🍻 Selber Bier Brauen

Since May 2025, media footage has shown French police wading through shallow waters just off the northern coast near Calais, using knives to slash so-called “taxi boats” packed with asylum seekers, thus forcing those on board to abandon the sinking dinghies and scramble back to shore for safety. While such scenes are not entirely new – French police has not been known for their gallantry in attempts to stop taxi‑boats from crossing the Channel and have often been accused of resorting to violent tactics – these ‘enforcement techniques’ have now been provided with a legal basis, as Interior Minister Retailleau has endorsed a new policy allowing police to ‘take action’ up to 300 meters from the shore. The policy marks a significant shift from prior rules, which limited intervention at sea to cases of distress. This development is part of a broader UK-France strategy aimed at further securitizing the Channel. Last week, negotiations for a new UK–France agreement culminated in the announcement of a ‘one in, one out’ pilot scheme, under which the UK will return small boat arrivals to France while accepting asylum seekers selected from France who can demonstrate family ties in Britain. The agreement – that  still awaits to be evaluated by the Commission – echoes the controversial logic of the EU-Turkey Statement.

These measures signal a sui generis evolution in European migration control. For the first time, rather than pushing asylum seekers back to third countries to avoid legal responsibilities under EU and international law, an EU Member State is directly preventing departures from its own territory.  As the  UK-France agreement unfolds, and with the New Pact on Migration and Asylum beginning to take shape across the EU, France’s evolving practice in Calais raises concerns about its compliance with EU and international law.

Shaping a new model?

The newly crafted “300-metres” rule is part of a UK-France agreement aimed at containing migration from France in the post-Brexit era. Since January 2021, the UK is no longer bound by the Dublin Regulation, complicating efforts to return asylum seekers from its territory to other EU Member States. Consequently, the UK government has increasingly resorted to pushbacks towards France in an effort to deter irregular crossings. Despite these measures, the number of individuals successfully reaching the UK has continued to rise. In 2022, over 45,000 people crossed the Channel; although numbers dipped in 2023, they surged by 25% in 2024. In response, French police have been given green light to intervene up to 300 metres from the shore, regardless of whether boats are at risk of distress. Attempts to stop people at sea have been backed by the financial incentives given by the UK over the years. Since 2010, the UK has invested more than £300 million in efforts to secure the French border by funding measures such as fencing, surveillance cameras, detection equipment, and deploying guards and police forces. In this way, the UK has de facto outsourced its border controls (see here a critique). By enforcing the 300 metres rule, France will now be acting as a containment zone for asylum seekers attempting to cross the EU external border. This scenario seems to establish a new variation of the externalization models which have been gaining momentum over the last years (see here, here, and here).

These models stemmed from Member States partnering up with third countries to bypass their responsibilities under international human rights law and EU law. In the central Mediterranean, Italy and  Malta have established operational partnerships with Libyan authorities to support  systematic pullbacks, despite the well-documented risk of arbitrary detention, torture, and other serious human rights violations taking place in Libya. On the eastern side, Turkey has served as a containment zone in exchange for substantial financial compensation from the EU on the basis of the EU-Turkey Statement. In order to facilitate the implementation of the Statement and the move of commodified migrants across the Greek-Turkey border, Turkey was designated by Greece as a safe third country on the basis of Article 33(2)(c) of the Asylum Procedures Directive. This designation has been contested as Turkey has been exposing asylum seekers to limited access to asylum procedures, lack of effective remedies, and a real risk of arbitrary detention and onward refoulement (for a comment on the attempts to challenge the Statement and the legal presumption of Turkey as safe, see here). While there is no text of the UK-France deal yet – only a joint statement and unilateral statements from the UK Prime Minister and Home Office – the agreement seems to follow the model of the Statement.

What differentiates the French case, however, is that France is an EU Member State and, as such, it is bound to comply with EU asylum and fundamental rights standards. This spares the UK the need to justify outsourcing border control to a ‘safe’ third country, as required in cases like Turkey. The arrangement thereby allows the UK to distance itself from the stigma of conducting direct pushbacks, by outsourcing enforcement actions to an EU State whose status as ‘safe’ is both factually and legally accepted. This, in turn, is likely to allow the UK government to avoid a repeat of the judicial defeat that beset its initial attempt at externalization. Under the Rwanda agreement, Rwanda was supposed to process asylum claims from certain individuals arriving in the UK. However, the UK Supreme Court rejected this externalization plan, ruling that Rwanda could not be considered a ‘safe’ country.

Sleep tight, there is nothing to be afraid of…

Pullback operations conducted within 300 meters off the coastline occur in the French territorial sea, where France has full jurisdiction to enforce national law, inter alia immigration and border control measures, in accordance with Articles 21 and 25 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). By asserting its authority to stop taxi-boats within its territorial sea prior to their attempt to cross the Channel, France implicitly considers the activity of taxy-boats as falling outside the scope of innocent passage (Article 19(2) UNCLOS). Nonetheless, the legality of these coercive measures and of the upcoming agreement ultimately depends on their compliance with binding rules of maritime law, international human rights and EU law.

First, under maritime law, France is under the duty to rescue persons in distress at sea, as set out in Article 98 UNCLOS and reinforced by the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. Although the “300-meters rule” authorizes police interventions close to the shore, proximity to land does not rule out the possibility of situations of distress (as it happened in this case )  and slashing dinghies with knives, even if close to the shore, arguably does not help people in distress at sea.

Second, France is bound by human rights obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) made clear that States have a positive obligation under Article 2 ECHR to protect the lives of asylum seekers and migrants at or near their territorial border (N.D. and N.T. v Spain paras 174-177). The Court also made clear that States are bound by Article 3 ECHR to protect migrants from ill-treatment and to ensure that they are not subjected to inhuman treatment during border enforcement operations (M.A. and Others v Lithuania, para 230). France’s use of force must therefore be necessary, proportionate, and accompanied by appropriate procedural safeguards. The systematic and indiscriminate use of physical force by the French police to prevent departures – also vis-a-vis children and other vulnerable groups – raises serious concerns.

Third, France is bound by EU law standards of protection for asylum seekers. The CJEU has held on several occasions that the practice of pushbacks is contrary to Article 6 of  Directive 2013/32, which guarantees access to the asylum procedure, and Article 18 CFR (C-392/22 paras 50-51), which safeguards the right to asylum. Drawing on the case law of the ECtHR, the CJEU has also confirmed that pushbacks may violate the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits returning individuals to a country where they face serious harm (Joined Cases C-564/19  PPU and C-713/19 PPU, paras. 50-53). The fact that the new rules enable pullbacks rather than pushbacks does not make this case-law inapplicable. Although France, as a Member State, may be presumed safe and compliant with EU law and human rights standards, scholars highlighted that “safety is not an abstract or generalizable status, but a function of individual experience and access to effective protection” (Moreno-Lax, p.363).

It matters, in this regard, France has repeatedly been condemned by the ECtHR for its failure in guaranteeing  asylum seekers effective protection, access to asylum procedures, adequate reception conditions, and safeguards against arbitrary detention (see, for example,  N.H. and Others v. France and M.D. and A.D. v. France). It should also be recalled that many of the migrants attempting to reach the UK are individuals stranded in the infamous “Jungle” of Calais, living in a state of legal limbo and awaiting an opportunity to leave French territory. Human rights organizations have extensively documented that the conditions in these encampments may constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. These include inadequate shelter, lack of access to basic services, repeated forced evictions, and reports of police violence. Faced with such conditions, many choose not to seek asylum in France, believing their chances of protection, family reunification, or basic dignity may be greater in the UK.

Enabling the new pact?

The implementation of the “300 metres rule” comes at a time when the legal standards for the protection of asylum seekers and irregular third-country nationals have been significantly eroded through the adoption of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. The pact introduced – inter alia – the screening procedure, which can be conducted in border zones or even at sea. As the screening procedure enables authorities to perform preliminary checks on identity, health, and security status without triggering full access to the asylum procedure (see here), the new police measure seems to prepare the field for turning French shores into a buffer zone where fundamental rights receive no consideration. While the UK-France agreement still has to be scrutinized by the European Commission as to the potential infringement of EU exclusive powers, the harsh police measures on the French northern coast are already a reality that leaves migrants trapped in limbo within an EU Member State that offers little prospect of protection. If the EU–Turkey Statement set the stage for the hotspot approach, it remains to be seen what new forms of externalization will emerge under the shadow of the New Pact. Unfortunately, these early signs do not seem promising in terms of protection of fundamental rights.

The post Pullbacks in the Channel appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Advisory Opinion 32/25 (AO-32/25)  of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) marks a turning point in the interpretation of international human rights law in relation to climate change. In AO-32/25, the IACtHR recognizes that the world is facing a genuine climate emergency and affirms that this situation demands an urgent, coordinated, and human rights-based response (see here and here).

The IACtHR establishes that States have a series of obligations to ensure a healthy environment and climate, and prevent violations of human rights. To this end, the IACtHR develops the standard of enhanced due diligence as a binding framework for State action. This standard includes elements aimed at ensuring that the response to climate change is effective, fair, transparent, and evidence-based (para. 224). The IACtHR explains that the severity of climate impacts, the urgency of effective action, and the need for accurate and up-to-date information require States to act with enhanced care to prevent harm and protect the rights enshrined in the American Convention. The specific shape this enhanced due diligence standard takes depends on particular risks, the degree of vulnerability of affected persons, and evolving scientific and technological knowledge (para. 233). This blog post discusses the heightened due diligence standard, as clarified by the IACtHR, and outlines nine key elements of this standard.

Comprehensive and in-depth identification and assessment of risks

The identification and assessment of climate-related risks forms the foundation of State obligations (para. 236). This makes sense; without knowing where the greatest threats lie and who is most affected, it is impossible to prevent harm or uphold rights. 

States must conduct comprehensive, detailed, and forward-looking assessments of how climate change impacts the effective enjoyment of human rights. As part of this assessment, States must consider both current and projected risks, using disaggregated data by territory, population group, gender, age, and other factors that shape vulnerability. A general or aggregate evaluation is not sufficient. What is required is a clear mapping of how specific individuals, communities, and ecosystems are affected, particularly those who have historically been marginalized or overlooked in public policy.

The IACtHR underscores the particular vulnerability of ecosystems such as the Amazon (para. 106), insular islands, and the Caribbean (paras. 111-119). These ecosystems are not only ecological hotspots but also cultural and spiritual homelands. Their loss would result in irreversible damage not only to biodiversity but to entire ways of life. These areas, along with others identified through the best available science, must be at the center of national strategies to ensure survival, adaptation, and justice. 

Risk assessment must also recognize that climate harm is not confined by borders. A State’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions can endanger rights and ecosystems far beyond its territory.  The obligation of comprehensive and in-depth identification and assessment of risk therefore applies not only to domestic policy but also to how States, especially major emitters, consider and mitigate the extraterritorial impacts of their actions or omissions, which was highlighted in KlimaSeniorinnen v Switzerland by the European Court of Human Rights and in Sacchi et al. v. Argentina et al.the Sacchi et al. v. Argentina et al. by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. 

Robust risk assessment is what enables timely early warning systems, targeted protection measures, and the meaningful participation of affected communities. It is the foundation for equitable climate governance and a test of whether States are serious about addressing the structural injustices that the climate crisis amplifies.

Adoption of proactive and ambitious preventive measures

States must adopt preventive measures to address climate-related harms that are proactive and ambitious, moving beyond mere compliance to transformative actions that prevent the worst scenarios projected by science. These measures should anticipate impacts, reflect the urgency of the climate crisis, and include reforming economic and social structures as necessary.

The IACtHR recalls that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has warned since 2018 that limiting warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius depends on significant emissions reductions this decade (para. 186). The IACtHR also reminds States of the pressing need to adopt effective mitigation and adaptation measures to prevent climate-related risks, not only through reductions in GHG emissions, but also by achieving “carbon neutrality” around the year 2050 (para. 186).  

This is particularly relevant in regions where, over the past decade, oil and gas exploration has continued to grow despite international climate commitments. According to the 2023 Global Oil and Gas Exit List, at least 96 companies are exploring new fossil fuel reserves in over 70 countries. In 2022 alone, projects were approved that will add 8.6 billion barrels of oil equivalent to future production. These projects would emit approximately 3.1 to 3.8 gigatons of carbon dioxide, based on standard emissions factors (≈0.43 tCO₂ per barrel for oil, adjusted for gas mix).  Meanwhile, the International Energy Agency reported that global investments in oil and gas exploration and production reached 528 billion dollars in 2023, a steady rise since 2020. These investments are expected to continue increasing, especially driven by state-owned companies in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Such expansion directly contradicts scenarios aligned with the 1.5-degree goal of the Paris Agreement.

Use of the best available science

All climate action must be grounded in the best available science. This science must be up-to-date, peer-reviewed, empirically based, transparent in its methods, and clear about uncertainties and assumptions. The IACtHR explicitly names IPCC reports as authoritative. (para. 487)

The IACtHR makes clear that ignoring or manipulating scientific findings constitutes a violation of the duty of diligence. This could be interpreted to mean that denying climate science amounts to a human rights violation, as it undermines the evidence base needed to protect environmental and human rights. This point is particularly relevant in Latin America and the Caribbean, which are experiencing climate denial policies or efforts to weaken environmental protections (paras. 486-487).

Integration of a human rights perspective into all climate policy

The IACtHR demands that climate policies fully integrate a human rights-based approach. Measures must not generate new vulnerabilities or deepen existing ones. On the contrary, they must protect those at risk and ensure that the green transition does not reproduce existing inequalities (paras. 341, 342 and 388).

This approach was affirmed in previous IACtHR decisions. For example, in Lhaka Honhat v Argentina, the IACtHR recognized, based on Advisory Opinion 23/17 (AO-23/17), for the first time in a contentious case, the autonomous right to a healthy environment and other material conditions of existence concerning Indigenous peoples. The IACtHR emphasized that environmental degradation can violate collective and territorial rights, even in the absence of identifiable individual harm. This jurisprudence, in line with AO-32/25, strengthens the obligation to ensure that climate policies respect cultural identity, land rights, and the interconnectedness between ecosystems and community well-being across the region.

This is especially important in Latin America, the most unequal region in the world. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), in Latin America and the Caribbean, the richest 10 percent hold 55 percent of total income, while over 30 percent of the population lives in poverty. Gender and ethno-racial disparities further compound inequality. Integrating a human rights perspective supports a just transition, one that maximizes the social and economic benefits of climate action while safeguarding labor rights through effective social dialogue.

Continuous and effective monitoring of the outcomes and impacts of climate measures adopted

States must establish monitoring systems that are continuous, technical, independent, transparent, and participatory to oversee the implementation and effectiveness of climate mitigation and adaptation measures, the protection of ecosystems, the integrity of climate-related information and the performance of public and private actors. These mechanisms are not mere formalities; they are essential for evaluating the effectiveness of climate measures, detecting unintended harms, and adjusting strategies based on evolving risks and evidence (paras. 349, 354, 355, 366, 389).

Effective monitoring should enable real-time learning and correction, identifying implementation gaps, incorporating new scientific knowledge, and responding to the voices of affected communities. These systems should not be limited to state agencies but should also involve civil society, Indigenous peoples, and frontline populations (paras. 528, 560, 578, and 579).

Environmental impact assessments play a central role in this process. When properly designed, they help anticipate risks, evaluate alternatives, and ensure that environmental and social concerns shape decision-making. The IACtHR, notably especially in AO 23/17, already recognized EIAs as legal obligations tied to the duty of prevention It emphasized that they must be scientifically sound, transparent, and inclusive. In AO-32/25, the Court further strengthens this by linking assessments to participatory climate risk governance and adaptive measures. 

To fulfill this duty, national legislation must establish clear standards and mechanisms to act on findings. Political will is equally important. Laws have little impact without enforcement, oversight, and public access to data.

Respect for procedural rights: information, participation, and justice

The IACtHR’s jurisprudence has decisively advanced procedural rights. In Claude Reyes and Others v Chile, access to public information was recognized as an integral part of freedom of expression with direct environmental implications. The IACtHR reinforced the principle of maximum disclosure, under which all State-held information is presumed public unless excluded by narrow and justified exception. It also affirmed that due process guarantees apply to administrative procedures. Individuals are entitled to reasoned and timely responses when seeking information on activities that may affect their environment or health. States must adopt clear legal frameworks and effective mechanisms to ensure access to environmental information. This includes training officials, creating accessible registries, and enabling appeals of unjustified refusals. This ruling paved the way for many principles found in the Escazú Agreement and solidified access to information as a critical tool for environmental and human rights defense.

Building on this and other rulings, as well as other international treaties, in AO-32/25, the IACtHR confirms that access to information, participation, and justice are indispensable procedural rights in the context of the climate emergency (paras. 438, 459, 488, 495, 501). Information must be reliable and timely; participation must be meaningful, particularly in decisions affecting territories or ways of life; and effective remedies must be available for omissions or harms resulting from climate inaction (paras. 471-587).

Transparency and accountability

States must ensure full transparency and accountability in climate action. They must publish plans, goals, budgets, and indicators, and enable citizen oversight, independent audits, and parliamentary scrutiny (paras. 349, 355, 436, 438 and 505). 

The case of La Oroya v Peru illustrates the consequences of opacity, lack of transparency and accountability. The State failed for years to provide public access to environmental health data or act on evidence of severe pollution by a private metal smelting operation. In AO-32/25, the Court builds on these findings and reinforces that transparency is an indispensable condition and a legal obligation for ensuring accountability and preventing abuse (paras. 438, 505). It confirms that States must publish climate-related plans, indicators and budgets (para. 438), enable public oversight and independent audits (para. 505), and guarantee access to reliable, timely and culturally appropriate information (paras. 349, 436). Together, these standards establish that transparency is a concrete legal means to safeguard health, prevent environmental degradation and resist corporate impunity, principles central to both La Oroya and AO-32/25. 

Regulation and oversight of corporate due diligence

One of AO-32/25’s most powerful elements is its recognition that public and private businesses have responsibilities in the climate emergency, especially when their activities generate or significantly contribute to GHG emissions. This builds on the Court’s broader and longstanding jurisprudence that the obligation to guarantee rights extends beyond the actions of State agents and includes the duty to prevent violations by private actors. In a growing line of jurisprudence, the IACtHR has reaffirmed that States must regulate and oversee business activities to prevent rights violations, especially where Indigenous Peoples are affected. In Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, the Court found that granting concessions for logging and mining on Indigenous lands without consultation or safeguards violated the Convention. This finding was reinforced in Garífuna Communities of Triunfo de la Cruz and Punta Piedra v. Honduras, where the Court held the State responsible for failing to protect communities from violence and dispossession amid land conflicts involving third parties. Most recently, in La Oroya v. Peru, the Court held the State accountable for failing to regulate a private company whose toxic emissions severely harmed residents’ health and environment.

Following the same logic, the IACtHR establishes in AO-32/25  that States must enact legislative, regulatory, and administrative measures to ensure companies apply enhanced environmental and human rights due diligence. This means requiring internal due diligence processes adapted to a company’s size, sector, and context. These processes should span the entire value chain, including suppliers and subsidiaries, and aim to identify, prevent, mitigate, and remedy adverse impacts (paras. 345-456). The IACtHR further mandates that States assign differentiated obligations to higher-emitting companies, reflecting the principle that those who pollute more must bear greater responsibility. This could include higher taxes, stricter regulatory requirements, mandatory participation in just transition schemes, or specific investments in mitigation and adaptation (para. 350). 

The IACtHR also warns against greenwashing, undue corporate influence in lawmaking, and threats against human rights defenders by corporate actors. This business dimension of enhanced diligence has immediate relevance for litigation, regulation, and advocacy.

Reinforced international cooperation

Because climate change is global, States have a duty to cooperate. This includes technology transfer, climate financing, capacity building, shared knowledge, and collective responses to climate change (para. 264). While these obligations are already reflected in instruments such as the Paris Agreement, the IACtHR now lends them regional legal weight within the Inter-American human rights system. The IACtHR also affirms that international cooperation is essential to address the disproportionate impacts of climate change on countries and populations that have contributed least to the crisis (paras. 260–261). It links the duty to cooperate with the elimination of poverty, the promotion of sustainable development and the guarantee of economic, social and cultural rights. The IACtHR also highlights that this duty encompasses not only financial and technical support, but also the creation of fairer economic systems and sustained multilateral engagement grounded in solidarity (paras. 262–265). 

Conclusion

The IACtHR’s model of enhanced due diligence goes far beyond technical obligations. It redefines responsible climate action in a world of accelerating risks and deepening inequality. The IACtHR offers a structured and principled framework that guides States not only in responding to climate threats, but in how they plan decisions and govern with human dignity, justice, and environmental integrity at the center.

This framework moves due diligence from narrow project-based procedures to a broader standard of governance. It applies across legal systems, national boundaries, and policy sectors, recognizing that although climate change is a global phenomenon, its consequences are deeply unequal. It challenges States to move beyond symbolic commitments and take action that is transparent, science-based, and rooted in the lived experiences of those most affected.

The influence of the Inter-American system increasingly extends beyond the region. In Kenya, the Environment and Land Court just drew on the La Oroya case to reaffirm that the environment cannot protect itself and that it is the role of the State to safeguard it. This reasoning supported the Kenyan court’s decision to order the restoration of land and water harmed by pipeline construction. AO 23/17 has also helped shape global standards. Its principles have been echoed by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child and cited by Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court in recognizing the Paris Agreement as a human rights treaty (see here). Together, these developments reflect a growing cross-regional judicial dialogue and demonstrate the importance of the Inter-American system in protecting the environment both within the region and globally. They also confirm that advisory opinions are not abstract texts but powerful legal tools that shape jurisprudence, inform public policy, and empower communities pursuing climate justice.

For lawyers, advocates, and institutions, the IACtHR’s framework is more than legal guidance. It is an invitation to reimagine environmental governance as a space for transformation, inclusion, and accountability. It affirms that truly effective climate action must be grounded in human rights and capable of transforming the systems that have allowed environmental harm and exclusion to persist.

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Kaum eingeführt, schon wieder abgeschafft? Erst im Februar 2024 trat § 62d AufenthG in Kraft. Dieser regelte erstmals, dass zur richterlichen Entscheidung über die Anordnung von Abschiebungshaft eine anwaltliche Vertretung beigeordnet sein muss. Nur knapp 18 Monate später soll diese zentrale rechtsstaatliche Errungenschaft – eingebettet in einen ebenfalls stark zu kritisierenden Gesetzesentwurf – nach dem Willen der Bundesregierung bereits wieder abgeschafft werden. Freiheitsrechte und Rechtsstaatlichkeit dürfen jedoch nicht dem politischen Ziel schnellerer Abschiebungen untergeordnet werden.

Reaktion auf systemische Defizite

Die Einführung des § 62d AufenthG im Februar 2024 war eine späte, aber überfällige Reaktion auf die anhaltende Kritik an der rechtsstaatlichen Ausgestaltung der Abschiebungshaft. Bereits seit Jahren wird die hohe Rechtswidrigkeitsquote (ca. 50–90 %) in den Abschiebungshaftverfahren moniert. Oftmals beruht diese Rechtswidrigkeit bereits darauf, dass die formellen Voraussetzungen für die Haftanordnung nicht vorliegen. In Stellungnahmen und wissenschaftlichen Beiträgen wurde deshalb immer wieder auf die Notwendigkeit einer anwaltlichen Vertretung in Abschiebungshaftverfahren von Amts wegen hingewiesen. Wesentliches Argument ist dabei die besondere Bedeutung des Freiheitsgrundrechts aus Art. 2 Abs. 2 S. 2 GG, in welches die Abschiebungshaft eingreift (Rn. 48 ff.). Für das Verfahren des Freiheitsentzuges enthält das Grundgesetz besondere Schutzvorkehrungen. Hierzu zählen neben dem Richtervorbehalt gem. Art. 104 Abs. 2 GG insbesondere die Förmlichkeit des Verfahrens nach Art. 104 Abs. 1 GG. Im Rahmen dieses Verfahrens sind der Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör gem. Art. 103 GG und das Gebot des fairen Verfahrens, abgeleitet aus Art. 3 Abs. 1 GG i.V.m. Art. 20 Abs. 3 GG wesentlich. Das Gebot des fairen Verfahrens gebietet es insbesondere, dass die betroffene Person ihre prozessualen Rechte mit der erforderlichen Sachkunde wahrnehmen kann (Rn. 32). Ist sie hierzu eigenständig nicht in der Lage, ist es geboten, dass sie sich durch eine*n Rechtsanwält*in vertreten lässt (Rn. 23).

Fehlinterpretation des Normzwecks

Vor diesem Hintergrund wurde 2024 eine entsprechende Pflichtbeiordnung in § 62d AufenthG im Rahmen des Gesetzes zur Verbesserung der Rückführung eingeführt. Ausweislich der Gesetzesbegründung soll die Norm es Betroffenen ermöglichen, „mithilfe eines anwaltlichen Vertreters seine Rechte in dem für ihn in der Regel unbekannten Verfahren der Anordnung der Abschiebungshaft bzw. des Ausreisegewahrsams geltend zu machen“ (S.18). Zwar wurde § 62d AufenthG im Kontext eines Gesetzes eingeführt, welches „gesetzliche Regelungen, die Abschiebungsmaßnahmen verhindern oder zumindest erschweren“ so anpassen soll, dass Rückführungen vereinfacht durchgeführt werden sollen. Aus der oben zitierten Begründung geht aber hervor: Diese Intention ist für die Einführung des § 62d AufenthG ausdrücklich nicht gegeben. Vielmehr wollte die Legislative mit § 62d AufenthG einen (verfahrensrechtlichen) Ausgleich zu den in den letzten Jahren und vor allem mit dem Rückführungsverbesserungsgesetz immer wieder gravierend abgesenkten materiellen Voraussetzungen der Abschiebungshaft (z.B. Erweiterung der Haftgründe, Verlängerung der zulässigen Haftdauern und Erleichterung der Inhaftierung während des Asylverfahrens) schaffen.

Im Gesetzesentwurf wird die Abschaffung des § 62d AufenthG dennoch damit begründet, dass die Norm dem „Ziel des Rückführungsverbesserungsgesetzes, Rückführungen zu erleichtern, […]“ entgegenstehe (S.11). Damit wird verkannt, dass § 62d AufenthG gerade nicht darauf gerichtet ist, Abschiebungen zu ermöglichen bzw. zu beschleunigen. Die Bundesregierung bedient sich damit unrichtigerweise des Sinn und Zwecks anderer Normen innerhalb eines Novellierungspakets und stellt das ursprüngliche Telos der Norm so auf den Kopf.

Diese (wohl bewusste) Fehlinterpretation wird im Zuge der rechtspolitischen Kommunikation weiter vorangetrieben. So äußert Innenminister Alexander Dobrindt (CSU) in der Bundestagsdebatte vom 10.07.2025, der*die Pflichtanwält*in verhindere die Abschiebungen. Sodann beschreibt er das Verfahren der Schutzbeantragung und Ablehnung in Deutschland (Minute 2:40). Dabei bleibt (wie auch bereits im Wahlkampf zur Bundestagswahl und im Koalitionsvertrag (S.94)) unberücksichtigt, dass der*die Pflichtanwält*in über § 62d AufenthG alleinig im Verfahren der Abschiebungshaft beteiligt wird, nicht jedoch auch im Verfahren der Abschiebung selbst tätig wird. Abschiebung und Abschiebungshaft sind rechtlich und verfahrensmäßig getrennte Maßnahmen. Während die Abschiebung unmittelbar der Durchführung einer vollziehbaren Ausreisepflicht dient, handelt es sich bei der Abschiebungshaft um eine Sicherungsmaßnahme dieser verwaltungsrechtlichen Vollstreckungsmaßnahme. Die Zulässigkeit und Durchführbarkeit der Abschiebung ist somit zwingende materielle Voraussetzung der Haft. Darüber hinaus erfordert eine rechtmäßige Abschiebungshaftanordnung das Vorliegen weiterer Voraussetzungen wie z.B. zwingende Haftgründe und die Feststellung, dass die Ausreisepflicht nicht auch mit milderen Mitteln durchgesetzt werden kann. Fehlt es an diesen weiteren Voraussetzungen der Inhaftierung (was insbesondere mit Hilfe eines Rechtsbeistandes gerichtlich festgestellt werden kann), ist allein die Haftanordnung, nicht jedoch auch die Abschiebung selbst rechtswidrig.

Kein entbehrlicher Luxus

Auch ein weiteres Argument für die Abschaffung verfängt nicht. Die Gesetzesbegründung (S. 11) lautet weiter:

„Die Pflichtbeiordnung eines Rechtsanwalts ist angesichts anderweitiger Regelungen auch nicht erforderlich, denn gerade in Freiheitsentziehungssachen sieht das Gesetz über das Verfahren in Familiensachen und in den Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit (FamFG), welches gemäß § 106 Absatz 2 AufenthG auf das Abschiebungshaftverfahren Anwendung findet, bereits besondere Pflichten des Gerichts zum Schutz des Betroffenen vor.  So hat das Gericht dem Betroffenen nach § 419 Absatz 1 FamFG zwingend einen Verfahrenspfleger zu bestellen, wenn dies zur Wahrnehmung der Interessen des Betroffenen erforderlich ist. Bei Schwierigkeit der Sach- und Rechtslage kommt die Beiordnung eines Rechtsanwaltes schon jetzt unter den Voraussetzungen des § 78 Absatz 2 FamFG in Betracht.“

Zutreffend ist, dass die Gewährleistung eines fairen Verfahrens nicht zwingend die Beiordnung von Pflichtanwält*innen von Amts wegen verlangt. Dies ist nur dann geboten, wenn die in der Verfahrensordnung verankerten Gewährleistungen nach den Umständen des jeweiligen konkreten Verfahrens ein effektives Verfahren nicht hinreichend gewährleisten können. Mit der Annahme, ein*e Pflichtanwält*in sei aufgrund der bestehenden Gewährleistungen des FamFG-Verfahrens nicht erforderlich, verkennt die Bundesregierung allerdings die besonderen Umstände des Abschiebungshaftverfahrens. Weder das Institut der Verfahrenspflegschaft noch die ebenfalls häufig angeführte Möglichkeit der Verfahrenskostenhilfe sind geeignet, die Rechte der Betroffenen in dem gebotenen Maße zu schützen. So ist Voraussetzung für die Gewährung von Verfahrenskostenhilfe ein entsprechender Antrag bei Gericht. Allein die Antragstellung erfordert eine so umfassende Begründung, dass sie ohne Unterstützung einer rechtskundigen Person von Personen, denen deutsche Rechts- und Sprachkenntnis in der Regel fehlt, kaum gewährleistet sein dürfte.

Auch die Bestellung von Verfahrenspfleger*innen ist nicht geeignet, die Rechte der Betroffenen umfassend zu schützen. So wird ein*e Verfahrenspfleger*in i.S.d. § 419 FamFG einerseits nur in den seltenen Ausnahmefällen beigeordnet, wenn der*die Betroffene seinen Willen nicht selbst kundtun kann. Eine solche Beiordnung kann allerdings weder durch die Komplexität der Sach- und Rechtslage noch durch sprachliche Barrieren gerechtfertigt werden. Zum anderen ist die notwendige Sachkunde der beigeordneten Verfahrenspfleger*innen zweifelhaft, denn selbst Jurist*innen scheitern häufig an der Komplexität der Kriterien der Abschiebungshaft (S. 8ff.; siehe zu der entsprechenden Argumentation auch bereits Franz, NVwZ 2024, 216, 218).

Rechtsstaatlichkeit ist keine bloße Effizienzfrage

Schließlich wird im Gesetzesentwurf angeführt, § 62d AufenthG habe „zu einer umfassenden Mehrbelastung der Justiz geführt“ (S.11). Die Abschiebungshaftverfahren seien „zeitintensiver und komplexer“ geworden (S.11). Dies greift eine entsprechende Beobachtung der Justizminister*innen der Länder auf, die aus diesen Erwägungen im November 2024 ebenfalls für eine Abschaffung der Norm plädiert hatten (S.11). Mit dieser Begründung lässt sich aber auch andersherum argumentieren: Ist nicht gerade der Umstand, dass die Verfahren nun u.a. aus Komplexitätsgründen länger dauern, ein Beweis für die Notwendigkeit der Norm? Insbesondere die sehr hohe Fehleranfälligkeit der bisherigen Verfahren spricht dafür. Auch darf es sich bei der Gewährleistung von rechtsstaatlichen Garantien – insbesondere bei Freiheitsentziehungssachen – nicht um bloße Effizienzfragen handeln. Zwar unterliegen auch Verfahren der Freiheitsentziehung dem allgemeinen verfassungsrechtlichen Beschleunigungsgrundsatz (Rn.11). Allerdings gebietet der unlösbare Zusammenhang (Rn.76) zwischen materiellem Freiheitsgrundrecht und formellen Gewährleistungen, dass verfahrensrechtliche Schutzvorschriften nicht als überflüssiges Beiwerk betrachtet werden dürfen. Auch zum Zwecke der Effizienzsteigerung darf auf sie nicht verzichtet werden. Das muss hier erst recht gelten, wenn es sich um eine so zentrale Schutzvorschrift wie den Rechtsbeistand handelt.

Kein Rechtsstaat light

Auch wenn die bisherige Ausgestaltung im Gesetz erhebliche Lücken (z.B. in Bezug auf ihren Anwendungsbereich und das Bestellungsverfahren) enthält, zeigt die Norm in ihrer ursprünglichen Intention doch einen Fortschritt zum Zustand vor 18 Monaten. Inwieweit § 62d AufenthG geeignet ist, die Rechte der Betroffenen im Verfahren tatsächlich geltend zu machen, untersucht derzeit ein Forschungsprojekt an der Universität Hamburg unter Befragung von unmittelbar an den Verfahren beteiligten Richter*innen und Anwält*innen.

Fest steht jedenfalls, dass die geplante Abschaffung des Rechtsbeistandes bei migrationsrechtlichen Freiheitsentziehungsmaßnahmen unter dem Deckmantel der verbesserten Rückführung ein Schritt in die falsche Richtung ist. Ein kritischer Blick auf die vorgebrachten Gründe offenbart zudem einen besorgniserregenden Mangel an Verständnis für den Normzweck des § 62d AufenthG und dessen verfassungsrechtliche Implikationen.

Umfassender Schutz im Freiheitsentziehungsverfahren ist und bleibt ein Eckpfeiler des Rechtsstaates. Pflichtanwält*innen sind in Verfahren der Abschiebungshaft keine überflüssige Formalie, die bloß Abschiebungen verhindert oder verzögert. Sie sollen die Einhaltung von Verfahrensrechten bei der Anordnung einer Freiheitsentziehungsmaßnahme gewährleisten. Es handelt sich somit um einen Mindeststandard, dessen Abschaffung massive verfassungsrechtliche Bedenken gegenüberstehen. Die ersatzlose Streichung des rechtsanwaltlichen Beistands in Abschiebungshaftverfahren reiht sich in die Tendenz ein, in asyl- und aufenthaltsrechtlichen Verfahren von rechtsstaatlichen Grundsätzen abzusehen, und markiert eine systematische Erosion des Rechtsstaates. Sie kann weder mit einer verwaltungs- und gerichtspraktischen Entlastung noch mit (im Übrigen nicht näher dargelegten) Effizienzgründen gerechtfertigt werden.

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