and guarantees surrounding the reform in both cases could ensure respect for the principle of proportionality. All the more so, as the reform should also include repealing Article 37(4) and (5) of the Fundamental Law, which excludes the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction in budgetary and tax matters.

Restoring the independence of the judiciary

Although the situation in Hungary cannot be compared to Poland, the independence of the ordinary judiciary has been a point of concern. Most importantly, consecutive rule of law reports (see 2021, 2022, 2023) have criticised the rules that made possible the election of the president of the Kúria (the Supreme Court of Hungary). Milestone 214 (which is a super milestone) of the RRF Plan of Hungary required changing these rules. In fact, two consecutive amendments of laws were necessary to make the current president eligible, and even the National Judicial Council voted with an overwhelming majority against his election.

Naturally, the protection against early dismissal under the common European standards is strong. Still, it must be examined whether new constitutional rules could allow for the removal of the sitting president of the Kúria because his election was made possible by ad hominem legislation and against the vote of the National Judicial Council. Arguably, this solution is not in violation of common European standards, especially if formal guarantees were to be included in the Fundamental Law that require the consent of the National Judicial Council for the election of the president of the Kúria.

Further quick judicial reforms should include reducing the excessive competences of the president of the National Judicial Office and extending the rights of self-governance of the judges. These administrative changes could be carried out without significant limits imposed by European standards, as long as they increase rather than reduce judicial independence.

Media

Restoring press freedom and the independence of public media is essential for the functioning of a democracy based on the rule of law. This is all the more necessary as there is currently an infringement procedure underway against Hungary based on the European Media Freedom Act and the Audiovisual Media Services Directive.

A solution is needed that, as far as possible, excludes bias over the long term, whilst also enabling the elimination of the current bias. The long-term interest is therefore the imperative of broad consensus, whilst the short-term interest is effective decision-making. A complete overhaul of the public service media and national media regulatory authorities seems inevitable, but the new regulations must ensure pluralism in both content and the composition of the various supervisory bodies. How this can be done in a polarised country like Hungary is one of the major challenges.

Accountability and the Public Prosecutor’s Office

One of the central demands of the electorate is accountability for the corruption-related crimes of the past 16 years. This is a matter of effective criminal prosecution and not of constitutional repair per se. Yet effective prosecution requires effective prosecutorial services. That Hungary will join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office is a given. Renewing the Public Prosecutor’s Office may also be necessary. A comprehensive reform is certainly beyond the limits of a quick constitutional repair. What could be done is to transfer the right to nominate the Prosecutor General by constitutional amendment from the President of the Republic to the Minister of Justice, thereby reflecting the executive branch’s responsibility for law enforcement.

Rationalisation of constitutional reservations regarding EU law

When Article E) of the Fundamental Law was worded, it essentially reproduced the text of Section 2/A of the previous Constitution almost word for word. This text also contained reservations regarding the primacy of EU law based on the practices of other EU member states – essentially the human rights reservation and the ultra vires reservation known from the case law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. These reservations could be addressed through interpretation without jeopardising our EU membership. The seventh amendment to the Fundamental Law, however, expanded the reservations to include provisions, some of which, if taken seriously, could call into question the fulfilment of our membership obligations. Their deletion is justified.

Safeguards for restrictions on fundamental rights

Article 52(2) of the Fundamental Law currently allows for the complete suspension of virtually all fundamental rights under a special legal order. It is therefore necessary to stipulate, following the model of Article 15(1) of the ECHR, that derogations are permitted only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.

Building the common European standards of constitutional repair

The above list is far from exclusive, nor are the analyses of the issues complete. In the coming weeks many contributions in this symposium will expand on them from various perspectives. Whatever the outcome, not only the rules of the Hungarian Fundamental Law will change. The body of common European standards of constitutional repair will also evolve just as the standards applicable to constitutional crises have evolved. Ultimately, Hungary can contribute to the evolution of European law, now from a more positive angle.

The post Constitutional Repair! appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

On the anniversary of Germany’s unconditional surrender, the Bundesrat today held its first reading of a bill that would criminalise certain statements about Israel under a newly created offence. The initiative, introduced by the Hessian state government, proposes a criminal prohibition of the “denial of Israel’s right to exist”. Under the proposal, anyone who “publicly or in an assembly denies the right of the State of Israel to exist or calls for the elimination of the State of Israel in a manner capable of encouraging antisemitic acts of violence or arbitrary measures” would be liable to prosecution.

This is not the first attempt to establish such an offence – an effort apparently first set in motion by the pro-Zionist Tikvah Institute. Two years ago, a similar proposal, also put forward by Hesse, failed largely because of resistance from legal scholars and practitioners well beyond any suspicion of ideological bias. More recently, the French Loi Yadan met the same fate; it was constructed along strikingly similar lines, though at least framed, like the Tikvah Institute’s proposal, in formally abstract terms (“provocation à la destruction ou à la négation d’un État”).

The Hessian state government is evidently dissatisfied with what is already a far from restrained approach by German courts and prosecutors. In its view, pro-Palestinian activists, outspoken critics of Germany’s complicity in the escalation of violence in Palestine and Lebanon, the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) movement, and even anti-Zionist Jewish groups are still not being prevented firmly enough from assembling, nor punished harshly or consistently enough – whether for the use of symbols of unconstitutional organisations, approval of criminal offences, incitement of the people (Volksverhetzung), or whatever provision comes in handy. Hence the fix: abstract suitability to encourage readiness. Violence. Arbitrary measures. Right to exist. Elimination. Fine-grained doctrinal questions of legal certainty, the state of emergency/emergency powers, and geopolitics compressed into a single relative clause of the Criminal Code – whatever helps, the broader the punishment, the better. Following the Bundestag’s BDS resolution, the planned criminalisation constitutes another political enemy line drawn to outlaw a movement rooted in human rights advocacy. It belongs to a longer history of such declarations, stretching from the boycott protests organised by student groups, including Jewish ones, against the sentimental rehabilitation of Nazi star Veit Harlan (paving the way for the famous Lüth case of 1958!) to the “soldiers are murderers” controversy of the 1980s and 1990s: enemy lines which, until now, have invariably failed when confronted with the constitutional protection of freedom of expression.

The bill’s explanatory memorandum is itself a record of the constitutional, political, and moral dead end into which the German discourse on Israel has manoeuvred itself. The proposal is unconstitutional (see Kai Ambos). To reach any other conclusion would require a fairly advanced expertise in the legal methodology of authoritarian legalism – particularly when it comes to the principle of legal certainty. The memorandum cites the slogan “From the River to the Sea, Palestine will be free” as an example of denying Israel’s right to exist, despite the slogan’s well-known and highly contested history and ambiguity. What else? Would describing Israel as a settler-colonial state fall under the offence? Advocating a right of return for Palestinian refugees? Then there is the more or less openly unequal treatment based on ethnic or religious considerations (Article 3(3) of the Basic Law). Jewish offenders, Orthodox as well as secular anti-Zionists, are to remain exempt from punishment where they “articulate conceptions of the welfare of the Jewish people aimed at overcoming Jewish statehood”. In other words: they risk punishment, if at all, only once their concern extends to the welfare of the Palestinian people. The Hessian State Chancellery, for its part, certifies that intra-Jewish anti-Zionism does not represent a “plausible” position, while at the same time concluding that it nevertheless “fails to display the required specific connection presupposed by the criminal provision between negating the State of Israel’s right to exist and its suitability for promoting antisemitic acts of violence or arbitrariness” – although, and here comes the logic of criminal offences punishing mere risks, “such pronouncements may ultimately be invoked by third parties to underpin an attitude directed toward the destruction of the State of Israel” (all on p. 10). The clause appears designed chiefly to ensure that the criminal liability of those third parties remains guaranteed.

The very term “denial” further suggests an analogy to Holocaust denial under Section 130 (3) of the Criminal Code (StGB). Legally speaking, however, the question whether Israel possesses “a right to exist” is not a question of fact but of opinion. More than that: it is not even the denial of an existing legal entitlement, since international law recognises no autonomous “right to exist” detached from sovereignty and territorial integrity.

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The drafters do not deny that the proposed offence is directed at discriminating against a specific viewpoint. Nor do they bother to construct supposedly neutral legal interests to be – in accordance with standing precedent – “protected absolutely, irrespective of any particular opinion”. Instead, they seek to take advantage of the “exception” the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) carved out in its 2009 Wunsiedel decision for criminal restrictions on speech associated with National Socialism. This, however, is precisely what the Court had itself sought to foreclose. In Wunsiedel itself (para. 66), it insisted that the case concerned a “unique constellation touching upon the history-shaped identity of the Federal Republic of Germany” and was therefore “not transferable to other conflicts”. Yet, as the jurisprudence of the Court’s other Senate on European integration has demonstrated often enough, constitutional standards grounded in identitarian rather than legal reasoning have a tendency to emancipate themselves from their original limits. This becomes particularly clear in the memorandum’s central legal argument: “The statement that ‘Israel’s security is part of Germany’s reason of state’ rests not merely on a political commitment, but on constitutional substance.” Here, reason of state and constitutional identity function as virtually interchangeable concepts – one directed outward, the other inward – and whoever succeeds in invoking either wins.

What this inglorious race for constitutional-identitarian rewards looks like is documented in the bill’s memorandum. Denying Israel’s right to exist is to be equated with glorifying National Socialism. The argument only works under the Wunsiedel exception if the two are treated as historically and politically equivalent. Yet, historically speaking, mind you, things look rather different, even for Zionists: Zionism, as is well known, grounds the claim to Jewish statehood in Jewish identity itself; it does not conceive of that statehood as compensation for the Shoah. Yet, the memorandum postulates an “indissoluble historical and political nexus” between the State of Israel and the extermination of Europe’s Jews by Nazi Germany. The “negation of Israel’s legitimacy”, it claims, signifies, “in the typical [phänotypische] standard case,” at the same time a rejection of the Federal Republic’s “responsibility […] for the protection of Jewish persons”. In plain terms: the State of Israel is in fact a German institution, serving as the external projection of the successful postwar moral rehabilitation of the country of the murderers, while the Basic Law provides its internal constitutional counterpart. This lesson is addressed above all to those parts of German society shaped by migration, often from the Middle East. If they tell different stories about the history and dynamics of violence since the Nakba than those told by the Foreign Office, then constitutional identity must be punished into them through criminal law as unambiguously as possible, until they too can finally adopt, with suitably liberated conviction, the perspective of (West) German memory politics.

For day-to-day criminal law practice, the bill offers little, as even the Hessian Minister of Justice admits: “The number of cases in this specific area […] is not so high that it would result in any noticeable additional workload.” More important, presumably, the bill offers a new way to ban pro-Palestinian demonstrations that is more likely to stand in court. Above all, however – and the Minister of Justice says this explicitly – the bill is intended as a “landmark decision” by the legislature about Germany’s political stance on the issue.

Symbolic politics, then? The drafters invoke Germany’s responsibility to protect Jewish life in bold moral terms. Yet, the legislation they propose plainly denies that very responsibility. The political logic of viewpoint discrimination is inescapable, whatever the intentions. Discriminatory speech laws exclude directly those against whom they are directed, just as they indirectly exclude those in whose name they claim to speak. In Wunsiedel, the Federal Constitutional Court justified the exclusion of neo-Nazism from democratic public life at a moment when that exclusion still broadly corresponded to political and social consensus in Germany. And the relevant provision – Section 130 StGB – was designed to protect public peace, not a particular group. And today? At a time when German politics itself is drifting toward authoritarian and potentially fascist majorities, the proposed offence ties the protection of Jewish people – symbolically, but also very concretely – to the existence of a state that currently presents displacement, discrimination, genocide and aggression as conditions of its own existence. Put differently, the law would force Jewish communities in Germany to define their identity through that other state. The parliamentary debate may at least provide an opportunity to confront those implications of the proposal.

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Editor’s Pick

by JASPER NEBEL

Quelle: Apple TV

Do you know the feeling? Your trusted AI gives an obviously wrong answer – and when you flag the error, it responds in that very AI-specific blend of friendly, submissive and naive. That style regularly drives me mad. Which means I would be quite out of place in the world Vince Gilligan has created in the series “Pluribus”. This world is struck by a virus that soon infects (almost) all of humanity. The virus fuses everyone’s thoughts into a kind of collective super-consciousness. Everyone knows everything, everyone can do everything. The “I” ceases to exist – only a “we” remains. Except, of course, for the protagonist Carol Sturka – and eleven other people worldwide. The parallels with an artificial general intelligence are obvious – as are those with today’s AI: the “we” operates so efficiently and “perfectly” that it can neither lie nor be unkind.

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The Week on Verfassungsblog

summarised by EVA MARIA BREDLER

In this week’s editorial, Florian Meinel laid bare the political logic behind a Hessian draft law: it would criminalise the denial of Israel’s right to exist – and thereby wedge the so-called political Staatsräson into Germany’s constitutional identity. KAI AMBOS (GER) explains in detail why he considers this unconstitutional.

But even without the Hessian addition to § 130 of the German Criminal Code, courts and authorities have been restricting freedom of assembly when it comes to the Gaza war. Most recently, a pro-Palestinian group caused a stir when it wanted to hold a vigil for the victims of the Gaza war on the grounds of what is now the Buchenwald memorial site on the anniversary of Buchenwald’s liberation. The city of Weimar relocated the assembly to the city centre several kilometres away; the Weimar Administrative Court has now sided with the city. ENNIO FRIEDEMANN and PAUL STROTHMANN (GER) doubt whether the court’s standard provides a constitutionally sound and legally certain basis for handling assemblies at memorial sites.

Ireland, too, was contending with assemblies last month – but on a very different scale. April 2026 has been the most politically charged month in Ireland in recent memory, with fuel price blockades virtually shutting down several parts of the country. The blockades were framed as a grassroots revolt against carbon taxes. SURYAPRATIM ROY (ENG) shows how, beneath the rhetoric, lay an alliance of fossil and racial capital – where climate obstruction, anti-migrant politics and elite interests converged.

In Germany, the fight against the climate crisis took place in court rather than on the streets: the Federal Court of Justice rejected actions against BMW and Mercedes, with the claimants sought to ban the global marketing of passenger cars with internal combustion engines after October 2030. While the decision rested on very specific German legal grounds, ELBERT DE JONG and MARVIN REIFF (ENG) draw out comparative lessons worth taking seriously.

The legislator, too, seems to be putting the brake on decarbonisation: the federal government wants to restore “freedom in the heating cellar”, and key points for repealing the German Heating Act are now on the table. MICHAEL FEHLING and BENJAMIN MEVES (GER) show why the plans are legally tricky – and what the federal states can do.

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Am 9. Mai ist in Hellerau die ZDF/ARTE-Aufzeichnung von „Ein Volksbürger“ zu sehen – im Anschluss folgt ein Podiumsgespräch, moderiert von Tobi Müller, mit Maximilian Steinbeis, Nicola Hümpel, Lars Koch und Mike Dele Dittrich Frydetzki.

Die für das Theatertreffen und den Friedrich-Luft-Preis 2025 nominierte politische Farce von Nico and the Navigators basiert auf Recherchen unseres Thüringen-Projekts. Sie zeigt den rasanten Aufstieg eines populistischen Ministerpräsidenten in einem deutschen Freistaat und die daraus resultierende Bedrohung für die Demokratie. Gerade angesichts der bevorstehenden Landtagswahlen wirft „Ein Volksbürger“ Schlaglichter auf mögliche Szenarien.

Weitere Informationen und Tickets finden Sie hier.

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While Germany says farewell to its Heating Act, Hungary’s future Prime Minister Péter Magyar wants to wave Chief Justice András Zs. Varga good-bye, who has made a name for himself as an illiberal jurist under Orbán. ERIKA FARKAS(ENG) explains why political pressure is not the way to remove Varga but implementing the ECtHR’s Baka judgment is.

MICHAEL MEYER-RESENDE (ENG), too, turns to Magyar’s new power and sketches whyMagyar, with regard to the pressing need to reform Hungary’s election law, could become Hungary’s Cincinnatus – the hero of Roman legend who saved his country from peril and, once done, returned to his fields.

But who will save the European Union from peril? More than 70 years ago, the 1952 European Defence Communityfailed to be ratified by France and Italy. ROBERT SCHÜTZE (ENG) considers the attempts by a group of legal scholars to resurrect the European Defence Community to rest on a “legal fantasy” – and explain why this idea would clash with both international law and today’s EU Treaties.

While some dream of resurrecting a long-gone defence project, the EU stays realistic enough to save itself from the peril of Trump’s tariffs. The European Parliament has now confirmed the political EU–US Turnberry trade deal; the EU institutions will have to prepare the legal details of its implementation. PHILIPP REINHOLD (ENG) contextualises and explains the deal.

Largely overlooked in the EU so far: in the Musk v. Altman trial, Elon Musk and Sam Altman are disputing the future of OpenAI. Although the case plays out between US companies in a US court, it raises two fundamental issues with significant implications for the European debate, says TEODORA GROZA (ENG).

Another AI spillover from the US: Meta classifies “Antifa content” as risk content and thereby aligns itself with the Trump administration’s campaign against “the” Antifa. SASCHA WOLF (GER) sees in this a structural legal problem that EU platform regulation can solve more effectively than the German courts.

A question that kept Karlsruhe busy concerned content of a different kind: the Federal Constitutional Court has declared the so-called secondary publication obligation (Zweitveröffentlichungspflicht) – which required publicly employed academics to republish their work in open-access form after an embargo period –in Baden-Württemberg’s higher education law incompatible with the Basic Law. For ELLEN EULER (GER), the decision points to a deeper problem: the tension between scholarly communication and copyright.

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Mapping Article 13: Academic and Scientific Freedom under the EU Charter
Vasiliki Kosta & Marie Müller-Elmau (eds.)

Academic freedom is under pressure. Though protected by Article 13 of the EU Charter, academic freedom in the context of EU law received practically no or very little attention. As legal and political developments accelerate, the meaning of this right is taking shape in real time. This edited volume puts Article 13 of the EU Charter in the spotlight and reflects its potential in light of past and present threats to academic freedom.

Discover the potential of Article 13 EU Charter in protecting academic freedom here!

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On Thursday, the Bundestag debated the reform of the Federal Disability Equality Act. LARA SCHMIDT (GER) takes stock: of the federal government’s promises to make the private sector more accessible, little remains in the draft.

Little is also likely to remain of the AfD’s political promises: the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt wants to enshrine parental rights in the constitution – where they have long been anchored. RAHEL SCHWARZ (GER) shows how the state party uses them as a lever to remake education and society.

Elsewhere, right-wing politicians are reaching for far more drastic means: from Ecuador to Costa Rica, they make the pilgrimage to El Salvador’s mega-prison to copy this alleged silver bullet against gang violence. LUKAS GRAUTE(ENG) explains why the building cannot be imported without bringing along its authoritarian scaffolding.

Better role models can be found every month in our Outstanding Women Project: for May, LAURITZ WILDE (ENG) portrays Shaista Suhrawardy Ikramullah, who shaped the formation of Pakistan, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Genocide Convention – despite every obstacle she faced as a Pakistani woman. She was determined to take a new path, “in which one could taste the joys of achievement as well as the bitterness of failure, to know both hope and fear, disillusionment and attainment”, for it was undoubtedly a “richer, fuller and more rewarding way of life”. She was right – and rights she created.

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That’s it for this week. Take care and all the best!

Yours,

the Verfassungsblog Team

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The post The Dialectic of Viewpoint Discrimination appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Am Jahrestag der bedingungslosen Kapitulation lag dem Bundesrat heute zur ersten Beratung ein Gesetzentwurf vor, der Äußerungen über Israel nach neuen Gesichtspunkten unter Strafe stellen soll. Die Initiative der hessischen Landesregierung sieht einen neuen Straftatbestand der „Leugnung des Existenzrechts“ vor. Bestraft werden soll demnach, wer „in einer Weise, die geeignet ist, die Bereitschaft zu antisemitischen Gewalt- oder Willkürmaßnahmen zu fördern, öffentlich oder in einer Versammlung das Existenzrecht des Staates Israel leugnet oder zur Beseitigung des Staates Israel aufruft.“ Es ist nicht der erste Versuch, einen derartigen Tatbestand zu schaffen, wohl zuerst angestoßen vom prozionistischen Tikvah-Institut. Vor zwei Jahren scheiterte ein ähnlicher Gesetzesvorschlag, auch aus Hessen, maßgeblich am Widerstand von ideologisch unverdächtigen Juristen; gescheitert ist zuletzt in Frankreich die ganz ähnlich gebaute, immerhin noch (wie auch der Vorschlag des Tikvah-Instituts) formal abstrakt formulierte („provocation à la destruction ou à la négation d’un État“) Loi Yadan.

Die hessische Landesregierung ist unzufrieden mit der nicht gerade zimperlichen Arbeit der deutschen Justiz: Palästinasolidarische Aktivist·innen, prononcierte Kritiker·innen der deutschen Beihilfe zur Eskalation der Gewalt in Palästina und im Libanon, die BDS-Bewegung, ja selbst antizionistische jüdische Gruppen werden nicht entschieden genug an Versammlungen gehindert, nicht hart und nicht konsequent genug bestraft – wegen des Verwendens von Kennzeichen verfassungswidriger Organisationen, wegen der Billigung von Straftaten, wegen Volksverhetzung oder welcher Tatbestand auch immer gerade passend erscheint. Nun soll also dies helfen: abstrakte Geeignetheit zur Bereitschaftsförderung. Gewalt. Willkür. Existenzrecht. Beseitigung. Kleinteilige Tatbestandsbestimmtheitsdogmatik, Ausnahmezustand, Geopolitik, alles in einem StGB-Relativsatz, alles zusammen, Hauptsache alles strafbar. Die geplante Kriminalisierung ist nach der BDS-Resolution des Bundestages eine weitere politische Feinderklärung an eine menschenrechtlich getragene Bewegung. Sie reiht sich ein in die Geschichte solcher Feinderklärungen von den Boykottprotesten studentischer, auch jüdischer Gruppen gegen das rührselige Comeback des Nazi-Stars Veit Harlan (Lüth!) bis „Soldaten sind Mörder“: Feinderklärungen, die – bisher – unter dem Grundgesetz an der Meinungsfreiheit immer gescheitert sind.

Die Begründung des Gesetzentwurfs ist ein Dokument jener Sackgasse, in der sich der deutsche Israeldiskurs verfangen hat, verfassungsrechtlich, politisch und moralisch. Der Vorschlag ist verfassungswidrig (dazu Kai Ambos). Um zu einem anderen Ergebnis zu kommen, bräuchte man schon fortgeschrittene juristische Methodenkenntnisse im autoritären Legalismus – das Bestimmtheitsgebot, zum Beispiel. Die Begründung nennt als Fall einer Existenzrechtsleugnungshandlung den Slogan „From the River to the Sea, Palestine will be free“, der bekanntlich eine sehr komplexe Geschichte und also Bedeutungsvielfalt hat. Und sonst? Israel als Siedlerkolonie zu bezeichnen? Für ein Rückkehrrecht palästinensischer Flüchtlinge einzutreten? Dann die mehr oder minder offen ethnisch oder religiös motivierte Ungleichbehandlung (Art. 3 Abs. 3 GG): Straflos bleiben sollen jüdische Täter·innen, Orthodoxe ebenso wie säkulare Antizionisten, wenn sie „Vorstellungen vom Wohlergehen des jüdischen Volkes formulieren, die auf eine Überwindung der jüdischen Eigenstaatlichkeit gerichtet sind“. Will heißen: Strafe riskieren sie höchstens, wenn sie sich über das Wohlergehen des palästinensischen Volkes sorgen. Dem innerjüdischen Antizionismus schreibt die hessische Staatskanzlei zwar ins Zeugnis, keine „plausible“ Position zu vertreten, aber „den tatbestandlich vorausgesetzten spezifischen Zusammenhang zwischen der Verneinung des Existenzrechts des Staates Israel und der Eignung zur Förderung antisemitischer Gewalt- und Willkürmaßnahmen nicht aufzuweisen“, obschon – Achtung, abstraktes Gefährdungsdelikt! – „solche Verlautbarungen von Dritten letztlich zur Fundierung einer Haltung bemüht werden können, die auf Vernichtung des Staates Israel gerichtet ist“ (alles S. 10); eine Klausel, die offenbar sicherstellen soll, dass die Strafbarkeit der Dritten nicht scheitert.

Ferner: Der Begriff der „Leugnung“ suggeriert zwar eine Parallele zur nach § 130 Abs. 3 StGB strafbaren Holocaustleugnung. Tatsächlich geht es bei der Frage nach einem Existenzrecht Israels aber nicht um eine Tatsache, sondern um eine Meinung; ja noch nicht einmal um die Leugnung einer bestehenden Rechtsposition, da ein gegenüber Souveränität und territorialer Integrität verselbständigtes Existenzrecht völkerrechtlich nicht existiert.

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Dass sich die Strafnorm gegen eine bestimmte Meinung richtet, bestreiten die Entwurfsverfasser nicht. Sie geben sich keine Mühe mit der Erfindung von „schlechthin, ohne Rücksicht auf eine bestimmte Meinung zu schützenden Rechtsgütern“. Sie wollen vielmehr von der „Ausnahme“ profitieren, die das Bundesverfassungsgericht 2009 in seiner Wunsiedel-Entscheidung für NS-bezogenes Meinungsstrafrecht gemacht hat. Genau das hatte sich das BVerfG zwar einst formelhaft verbeten, indem es schon in Wunsiedel selbst dekretierte (Rn. 66), dass es sich um eine „die geschichtsgeprägte Identität der Bundesrepublik Deutschland betreffende einzigartige Konstellation“ handele, die „auf andere Konflikte nicht übertragbar“ sei. Aber – das ist aus der Europarechtsprechung des anderen Senats sattsam bekannt – die Erfindung von rechtlichen Maßstäben mit identitären statt mit Rechtsargumenten hat die Tendenz, sich zu verselbstständigen. Siehe das juristische Zentralargument der Begründung: „Der Feststellung, die ‚Sicherheit Israels ist deutsche Staatsräson‘, [liegt] nicht allein ein politisches Bekenntnis zugrunde, sondern ein verfassungsrechtlicher Gehalt.“ Staatsräson und Verfassungsidentität fungieren hier als praktisch austauschbare Begriffe, das eine außen, das andere innen, und wer das eine oder das andere für sich reklamieren kann, hat gewonnen.

Wie dieser traurige Wettlauf um verfassungsidentitäre Prämien aussieht, dokumentiert die Begründung des Gesetzentwurfs. Die Leugnung des Existenzrechts Israels soll der Verherrlichung des Nationalsozialismus gleichgestellt werden. Das funktioniert unter dem Dach der Wunsiedel-Ausnahme nur, wenn beides geschichtspolitisch miteinander identifiziert wird. Geschichtspolitisch, wohlgemerkt, denn die historischen Tatsachen liegen etwas anders: Der Zionismus beispielsweise gründet das Recht auf einen eigenen Staat bekanntlich auf die jüdische Identität und sieht es nicht als Wiedergutmachung nach der Shoah an. Die Entwurfsbegründung postuliert dazu einen „unauflöslichen historischen und politischen Zusammenhang“ zwischen dem Staat Israel und der Vernichtung der europäischen Juden durch das nationalsozialistische Deutschland. Die „Verneinung der Legitimität Israels“ bedeute „im phänotypischen [sic!] Regelfall“ zugleich eine Ablehnung der „Verantwortung […] der Bundesrepublik für den Schutz jüdischer Menschen“. Übersetzt: Der Staat Israel ist in Wahrheit eine deutsche Einrichtung, weil er die äußere Seite der gelungenen moralischen Sanierung des Landes der Mörder ist, während die innere Seite das Grundgesetz ist. Zur gewissenhaften Memorierung ins Stammbuch geschrieben vor allem den Teilen der deutschen Gesellschaft, die eine Migrationsgeschichte haben, und zwar nicht selten eine im Nahen Osten. Wenn sie über die Geschichte und Dynamik der Gewalt seit der Nakba andere Geschichten erzählen als das Auswärtige Amt, muss die Verfassungsidentität möglichst noch unmissverständlicher in sie hineingestraft werden, bis auch sie sich endlich innerlich befreit auf den Standpunkt (west)deutscher Erinnerungspolitik stellen können.

Für die strafrechtliche Praxis bringt der Entwurf wenig, wie der hessische Justizminister einräumt: „In diesem konkreten Bereich ist die Fallzahl […] nicht so hoch, dass daraus insgesamt eine spürbare Mehrbelastung entstünde.“ Wichtiger ist wohl, eine neue Handhabe zu haben, um palästinasolidarische Demonstrationen endlich gerichtsfest zu verbieten. Vor allem aber will man – der Justizminister sagt es deutlich – eine „Leitentscheidung auch des Gesetzgebers, wie sich Deutschland in dieser Frage positioniert“.

Symbolpolitik? Die Autoren des Entwurfs tragen die Verantwortung der Bundesrepublik für den Schutz jüdischer Menschen zwar wichtigtuerisch vor sich her, weisen sie aber mit dem, was sie regeln wollen, zugleich unbewusst weit von sich. Der politischen Logik des Sonderrechts entkommt man nämlich auch mit den besten Absichten nicht. Sonderrecht exkludiert unmittelbar die, auf die es zielt, wie indirekt die, die es zu schützen vorgibt. Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat in Wunsiedel diese politische Exklusion des Neonazismus aus dem politischen Raum in einem Moment vollzogen, als dieser Ausschluss im Parteiensystem und der Öffentlichkeit der Bundesrepublik noch halbwegs plausibel abgebildet war, und für eine Norm, die gerade keine bestimmte Gruppe, sondern den öffentlichen Frieden schützt (§ 130 StGB). Und heute? In einer innenpolitischen Lage, die hin zu faschistischen Mehrheiten zu kippen droht, verknüpft der Gesetzentwurf den Schutz jüdischer Menschen symbolisch wie eben auch ganz konkret mit dem Bestand eines Staates, der Vertreibung, Diskriminierung, Genozid und Aggression einstweilen als seine notwendigen Existenzbedingungen ausweist. Die Strafnorm soll, heißt das, deutsche Jüdinnen und Juden dazu zwingen, ihre Identität über diesen anderen Staat zu definieren. Das parlamentarische Verfahren wird Gelegenheit geben, sich über diese Implikationen klar zu werden.

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Editor’s Pick

von JASPER NEBEL

Quelle: Apple TV

Kennen Sie das Gefühl? Die KI Ihres Vertrauens gibt eine offensichtlich falsche Antwort und wenn man sie darauf hinweist, reagiert sie in dieser sehr KI-eigenen Mischung aus freundlich, unterwürfig und naiv. Mich jedenfalls treibt dieser Stil regelmäßig zur Weißglut. Entsprechend schlecht wäre ich in der Welt aufgehoben, die Vince Gilligan in der Serie „Pluribus“ geschaffen hat. Diese Welt wird von einem Virus befallen, der schon bald (fast) die gesamte Menschheit infiziert. Das Virus sorgt dafür, dass sich die Gedanken aller Menschen zu einer Art kollektivem Superbewusstsein verbinden. Alle wissen alles, alle können alles. Das „Ich“ hört auf zu existieren, es gibt nur noch ein „Wir“. Bis auf die Hauptfigur Carol Sturka natürlich – und elf andere Personen weltweit. Die Parallelen zu einer artificial general intelligence liegen auf der Hand – und auch zur KI von heute: Das „Wir“ agiert so effizient und „perfekt“, dass es weder lügen noch unfreundlich sein kann.

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Die Woche auf dem Verfassungsblog

zusammengefasst von EVA MARIA BREDLER

Im Editorial hat Florian Meinel die politische Logik des hessischen Gesetzesentwurfs freigelegt: Der Entwurf will die Leugnung des Existenzrechts Israels kriminalisieren – und damit die sogenannte Staatsräson in die bundesdeutsche Verfassungsidentität hineinwunsiedeln. KAI AMBOS (DE) erklärt ausführlich, warum er das für verfassungswidrig hält.

Auch ohne die hessische Ergänzung von § 130 StGB schränken Gerichte und Behörden Grundrechte ein, wenn es um den Krieg in Gaza geht. Für bundesweites Aufsehen sorgte in diesem Zusammenhang zuletzt das Vorhaben einer pro-palästinensischen Gruppe, eine Mahnwache für die Opfer des Gazakriegs auf dem Gelände der heutigen Gedenkstätte Buchenwald abhalten. Die Versammlungsbehörde verlegte die Versammlung ins mehrere Kilometer entfernte Weimar; das VG Weimar gab der Stadt nun Recht. ENNIO FRIEDEMANN und PAUL STROTHMANN (DE) bezweifeln, ob der gerichtliche Maßstab eine verfassungskonforme und rechtssichere Grundlage für den Umgang mit Versammlungen an Gedenkstätten bietet.

Auch Irland hatte letzten Monat mit Versammlungen zu kämpfen – allerdings in ganz anderem Ausmaß: Der April 2026 war einer der politisch aufgeladensten Monate in der jüngeren Geschichte Irlands: Blockaden gegen die Spritpreise legten Teile des Landes praktisch lahm, inszeniert als Graswurzelrevolte gegen die Kraftstoff-Steuer. SURYAPRATIM ROY(EN) zeigt, wie die Proteste fossile Interessen und rassistische Rhetorik zusammenführen.

In Deutschland fand der Kampf gegen die Klimakrise zuletzt weniger auf der Straße, dafür aber erneut vor Gericht statt: Ende März wies der BGH Klagen gegen BMW und Mercedes zurück, mit denen die Direktor:innen der Deutschen Umwelthilfe das Inverkehrbringen von Pkw mit Verbrennungsmotor nach Oktober 2030 verbieten lassen wollten. Die Entscheidung beruhte zwar auf sehr spezifischen deutschen Anspruchsgrundlagen, doch ELBERT DE JONG und MARVIN REIFF (EN) ziehen dennoch interessante rechtsvergleichende Lehren.

Auch der Gesetzgeber scheint bei der Dekarbonisierung auf die Bremse zu treten:  Die Bundesregierung möchte die „Freiheit im Heizungskeller“ wiederherstellen. Nun liegen Eckpunkte für die Rücknahme des Heizungsgesetzes vor. MICHAEL FEHLING und BENJAMIN MEVES (DE) zeigen, warum die Pläne rechtlich heikel sind und was die Bundesländer tun können.

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Am 9. Mai ist in Hellerau die ZDF/ARTE-Aufzeichnung von „Ein Volksbürger“ zu sehen – im Anschluss folgt ein Podiumsgespräch, moderiert von Tobi Müller, mit Maximilian Steinbeis, Nicola Hümpel, Lars Koch und Mike Dele Dittrich Frydetzki.

Die für das Theatertreffen und den Friedrich-Luft-Preis 2025 nominierte politische Farce von Nico and the Navigators basiert auf Recherchen unseres Thüringen-Projekts. Sie zeigt den rasanten Aufstieg eines populistischen Ministerpräsidenten in einem deutschen Freistaat und die daraus resultierende Bedrohung für die Demokratie. Gerade angesichts der bevorstehenden Landtagswahlen wirft „Ein Volksbürger“ Schlaglichter auf mögliche Szenarien.

Weitere Informationen und Tickets finden Sie hier.

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Während Deutschland sich vom Heizungsgesetz verabschiedet, möchte sich Ungarns künftiger Premier Péter Magyar von Chief Justice András Zs. Varga verabschieden, der sich unter Orbán den Ruf eines illiberalen Juristen aufgebaut hat. ERIKA FARKAS (EN) erklärt, warum nicht politischer Druck, sondern die Umsetzung des Baka-Urteils des EGMR der beste Weg ist, Varga aus dem Amt zu entfernen.

Auch MICHAEL MEYER-RESENDE (EN) wendet sich Magyars neuer Macht zu und skizziert, warum ihn das ungarische Wahlrecht zu einem modernen Cincinnatus machen könnte – jener Heldenfigur der römischen Sage, die ihr Land aus der Not rettete und danach wieder auf ihren Acker zurückkehrte.

Doch wer rettet eigentlich die Europäische Union aus der Not? Vor mehr als 70 Jahren scheiterte die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft 1952 an der Ratifikation in Frankreich und Italien. Nun gibt es Ideen, jene Verteidigungsgemeinschaft mit einer ungewöhnlichen Idee wiederzubeleben. ROBERT SCHÜTZE (EN) sieht in jenen Versuchen jedoch eine „legal fantasy“, die weder mit dem Völkerrecht noch dem Unionsrecht vereinbar sei.

Während manche vom Wiederbeleben eines längst verflossenen Verteidigungsprojekts träumen, übt sich die EU in Realismus und versucht, sich wenigstens vor Trump-Zöllen zu retten. Das Europäische Parlament hat den EU–US-Turnberry-Deal nun bestätigt; die EU-Institutionen müssen jetzt die rechtlichen Details der Umsetzung vorbereiten. PHILIPP REINHOLD (EN) ordnet den Deal ein.

Was in der EU bislang kaum diskutiert wird: Im Musk v. Altman streiten die KI-Titanen Elon Musk und Sam Altman um die Zukunft von OpenAI. Auch wenn es um einen Streit zwischen US-Unternehmen vor einem US-Gericht geht, wirft er zwei Grundsatzfragen auf, die für die europäische Debatte erhebliche Folgen haben, sagt TEODORA GROZA (EN).

Noch ein KI-Spillover aus den USA: Meta stuft „Antifa-Inhalte” als Risikoinhalte ein und reiht sich damit in den Kampf der Trump-Administration gegen „die” Antifa ein. SASCHA WOLF (DE) sieht darin ein strukturelles Rechtsproblem, das die EU-Plattformregulierung effektiver lösen kann als die deutschen Gerichte.

In Karlsruhe ging es dagegen um andere Inhalte: Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat die sogenannte Zweitveröffentlichungspflicht im baden-württembergischen Hochschulgesetz für mit dem Grundgesetz unvereinbar erklärt. Für ELLEN EULER (DE) verweist die Entscheidung auf ein tieferes Problem: den Zielkonflikt zwischen Wissenschaftskommunikation und Urheberrecht.

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Mapping Article 13: Academic and Scientific Freedom under the EU Charter
Vasiliki Kosta & Marie Müller-Elmau (eds.)

Academic freedom is under pressure. Though protected by Article 13 of the EU Charter, academic freedom in the context of EU law received practically no or very little attention. As legal and political developments accelerate, the meaning of this right is taking shape in real time. This edited volume puts Article 13 of the EU Charter in the spotlight and reflects its potential in light of past and present threats to academic freedom.

Discover the potential of Article 13 EU Charter in protecting academic freedom here!

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Am Donnerstag hat der Bundestag die Reform des Bundesbehindertengleichstellungsgesetzes beraten. LARA SCHMIDT (DE) bilanziert: Von den Versprechungen der Bundesregierung, die Privatwirtschaft besser zugänglich zu machen, bleibt im Gesetzentwurf wenig übrig.

Von politischen Versprechen dürfte auch bei der AfD wenig übrig bleiben: Die AfD Sachsen-Anhalt will Elternrechte in der Verfassung verankern – dabei stehen sie dort längst. RAHEL SCHWARZ (DE) zeigt, wie der Landesverband sie instrumentalisiert, um Bildung und Gesellschaft umzubauen.

Andernorts greifen rechte Politiker:innen zu weit drastischeren Mitteln: Von Ecuador bis Costa Rica pilgern sie zum Mega-Gefängnis in El Salvador, um das vermeintliche Allheilmittel gegen Bandengewalt zu kopieren. LUKAS GRAUTE (EN) erklärt, warum sich das Gebäude nicht importieren lässt, ohne sich auch sein autoritäres Gerüst einzufangen.

Bessere Vorbilder gibt es jeden Monat in unserem Outstanding Women Project: Für Mai porträtiert LAURITZ WILDE(EN) Shaista Suhrawardy Ikramullah, die die Gründung Pakistans, die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte und die Völkermordkonvention entscheidend prägte – trotz aller Widrigkeiten, denen sie als pakistanische Frau ausgesetzt war. Sie war fest entschlossen, einen neuen Weg zu gehen, „in which one could taste the joys of achievement as well as the bitterness of failure, to know both hope and fear, disillusionment and attainment“, denn dies sei ohne Zweifel ein „richer, fuller and more rewarding way of life“. Recht hat sie, und Recht hat sie geschaffen.

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Das war’s für diese Woche.

Ihnen alles Gute!

Ihr

Verfassungsblog-Team

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The post Dialektik des Sonderrechts appeared first on Verfassungsblog.