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SchÀdlicher Schutz?

Gegen Mitglieder des EuropĂ€ischen Parlaments (EP) wurde in der Vergangenheit mehrfach aufgrund mutmaßlicher Veruntreuung von EU-Geldern und Korruption ermittelt – man denke nur an die sog. Qatargate-FĂ€lle oder an die Ermittlungen gegen die ehemalige EU-Abgeordnete Marine Le Pen, die am 07.07.2026 auch in zweiter Instanz verurteilt wurde. Die ImmunitĂ€t der Parlamentarier kann dabei ein Hindernis fĂŒr die Ermittlungsbehörden darstellen. Zwei aktuelle FĂ€lle unterstreichen dies: Am 19.05.2026 stimmte das EP im Verfahren 2025/2175(IMM), wie schon zuvor der Rechtsausschuss, gegen die Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t der deutschen EU-Abgeordneten Angelika Niebler. Am 02.07.2026 stimmte der Rechtsausschuss im Verfahren 2026/2000(IMM) erneut gegen die Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t, diesmal des bulgarischen Abgeordneten Ilhan Kyuchyuk – im Übrigen Vorsitzender dieses Ausschusses. Am 07.07.2026 bestĂ€tigte das EP die Entscheidung.

In beiden Verfahren kamen die AntrĂ€ge auf Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t von der EuropĂ€ischen Staatsanwaltschaft (EuStA). Die beiden FĂ€lle weisen neben Gemeinsamkeiten auch Unterschiede auf. Deutlich wird dabei, dass das VerhĂ€ltnis zwischen EuropĂ€ischer Staatsanwaltschaft und Europaparlamentariern immer mehr zur Zerreißprobe wird. Um die IntegritĂ€t des Parlaments als bedeutende Institution nicht zu gefĂ€hrden, sollte das EP seine Abstimmungspraxis in ImmunitĂ€tsangelegenheiten ĂŒberdenken.

Die Gemeinsamkeiten der Verfahren

Gegen beide Abgeordnete wird von der EuropĂ€ischen Staatsanwaltschaft (EuStA) ermittelt. Die EuStA wurde 2021 gegrĂŒndet, vor wenigen Tagen ist mit Ungarn der 25. EU-Mitgliedsstaat beigetreten. Ihre Aufgabe ist die Untersuchung und Verfolgung von Straftaten zum Nachteil der finanziellen Interessen der Union. Sowohl Angelika Niebler als auch Ilhan Kyuchyuk werden der Veruntreuung von EU-Mitteln bezichtigt. Niebler wird insbesondere die vorschriftswidrige Beantragung von Reisekosten vorgeworfen. Parlamentarische Assistenten sollen zeitweise zu privaten Zwecken eingesetzt worden sein, zudem soll ein Assistent faktisch ausschließlich fĂŒr ein anderes ehemaliges Mitglied des EP tĂ€tig gewesen sein (vgl. ausfĂŒhrlicher zu den VorwĂŒrfen hier, S. 4). Gegen Ilhan Kyuchyuk lauten die VorwĂŒrfe, es seien lokale Mitarbeitende zu Zwecken der Parteiarbeit statt fĂŒr sein Mandat als Europaparlamentarier eingesetzt worden, insgesamt umfassen die Ermittlungen einen Zeitraum von mehr als zehn Jahren (ausfĂŒhrlicher hier). In beiden FĂ€llen stellte die EuStA durch ihre GeneralstaatsanwĂ€ltin Laura Codruța Kövesi einen Antrag auf Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t.

Geregelt ist die ImmunitĂ€t der EU-Abgeordneten – inhaltlich unverĂ€ndert seit 1957 – heute in Art. 9 des Protokolls (Nr. 7) ĂŒber die Vorrechte und Befreiungen der EuropĂ€ischen Union. Die Vorschriften sind damit gem. Art. 51 EUV PrimĂ€rrecht. In Art. 9 heißt es: „WĂ€hrend der Dauer der Sitzungsperiode des EuropĂ€ischen Parlaments a) steht seinen Mitgliedern im Hoheitsgebiet ihres eigenen Staates die den Parlamentsmitgliedern zuerkannte Unverletzlichkeit zu, b) können seine Mitglieder im Hoheitsgebiet jedes anderen Mitgliedstaats weder festgehalten noch gerichtlich verfolgt werden.“ Bei dem „eigenen“ Staat handelt es sich nach ĂŒberzeugender Auffassung um den Staat, in dem der Parlamentarier gewĂ€hlt wurde. In diesen FĂ€llen wird somit auf die nationalen Regelungen verwiesen, die teilweise sehr unterschiedlich sind (vgl. ausfĂŒhrlich hier).

Sowohl bei Niebler als auch bei Kyuchyuk wurde im eigenen Staat ermittelt, somit gilt Art. 9 a) des Protokolls. Nach bulgarischem, sowie nach deutschem Verfassungsrecht greift die ImmunitĂ€t frĂŒh und schĂŒtzt bereits vor der Aufnahme von strafrechtlichen Ermittlungen. Dass im Deutschen Bundestag in gĂ€ngiger Praxis zu Beginn der Legislaturperiode bis zu dessen Ablauf die DurchfĂŒhrung von Ermittlungsverfahren wegen Straftaten, mit Ausnahme von Beleidigungen politischen Charakters, vorab genehmigt wird (vgl. hier), ist fĂŒr das EP irrelevant, da die jeweilige nationale Rechtslage und nicht die nationale Parlamentspraxis zugrunde gelegt wird

Bemerkenswert ist, dass die bulgarische und deutsche Verfassungsrechtslage nicht unbedingt der Regel in den Mitgliedsstaaten entspricht. Einige Mitgliedsstaaten, beispielsweise Polen oder Ungarn kennen zwar ebenfalls eine umfassende ImmunitĂ€t. In Frankreich schĂŒtzt die ImmunitĂ€t seit 1995 hingegen nicht mehr vor der bloßen Aufnahme von Ermittlungen (vertiefend hier). In Italien gab es im Jahr 1993 eine Ă€hnliche EinschrĂ€nkung, in Belgien 1997. Auch in DĂ€nemark und RumĂ€nien schĂŒtzt die ImmunitĂ€t nicht vor der Aufnahme von Ermittlungen. Die Niederlande kennen eine ImmunitĂ€t von Abgeordneten ĂŒberhaupt nicht. Eine Vereinheitlichung wurde mehrfach diskutiert, aber nie beschlossen. Vor dem Hintergrund einer gewissen Angleichung des Status der EU-Abgeordneten, insb. durch das Abgeordnetenstatut 2009 oder den 2012 verabschiedeten gemeinsamen Verhaltenskodex erscheint eine Vereinheitlichung auch bei den ImmunitĂ€tsregelungen denkbar.

Der Blick in die Mitgliedsstaaten zeigt somit, dass eine bereits vor strafrechtlichen Ermittlungen schĂŒtzende ImmunitĂ€t heute nicht mehr die Regel ist – ein Umstand, der als Vorbild fĂŒr die Vereinheitlichung dienen könnte.

Jedoch ist dabei zu bedenken, dass starke ImmunitĂ€tsvorschriften das Parlament als Institution, mittelbar aber natĂŒrlich auch seine Abgeordneten schĂŒtzen. Diese werden dadurch insbesondere vor mutmaßlich politisch motivierten Ermittlungen geschĂŒtzt, sog. fumus persecutionis. Der Verdacht auf einen solchen Fall wurde sowohl im Verfahren Niebler als auch im Verfahren Kyuchyuk geltend gemacht. Allerdings liegen beide Fallkonstellationen durchaus unterschiedlich.

Die Unterschiede der Verfahren

Im Fall der Abgeordneten Angelika Niebler kommen die VorwĂŒrfe von einer ehemaligen Mitarbeiterin, die, sollte sich Niebler beispielsweise wegen des öffentlichen Drucks zum RĂŒcktritt gezwungen sehen, aufgrund ihres Listenplatzes fĂŒr Niebler in das Parlament nachrĂŒcken könnte. Der Verdacht eines politischen Hintergrundes der VorwĂŒrfe rĂŒhrt also daher, dass die ehemalige Mitarbeiterin selbst von einem Ausscheiden Nieblers profitieren könnte. Allerdings richteten sich die Argumente von Rechtsausschuss und Parlament gegen die Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t Nieblers vor dem Hintergrund des fumus persecutionis nicht gegen die EuStA selbst. Lediglich einer der genannten GrĂŒnde fĂŒr die Ablehnung des ImmunitĂ€tsgesuchs, nĂ€mlich angebliche Unstimmigkeiten „einschließlich eines offensichtlichen Mangels an Genauigkeit in Bezug auf die genauen in Rede stehenden finanziellen BetrĂ€ge“ bezog sich auf den Antrag der EuStA. Die deutschen ImmunitĂ€tsvorschriften des Grundgesetzes greifen bereits frĂŒh im Ermittlungsverfahren (s.o.) und verhindern damit bereits die Aufnahme vertiefter Ermittlungen und damit detaillierte Ermittlungsergebnisse. In einem solchen Fall, in dem die EuStA den Fall geprĂŒft hat und zu dem Schluss gekommen ist, dass vertiefte Ermittlungen aufzunehmen sind, muss der Weg fĂŒr diese PrĂŒfung vom EP freigemacht werden. FĂŒr das Misstrauen, das die Abstimmung im Fall Niebler der EuStA gegenĂŒber ausgedrĂŒckt hat, gibt es in dem Verfahren keinen ersichtlichen Anlass. Ein Schaden fĂŒr das Ansehen des EP ist durch die Abstimmung jedenfalls bereits entstanden. Sie wurde in deutschen Medien als „rufschĂ€digend“ fĂŒr das Parlament bezeichnet, von Lobby Control im Vorfeld als „Schaden der LegitimitĂ€t“.

Anders liegt der Fall Ilhan Kyuchyuk. Auch hier stammen die VorwĂŒrfe Berichten zufolge von einem seiner Mitarbeitenden und auch im Fall von Kyuchyuk wurde mit der Figur des fumus persecutionis argumentiert, aber mit einer Besonderheit: In diesem Fall richtet sich die Kritik einer mutmaßlichen politischen Ermittlung auch gegen die EuStA selbst. Hintergrund ist, dass Teodora Georgieva, die bulgarische Delegierte EuropĂ€ische StaatsanwĂ€ltin, suspendiert worden war und durch das Kollegium der EuStA ein schweres Fehlverhalten festgestellt wurde. Daher argumentierten Rechtsausschuss und EP mit „grave doubts raised by the finding of serious misconduct on the part of the Bulgarian European Prosecutor – under whose supervision the investigation giving rise to the request for the waiver of immunity was made“, was, neben anderen Argumenten, zur Annahme eines fumus persecutionis fĂŒhrte.

Die EuStA hat sich nicht offiziell zu den VorwĂŒrfen gegen Georgieva geĂ€ußert, vgl. jedoch die Berichte hierGeorgieva selbst gab an, unter Druck gesetzt zu werden sich bedroht zu fĂŒhlen, dazu hier und hier, und erhob wiederum selbst VorwĂŒrfe gegen wichtige bulgarische Politiker, vgl. hier. Klar ist jedenfalls: Die internen Untersuchungen der EuStA gegen Georgieva haben schwerwiegendes Fehlverhalten festgestellt, sie bleibt suspendiert.

Die UnabhÀngigkeit der EuropÀischen Staatsanwaltschaft

Die EuStA hat eine hybride Struktur: Sie besteht gemĂ€ĂŸ der Verordnung 2017/1939 auf zentraler Ebene neben dem Kollegium (Art. 9) aus der EuropĂ€ischen Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Art. 11), den EuropĂ€ischen StaatsanwĂ€lten (Art. 12) und den StĂ€ndigen Kammern (Art. 10). Auf dezentraler Ebene besteht sie aus den Delegierten EuropĂ€ischen StaatsanwĂ€lten (Art. 13), die in den Mitgliedsstaaten angesiedelt sind und dort im Namen der EuStA handeln. Diese Struktur und insbesondere die Rolle der Delegierten EuropĂ€ischen StaatsanwĂ€lte kann man durchaus fĂŒr verbesserungswĂŒrdig halten, vertiefend bspw. hier, zu Bulgarien vgl. hier auf dem Verfassungsblog.

Die suspendierte Teodora Georgieva war die EuropĂ€ische StaatsanwĂ€ltin fĂŒr Bulgarien. Sie beaufsichtigte somit die in Bulgarien mit den Verfahren betrauten Delegierten EuropĂ€ischen StaatsanwĂ€lte und konnte diese anweisen (vgl. Art. 12 Abs. 1, Abs. 3). Die VorwĂŒrfe gegen Georgieva stellen daher eine schwerwiegende Herausforderung fĂŒr die EuStA dar und haben in der Ablehnung des Antrags auf Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t des Abgeordneten Kyuchyuk nun ihren Höhepunkt gefunden. Deutlich wird die FragilitĂ€t der EuStA und die Schwierigkeiten, die mit ihrer Struktur einhergehen. Um Bulgarien ist es dabei nicht ruhiger geworden. Kontroversen gab es jĂŒngst um die Vorschlagslisten fĂŒr die Nachfolge der suspendierten Teodora Georgieva, deren Amtszeit Ende Juli endet, vgl. vertiefend hier und hier, sowie eine aktuelle bulgarische Gerichtsentscheidung vom 07.07.2026. Das bulgarische Rechtssystem weist erhebliche Probleme auf, vgl. dazu auch diese Analyse auf dem Verfassungsblog.

Allerdings kann deshalb nicht unbedingt davon ausgegangen werden, dass die Entscheidung des EP zur Ablehnung des Antrags auf Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t ĂŒberzeugt. Die Ermittlungen in Bulgarien wurden nicht von Teodora Georgieva selbst, sondern von den Delegierten EuropĂ€ischen StaatsanwĂ€lten gefĂŒhrt. Diese werden zwar durch die EuropĂ€ischen StaatsanwĂ€lte beaufsichtigt und angewiesen (vgl. Art. 12 Abs. 1, Abs. 3). Die EuropĂ€ischen StaatsanwĂ€lte beaufsichtigen nach diesen Vorschriften allerdings „fĂŒr die StĂ€ndige Kammer und im Einklang mit etwaigen von dieser gemĂ€ĂŸ Artikel 10 AbsĂ€tze 3, 4 und 5 erteilten Weisungen“; sie können den Delegierten EuropĂ€ischen Staatsanwalt zwar selbst anweisen, aber „im Einklang (
) mit den Weisungen der zustĂ€ndigen StĂ€ndigen Kammer“. Die StĂ€ndigen Kammern bestehen aus drei Mitgliedern, die gerade nicht aus dem jeweiligen Staat des EuropĂ€ischen Staatsanwaltes stammen (vgl. auch Art. 19 Abs. 2 der GeschĂ€ftsordnung der EuStA). Letztlich sind es also die StĂ€ndigen Kammern, die die wichtigen Verfahrensentscheidungen treffen, vgl. Art. 10 Abs. 3-5. Zwar ist der jeweilige EuropĂ€ische Staatsanwalt gem. Art. 10 Abs. 9 in vielen dieser Entscheidungen stimmberechtigt – was sinnvoll ist, da die Mitglieder der StĂ€ndigen Kammern das nationale Recht nicht kennen (vertiefend hier S. 60). Er kann aber von den drei Mitgliedern aus jeweils einem anderen Mitgliedsstaat ĂŒberstimmt werden und durch diese Struktur wird eine UnabhĂ€ngigkeit der Entscheidungen gewĂ€hrleistet. Den Antrag auf Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t stellt im Übrigen nicht der nationale EuropĂ€ische Staatsanwalt, sondern ihn kann gem. Art. 29 Abs. 2 allein der EuropĂ€ische Generalstaatsanwalt stellen.

Im konkreten Fall Ilhan Kyuchyuk ist zudem zu beachten, dass es, soweit ersichtlich, keine konkreten Hinweise zu einem Zusammenhang zwischen der Suspendierung von Georgieva und den Ermittlungen gegen Kyuchyuk gibt. Zudem wurden am 26.03.2025 erste Ermittlungen gegen Georgieva eingeleitet, ab diesem Zeitpunkt wurde sie suspendiert. Georgieva war somit zum Zeitpunkt des Antrags auf Aufhebung der ImmunitÀt am 24.11.2025 bereits seit mehreren Monaten suspendiert.

So schwerwiegend die VorwĂŒrfe gegen Teodora Georgieva auch sein mögen, die Struktur der EuStA durch die StĂ€ndigen Kammern gewĂ€hrleistet grundsĂ€tzlich ihre UnabhĂ€ngigkeit und es existieren effektive interne Kontrollmechanismen der EuStA, was auch die Suspendierung zeigt. Stellt die EuropĂ€ische GeneralstaatsanwĂ€ltin in Kenntnis der Geschehnisse und der Suspendierung Monate spĂ€ter dennoch den Antrag auf Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t, sollte der Weg fĂŒr weitere Ermittlungen der EuStA auch in einem solchen Fall frei gemacht werden. Dass dies nicht getan wurde, ĂŒberrascht allerdings nicht: Wenn die Parlamentarier schon im Verfahren von Angelika Niebler gegen die Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t Nieblers stimmten, lag es nahe, dass sie es im Verfahren gegen Ilhan Kyuchyuk vor dem Hintergrund der VorwĂŒrfe gegen Teodora Georgieva ebenso wenig taten.

Fazit und Ausblick

Berichten zufolge fordern Stimmen des gesamten politischen Spektrums eine grundsĂ€tzliche ÜberprĂŒfung der ImmunitĂ€tsverfahren des EP. Änderungen des Protokolls Nr. 7 wĂ€ren theoretisch denkbar. Allerdings wĂ€re eine solche Änderung des PrimĂ€rrechts (Art. 48 EUV) vor dem Hintergrund des Einstimmigkeitsprinzips kompliziert und langwierig. Kurzfristig sollte das EP seine Abstimmungspraxis in ImmunitĂ€tsangelegenheiten ĂŒberdenken, wenn die AntrĂ€ge von der EuStA ausgehen und sich in diesen FĂ€llen der DurchfĂŒhrung von Ermittlungsverfahren nicht entgegenstellen. Es ist fĂŒr die IntegritĂ€t des Parlaments als Institution von hoher Bedeutung, dass nicht der Eindruck entsteht, Ermittlungen wegen Veruntreuung von EU-Geldern verhindern zu wollen. Aktuell scheint es dafĂŒr jedoch am Vertrauen der Parlamentarier gegenĂŒber der EuStA zu fehlen. Dieses Vertrauen muss wiederhergestellt werden. Auf den designierten EuropĂ€ischen Generalstaatsanwalt, AndrĂ©as Ritter, dessen Amtszeit am 01.11.2026 beginnt, wird viel Arbeit zukommen.

The post SchÀdlicher Schutz? appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Dignity Without Autonomy

In Prajwala v. Union of India, the Supreme Court held that victims of trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation (“CSE”) have a right to rehabilitation under Article 23 read with the right to dignity under Article 21.

While the judgment has been celebrated for its three-dimensional dignity framework, it is a missed opportunity to articulate a constitutional basis for protecting the rights of sex workers. The Court’s dignity framework – calibrated against objectification in trafficking – is insufficient alone to address persons who assert agency over their work. I argue that reading it alongside decisional autonomy fills the gap: it grounds the Court’s procedural safeguards for sex workers in enforceable constitutional rights while respecting the institutional boundary between judicial protection of persons and legislative determination of sex work policy.

The Limits of Dignity in Prajwala

In Prajwala, the Court observed that human trafficking law has traditionally been framed from a crime-control perspective: one that prioritises punishment of the perpetrator over the rights and needs of victims. In this view, since trafficking is a crime against society at large, the victim’s interests are subsumed within society’s interest in accurate prosecution. The victim, their rights, and their special needs are only incidentally, if at all, addressed.

Against this backdrop, the Court adopted a human rights approach: victims are rights-holders independent of the criminal justice system’s goals, and their rehabilitation is constitutionally mandated alongside punishment of the perpetrator. The Court relied primarily on the right to dignity under Article 21 to elaborate on the rights of trafficking victims. It held that while dignity is a malleable concept capable of supporting contrary positions, there exists a minimum content that cannot be derogated from.

Building on earlier jurisprudence, the Court identified three dimensions of dignity guaranteed to every person [para. 264]. First, inherent dignity: the intrinsic worth of every human being as an end in themselves. Second, dignity in its material dimension: access to the basic conditions necessary for a dignified life. Third, dignity as recognition: protection against the concrete harms caused by pervasive stigmatisation and social exclusion.

The Court held that trafficking violates inherent dignity by objectifying persons: the trafficked individual is reduced to their value to the buyer, stripped of intrinsic worth [para. 265]. The material dimension is implicated because the absence of basic conditions – shelter, livelihood, safety – creates the vulnerability that trafficking exploits [para. 272]. Finally, trafficking victims are particularly disadvantaged along the recognition dimension: their suffering is frequently treated as self-inflicted or undeserving of concern, resulting in social isolation and inaccessibility of legal assistance.

Reading Article 21 alongside the prohibition on trafficking under Article 23, the Court held that trafficking victims have a right to rehabilitation enforceable against the State, a right that extends beyond punishment and rescue. This framework informed the binding guidelines the Court laid down, exercising its jurisdiction under Article 142, which empowers it to pass orders necessary to do “complete justice”, covering the full spectrum from rescue to reintegration.

The Court did not, however, extend this framework to voluntary sex workers despite making two observations that closely track its own dignity analysis. First, it noted that the law fails to address the conditions of vulnerability and abuse in which sex work takes place: an observation that maps onto dignity in its material dimension [paras. 407, 408]. Second, it observed that society’s moral condemnation of sex workers as willing participants in indecent work produces concrete harms – isolation and inaccessibility of legal assistance – which is precisely what dignity as recognition is designed to address [para. 409].

This omission is especially curious given the Court’s own holding that the rights of sex workers can be protected independently of a right to sex work. The Court could have recognised sex workers’ right to dignity, particularly in its material and recognition dimensions, while leaving the status of sex work itself to the Legislature.

Autonomy as the Missing Constitutional Principle

The Court likely refrained from grounding sex workers’ claims in the right to dignity because its inherent dignity formulation was specifically calibrated to trafficking: it targets objectification – the reduction of a person to their value to the buyer. Applying that formulation to sex work as such would risk treating it as inherently involving self-commodification, without acknowledging the agency of persons who engage in it voluntarily. This would effectively endorse the abolitionist position – one the Court deliberately declined to take [para. 314].

Autonomy, an analytically distinct principle developed in Puttaswamy (9J) remedies this. Where inherent dignity concerns a person’s intrinsic worth as an end in themselves (a quality that exists independently of their relationships), autonomy is relational: it protects the individual’s choices from interference by the State or third parties. I argue that the two principles can coexist and, together, cover what neither covers alone.

In Puttaswamy, the judges converged on the autonomy principle as the basis of privacy. Chandrachud J. and Nariman J. both held that the right to privacy protects decisional autonomy over fundamental personal choices. Most significantly for present purposes, Chelameswar J. held that this autonomy encompasses “the freedom to choose either to work or not and the freedom to choose the nature of the work” – a formulation that applies directly to sex workers’ claims [para. 38].

The Puttaswamy court also addressed the relationship between privacy and dignity. Nariman J. held that privacy of choice is a prerequisite for the self-development encompassed by the right to dignity [para. 85]. Bobde J. went further, holding that the two rights are inextricably intertwined under Article 21 [para. 30].

In the context of sex work, however, dignity and decisional autonomy can pull in opposite directions. The Puttaswamy court leaves this tension unresolved. The question is therefore how courts should approach it – and the Prajwala judgment itself offers a framework.

The Prajwala Court observed [para. 317]:

“In all of us, agency and vulnerability coexist. What varies is the extent to which one bears upon the other, and this is determined largely by the circumstances of our lives. For a person who faces poverty, social exclusion, and the absence of livelihood alternatives, their vulnerability may significantly narrow the range of choices available to them. But it does not extinguish choice altogether. Acknowledging this co-existence has two important implications when it comes to those who engage in prostitution. First, viewing a woman who has entered prostitution voluntarily as an ‘agent’ does not mean that one becomes blind to the vulnerabilities that shaped and constrained her decision. Understanding her agency requires understanding the circumstances in which it was exercised, thereby necessitating measures in cases where agency is severely constrained. Secondly, viewing a trafficked or coerced woman as a ‘victim’ does not mean she is without agency. Even within conditions of exploitation and coercion, she retains the capacity to make decisions about her present and her future.”

This passage yields a workable constitutional test. The default position must be that where a person asserts voluntary engagement in sex work, their decisional autonomy is engaged and the State bears the burden of establishing that agency-diminishing circumstances were so severe as to negate meaningful choice. Only where that burden is discharged should inherent dignity override autonomy.

In this inquiry, the person’s own statement about voluntariness carries presumptive weight – rebuttable only where there is objective evidence of coercion or third-party control, assessed by a Magistrate rather than the police. The burden of producing such individualised evidence lies on the State; it may include documentary records or indicators of third-party control. This is grounded in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, where the Court held that under Article 21, any procedure affecting life or liberty must be fair, just, and reasonable. Where the State proposes to restrict liberty on the ground that a person’s apparent consent is not real, due process consequently requires that the person be heard on whether their agency was compromised. The right to be heard requires that the person’s account be genuinely weighed – it cannot be nullified by a blanket presumption that persons in sex work lack agency.

A possible objection is that recognising decisional autonomy in relation to sex work effectively endorses decriminalisation, resolving a contested legislative policy question by judicial fiat. This objection misreads the argument. First, the ITPA already permits sex work for personal benefit without third-party involvement (subject to the limited exceptions in Sections 7 and 8); the constitutional right operates within that existing legal space, not beyond it. Second, and more fundamentally, the right would attach to sex workers as persons – not to the activity of sex work – in line with the Court’s own framing. Recognising that a person has a constitutional right to make choices about their work is categorically different from recognising a right to sex work; the former constrains how the State may treat individuals, while the latter would constrain legislative authority over the activity itself.

It may be argued that decisional autonomy presupposes a choosing subject who is free from structural coercion – yet sex work in the Indian context takes place within conditions of extreme poverty, caste subordination, and patriarchal constraint. However, relational autonomy theory, which analyses how autonomy operates under conditions of structural constraint, holds that the presence of such conditions does not extinguish autonomy altogether.

Diana Meyers distinguishes three forms of autonomy. Programmatic autonomy – the most demanding – involves ownership of one’s major life decisions and overall life plan. Narrowly programmatic autonomy is the capacity to make autonomous decisions within a particular significant domain of one’s life. Episodic autonomy is the ability to identify one’s immediate wants and act on them in a specific situation. While programmatic autonomy may be systematically diminished by structural oppression, Meyers argues that narrowly programmatic and episodic autonomy survive because they depend on skills such as emotional perceptiveness and self-awareness that oppressive conditions do not necessarily destroy. The choice to engage in sex work reflects narrowly programmatic autonomy, as it involves evaluating economic options, assessing risk, and comparing alternatives within a significant but bounded domain of one’s life, which is precisely the kind of decision that Meyers’ framework is designed to recognise.

Constitutional Foundations and Future Challenges

Without a constitutional foundation in dignity and autonomy, the procedural safeguards in the Victim Protection Plan rest on the Court’s Article 142 directions alone – giving rise to the compliance problem that has historically plagued such directions. Two safeguards are particularly significant. First, citing Budhadev Karmaskar v. State of West Bengal (2022), the Court held that the non-interference principle requires police to determine whether a person is a voluntary sex worker before removing them during a rescue operation under Section 15 of the ITPA [para. 362 c.(iii)].

Second, the Court acknowledged that rescue operations are often conducted in time-sensitive conditions, making it likely that voluntary sex workers will be taken into custody. When such persons are produced before a Magistrate under Section 17, the Court held that a threshold determination must be made at the outset as to whether they are voluntary sex workers who do not wish to be subjected to further custody – if so, they should not be subjected to the more intrusive inquiry under Section 17(2) [para. 335].

As matters stand, these safeguards depend on compliance with Article 142 directions – a mechanism with a poor track record. Had the Court grounded sex workers’ claims in the right to dignity and decisional autonomy under Article 21, violations of these safeguards would be directly enforceable: sex workers could challenge non-compliance through writ petitions before the High Courts under Article 226 or the Supreme Court under Article 32. The constitutional foundation would convert the Court’s directions from aspirational guidelines into justiciable rights.

Recognition of dignity and decisional autonomy would also enable incremental constitutional challenges to the ITPA’s most problematic provisions. In Shakti Vahini v. Union of India (2018), the Court extended the decisional autonomy principle from Puttaswamy to intimate association, holding that an adult’s choice of life partner is constitutionally protected. The ITPA raises analogous concerns.

Section 4(1) penalises adults financially dependent on a sex worker, potentially criminalising dependent family members; Section 4(2) punishes persons who live with or habitually keep the company of a sex worker. Both provisions burden the relationships that surround a sex worker’s choices without distinguishing exploitative third-party control from legitimate supportive association – the same defect that led the Supreme Court of Canada in Bedford (2013) to strike down a comparable prohibition on living off the avails of prostitution, and one that the decisional autonomy principle, read through Shakti Vahini, equally condemns. Section 20, which enables the removal of sex workers from a locality on the sole basis of their occupation, raises a distinct but related concern: as Bhatia has argued, it targets persons for conduct that Article 21 protects.

Conclusion

The Prajwala judgment developed a powerful dignity framework for victims of trafficking but stopped short of articulating a constitutional basis for protecting sex workers. Reading dignity alongside decisional autonomy fills that gap: it grounds the Court’s procedural safeguards in enforceable constitutional rights and provides the foundation for incremental challenges to the ITPA’s most problematic provisions. More broadly, it demonstrates that the rights of sex workers can be constitutionally secured – as the Court itself affirmed – without the Court having to take a position on the right to sex work.

The post Dignity Without Autonomy appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Erfurt Shines

Last weekend I was in Erfurt, the place where the authoritarian-populist AfD party held its annual federal convention. On Friday, I sat on a panel with my colleague Janos Richter at the conference “Before It Is Too Late: Scholarly Perspectives on the Fascist Danger”. And on Saturday I got up at the crack of dawn to help block the AfD delegates from reaching the assembly hall. I sat on Gothaer Platz, surrounded by police in black helmets, together with researchers of all disciplines and levels of seniority, as part of the refreshingly well-attended “science bloc”, and along with thousands of other protesters – to place my body in the path of this party hostile to the constitution.

Was I supposed to do that? As managing director of a legal-scholarly discourse platform on which this intellectual contest is supposed to be able to take place, should I not have remained neutral? Do I not thereby alienate the pole of the debate that simply sees things differently, that may well identify with one or another of such identitarian projects, and that will then no longer feel comfortable and welcome at Verfassungsblog? Do I not thereby damage the very thing I want to defend – the free contest of ideas among the free and equal, which has been regarded for seventy years as nothing less than constitutive of the Federal Republic’s constitutional order?

If one believes what could be read last week in all sorts of liberal centrist media, my behaviour was at any rate one thing: undemocratic. The AfD, the argument ran, has not been banned for the time being, and all democrats are therefore duty-bound to let it hold its party conference in peace, as if it were a party like any other. What unsettles me about this criticism is above all the breadth with which it is shared in a German public whose faith in the state appears unbroken. The addressee of the prohibition on discriminating between parties that have not been banned is the state – which in return holds the monopoly on initiating proceedings to ban a party hostile to the constitution. A monopoly it has so far, for whatever reasons, declined to use. That this should oblige civil society to regard and treat a party hostile to the constitution, such as the AfD, as a perfectly normal, legitimate participant in democratic competition seems to me, to put it cautiously, in need of justification.

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The demand to forbid oneself from discriminating between non-banned parties loyal to the constitution and non-banned parties hostile to it is questionable not only insofar as it is addressed to democratic civil society, but also and especially insofar as it is addressed to scholarship. Anyone who cares about free scholarship must emphatically reject it. For one, because the freedom of scholarship itself sits squarely in the crosshairs already. There is more than enough evidence for that; anyone who doubts it can look up the chapter on science and scholarship in the AfD’s manifesto for Saxony-Anhalt, or briefly recall the infamous affair of the former Federal Minister of Research, Bettina Stark-Watzinger. For another, because scholarship, if it submits to this presumption, blinds itself. It then loses the very capacity to know a party hostile to the constitution for what it is. And if there is one thing that scholarship must not allow itself to be prevented from doing – for its own sake, as the epistemic enterprise it is – it is this: to know.

This demand’s inherent hostility to scholarship could also be felt in the unbelievable hate campaign – the most hideous death threats included – that scholars such as Ralf Michaels and Anne Graefe have had to endure in recent days, after they defended, in the run-up to the Erfurt protests, the legitimacy of civil disobedience against the AfD party conference. The aim of this campaign is clear: whoever takes a stand is to be made untenable as a scholar, ad personam, through the destruction of their academic reputation and, ultimately, their professional existence. Parts of the formerly respectable liberal-conservative press are not above rolling up their shirtsleeves and piling in with the greatest relish. (A salute, at this point, to JĂŒrgen Kaube, co-publisher of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Niklas Luhmann’s erstwhile student, who has now enriched the discipline with the sociological term of art “unwashed subjectivity”. Hello, Herr Kaube! Love everything about your performative contribution to the field.) What this means for scholarship is equally clear: it must place itself between the attackers and those under attack. Whoever fails to do so, whoever slinks off into the bushes muttering “neutrality”, whoever, worse still, yields to the pressure and sanctions those under attack – to say nothing of those who, as supposed scholars, actively participate in the campaign – had better not come to me ever again with their academic freedom.

Ceterum censeo: it is not as if the ethnocultural fantasies of purity and purification, of norming and normalisation harboured by the authoritarian populists of the AfD were the only identitarian grand project that democrats and scholars have reason to oppose with their bodies these days. Today the Bundesrat – the federal chamber representing the governments of the LĂ€nder – adopted a legislative initiative, launched by Hesse’s CDU-led state government, that aims at an authoritarian carve-out from freedom of opinion in favour of a new mythical founding narrative for our country. The “denial of Israel’s right to exist” is to be made a criminal offence – not for the purpose of protecting any legal good, however pretextual, but quite unabashedly as a piece of special legislation discriminating on the basis of viewpoint. What this bill is about, and why I consider it a caesura of constitutional-historical magnitude, I have set out at length for the Berlin Review. The essay appeared last Tuesday and can be read here without a paywall. I wish you a stimulating read!

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Back to Erfurt and to the hate campaign: That should have collapsed under its own weight at the latest after it had become clear that the Erfurt blockade had in fact remained what it had claimed to be from the outset: peaceful. Had the fantasies of violence in which some indulged beforehand actually come true, that might have provided for some pretext to pin the blame on some supposed academic instigators. But they did not.

That is probably owed above all to the astonishingly good and careful organisation of the protests. The organisers had not only defined a shrewdly crafted, peaceful action consensus under which literally everyone, black-clad anarchist or bespectacled granny, could gather. Above all, they seemed to have managed to win much of the city’s population over to their side. It was the city itself that took to the streets. People waved to us from balconies and windows as we set off towards the conference hall in the early morning. Small children. Old people. Everywhere, people had hung golden emergency blankets in their windows as a sign: Erfurt glĂ€nzt (Erfurt shines). There it was, the famous civil society. Mobilised. Ready for conflict. Ready to resist.

There is no place for civil society in the authoritarian grand projects of the AfD and the CDU. Whatever is not the state is family or business – private, either way. That is precisely why they need these identitarian myths: to allow something like collective identity to emerge at all in a depoliticised society. What could be felt in Erfurt is the opposite of that. What could be felt there was a society that identifies itself through collective action, through the shared experience of collective political efficacy. That is the society I want to live in.

*

Editor’s Pick

by JANOS RICHTER

Copyright: BiM Distribuzione

“Prometti, per sempre sarà” – “Promise me, it will be forever” – sings Ambra Angiolini in the song “T’appartengo”, which the young protagonists of the film “The Wonders” (Alice Rohrwacher, 2014) sing and hum again and again, sometimes dancing along. The film follows twelve-year-old Gelsomina as the end of her childhood teaches her that nothing lasts forever – a realization that unsettles her at first, but which she gradually comes to see as holding its own kind of freedom. She grows up with her siblings in rural Italy, under the harsh hand of her taciturn, weathered father, who seems to have forgotten the liberating power of change. Gelsomina handles her newfound freedom so responsibly that we feel the injustice sharply when her father responds with rejection and hurt. Alice Rohrwacher stages these conflicts and Gelsomina’s growth so authentically and enchantingly that it’s hard not to feel sad realizing the film doesn’t last forever, but only 111 minutes.

*

The Week on Verfassungsblog

summarised by EVA MARIA BREDLER

France has historically been a country of vigorous civil society – from the storming of the Bastille to the stormy Gilets Jaunes, young and old alike take to the streets to defend their rights, preferably with fiery fervour. How much room will be left for that? Marine Le Pen leads the polls for the 2027 presidential election. And now she may run again: on 7 July, the Paris Court of Appeal upheld her conviction for misappropriating public funds but eased the loss of her civil rights just enough to make her eligible once more. CHARLOTTE SCHMITT-LEONARDY (GER) explains what has changed and maps possible scenarios.

In Erfurt, civil society is shining. But if we want to act politically as a collective, we need, first of all, information. That’s about to get harder. The German government wants to fundamentally overhaul the Freedom of Information Act – with a narrower circle of applicants, higher fees and new exemptions. CHIARA LANG, ROBIN LENZ, MAXIMILIAN PICHL and HANNAH VOS (GER) argue: this turns a right of everyone into a privilege for the few.

Private actors make access to information harder too – especially US tech companies, which hand us the dark wand entirely unregulated: deepfakes are flooding our feeds and are barely recognisable as such anymore. And they are not the only AI-generated content creating regulatory headaches. The EU’s new “Code of Practice on Transparency of AI-Generated Content” is an attempt to regulate such synthetic media. For PAUL FRIEDL (ENG), it offers sensible answers to several open questions – but it cannot escape a structural shortcoming: AI-content detection is not a “fixable” technical problem but a context-dependent, political one that demands iterative, multi-actor coordination.

AI is not only distorting our informational ecosystem but also chopping down old trees, quite literally: AI companies buy up used books, scan them, and discard them to feed their models. This roundabout method exists because it’s expected to fall under the fair use provision of U.S. copyright law. JANNIS LENNARTZ (ENG) locates the real problem elsewhere, though: not that Americans are buying unwanted books, but that books are increasingly unwanted in Europe.

Much more unwanted in the US are real human beings who happen to be born on US soil without the privilege of a certain piece of paper. In one of his many Executive Orders targeting immigrants, Trump denied American citizenship to children born on U.S. soil to immigrant parents who are undocumented or present on certain visas. Last Tuesday, the Supreme Court deemed this attempt unconstitutional in Trump v Barbara. ANJA BOSSOW (ENG) considers it a rare and important win but cautions that Barbara should not be remembered as an example of principled judicial resistance against gross executive overreach.

European institutions are testing another route for excluding migrants: amid ECtHR proceedings over pushbacks, the Chișinău Declaration frames migration as a security issue. CAMELIA-CLAUDIA MURESAN (ENG) rejects the instrumentalisation of the Court and explains why migrants invoking their human rights cannot be seen as a threat to democracy.

What is indeed a threat to European democracy are parties that violate the values of the European Union. For the first time, a breach of Article 2 TEU could get a European party struck from the register and cut off from EU funding. Whether this fate awaits the Europe of Sovereign Nations, which includes the AfD, will not only hinge on political majorities alone, but on the dogmatic elaboration of Article 2 TEU. The CJEU has developed standards for this over the past years, which could now become practically relevant for the first time. JOHANNA MITTROP (GER) sketches out possible scenarios.

Another real threat to democracy plays out online: TikTok is not just for trends – it’s also a space for political provocation and criticism. How far can that go under Article 10 ECHR when directed at public officials? GIONATA BOUCHÉ (ENG) criticises the ECtHR’s narrow answer in Miladze v Georgia.

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Offline, the space for political action is narrowing too: in the Palestine Action case, the defendants broke into an Israeli defence company in the UK, causing millions in damage. FREDERICK ATTENBOROUGH (ENG) explains how the judge, rather than a jury, declared their actions to be terrorist acts.

Israel is also at the centre of a different debate, playing out in Brussels: at the next European Council meeting on 13 July, the European Commission is expected to finally propose measures to restrict EU trade with illegal Israeli settlements. PEDRO R. BORGES DE CARVALHO (ENG) contextualises the discussed proposals.

Meanwhile, the German government coalition wants to ban the federal states from socialising private rental housing stock. Would that be compatible with the Basic Law’s allocation of competences? TIMO LAVEN (GER) shows that the plans are unconstitutional for several reasons at once.

And the Bundestag debated, say, private organ stocks: once again, the question was whether the current “opt-in” system for organ donation should be replaced by the more effective “opt-out” system. KARSTEN WITT (GER) analyses the dispute from an ethical perspective.

Also, our symposium “European Society After Commission v Hungary” (ENG) came to an end – after no fewer than 23 contributions! At this year’s Academy of EU at the EUI, the concept of European society was heavily debated. CHIARA RIMKUS reflects on these discussions and explains what they mean for the future direction of EU legal scholarship. MARLENE TIEDE shows how EU private international law knits diverse national legal orders into one legal community. HANS W. MICKLITZ examines the potential impact of the concept of European society on private law relations in Europe. Article 2 TEU contains the operative legal category of solidarity. Yet, as TERESA VIOLANTE critically explains, this concept has not entered the CJEU’s reasoning.

Well, solidarity is best when it’s not a legal category but a collective reality, anyway. And gold foil doesn’t just look good in Erfurt’s windows. It reflects back, brilliantly, whatever stands opposite it. And however dark that might be.

*

That’s it for this week. Take care and all the best!

Yours,

the Verfassungsblog Team

 

 

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The post Erfurt Shines appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

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Immer mehr Menschen wird mittlerweile klar, dass die Presse, insbesondere die öffentlich-rechtlichen Sender, eine erhebliche Mitschuld an den gegenwĂ€rtigen VerhĂ€ltnissen haben, in denen man nicht mehr sicher sein kann, was wahre Begebenheit oder Propaganda ist. Am Letzten Wochenende fand in Erfurt am Rand einer „friedlichen“, aber gegen die Verfassung gerichteten Demonstration, indem man die AfD 
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SchÀdlicher Schutz?

Gegen Mitglieder des EuropĂ€ischen Parlaments (EP) wurde in der Vergangenheit mehrfach aufgrund mutmaßlicher Veruntreuung von EU-Geldern und Korruption ermittelt – man denke nur an die sog. Qatargate-FĂ€lle oder an die Ermittlungen gegen die ehemalige EU-Abgeordnete Marine Le Pen, die am 07.07.2026 auch in zweiter Instanz verurteilt wurde. Die ImmunitĂ€t der Parlamentarier kann dabei ein Hindernis fĂŒr die Ermittlungsbehörden darstellen. Zwei aktuelle FĂ€lle unterstreichen dies: Am 19.05.2026 stimmte das EP im Verfahren 2025/2175(IMM), wie schon zuvor der Rechtsausschuss, gegen die Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t der deutschen EU-Abgeordneten Angelika Niebler. Am 02.07.2026 stimmte der Rechtsausschuss im Verfahren 2026/2000(IMM) erneut gegen die Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t, diesmal des bulgarischen Abgeordneten Ilhan Kyuchyuk – im Übrigen Vorsitzender dieses Ausschusses. Am 07.07.2026 bestĂ€tigte das EP die Entscheidung.

In beiden Verfahren kamen die AntrĂ€ge auf Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t von der EuropĂ€ischen Staatsanwaltschaft (EuStA). Die beiden FĂ€lle weisen neben Gemeinsamkeiten auch Unterschiede auf. Deutlich wird dabei, dass das VerhĂ€ltnis zwischen EuropĂ€ischer Staatsanwaltschaft und Europaparlamentariern immer mehr zur Zerreißprobe wird. Um die IntegritĂ€t des Parlaments als bedeutende Institution nicht zu gefĂ€hrden, sollte das EP seine Abstimmungspraxis in ImmunitĂ€tsangelegenheiten ĂŒberdenken.

Die Gemeinsamkeiten der Verfahren

Gegen beide Abgeordnete wird von der EuropĂ€ischen Staatsanwaltschaft (EuStA) ermittelt. Die EuStA wurde 2021 gegrĂŒndet, vor wenigen Tagen ist mit Ungarn der 25. EU-Mitgliedsstaat beigetreten. Ihre Aufgabe ist die Untersuchung und Verfolgung von Straftaten zum Nachteil der finanziellen Interessen der Union. Sowohl Angelika Niebler als auch Ilhan Kyuchyuk werden der Veruntreuung von EU-Mitteln bezichtigt. Niebler wird insbesondere die vorschriftswidrige Beantragung von Reisekosten vorgeworfen. Parlamentarische Assistenten sollen zeitweise zu privaten Zwecken eingesetzt worden sein, zudem soll ein Assistent faktisch ausschließlich fĂŒr ein anderes ehemaliges Mitglied des EP tĂ€tig gewesen sein (vgl. ausfĂŒhrlicher zu den VorwĂŒrfen hier, S. 4). Gegen Ilhan Kyuchyuk lauten die VorwĂŒrfe, es seien lokale Mitarbeitende zu Zwecken der Parteiarbeit statt fĂŒr sein Mandat als Europaparlamentarier eingesetzt worden, insgesamt umfassen die Ermittlungen einen Zeitraum von mehr als zehn Jahren (ausfĂŒhrlicher hier). In beiden FĂ€llen stellte die EuStA durch ihre GeneralstaatsanwĂ€ltin Laura Codruța Kövesi einen Antrag auf Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t.

Geregelt ist die ImmunitĂ€t der EU-Abgeordneten – inhaltlich unverĂ€ndert seit 1957 – heute in Art. 9 des Protokolls (Nr. 7) ĂŒber die Vorrechte und Befreiungen der EuropĂ€ischen Union. Die Vorschriften sind damit gem. Art. 51 EUV PrimĂ€rrecht. In Art. 9 heißt es: „WĂ€hrend der Dauer der Sitzungsperiode des EuropĂ€ischen Parlaments a) steht seinen Mitgliedern im Hoheitsgebiet ihres eigenen Staates die den Parlamentsmitgliedern zuerkannte Unverletzlichkeit zu, b) können seine Mitglieder im Hoheitsgebiet jedes anderen Mitgliedstaats weder festgehalten noch gerichtlich verfolgt werden.“ Bei dem „eigenen“ Staat handelt es sich nach ĂŒberzeugender Auffassung um den Staat, in dem der Parlamentarier gewĂ€hlt wurde. In diesen FĂ€llen wird somit auf die nationalen Regelungen verwiesen, die teilweise sehr unterschiedlich sind (vgl. ausfĂŒhrlich hier).

Sowohl bei Niebler als auch bei Kyuchyuk wurde im eigenen Staat ermittelt, somit gilt Art. 9 a) des Protokolls. Nach bulgarischem, sowie nach deutschem Verfassungsrecht greift die ImmunitĂ€t frĂŒh und schĂŒtzt bereits vor der Aufnahme von strafrechtlichen Ermittlungen. Dass im Deutschen Bundestag in gĂ€ngiger Praxis zu Beginn der Legislaturperiode bis zu dessen Ablauf die DurchfĂŒhrung von Ermittlungsverfahren wegen Straftaten, mit Ausnahme von Beleidigungen politischen Charakters, vorab genehmigt wird (vgl. hier), ist fĂŒr das EP irrelevant, da die jeweilige nationale Rechtslage und nicht die nationale Parlamentspraxis zugrunde gelegt wird

Bemerkenswert ist, dass die bulgarische und deutsche Verfassungsrechtslage nicht unbedingt der Regel in den Mitgliedsstaaten entspricht. Einige Mitgliedsstaaten, beispielsweise Polen oder Ungarn kennen zwar ebenfalls eine umfassende ImmunitĂ€t. In Frankreich schĂŒtzt die ImmunitĂ€t seit 1995 hingegen nicht mehr vor der bloßen Aufnahme von Ermittlungen (vertiefend hier). In Italien gab es im Jahr 1993 eine Ă€hnliche EinschrĂ€nkung, in Belgien 1997. Auch in DĂ€nemark und RumĂ€nien schĂŒtzt die ImmunitĂ€t nicht vor der Aufnahme von Ermittlungen. Die Niederlande kennen eine ImmunitĂ€t von Abgeordneten ĂŒberhaupt nicht. Eine Vereinheitlichung wurde mehrfach diskutiert, aber nie beschlossen. Vor dem Hintergrund einer gewissen Angleichung des Status der EU-Abgeordneten, insb. durch das Abgeordnetenstatut 2009 oder den 2012 verabschiedeten gemeinsamen Verhaltenskodex erscheint eine Vereinheitlichung auch bei den ImmunitĂ€tsregelungen denkbar.

Der Blick in die Mitgliedsstaaten zeigt somit, dass eine bereits vor strafrechtlichen Ermittlungen schĂŒtzende ImmunitĂ€t heute nicht mehr die Regel ist – ein Umstand, der als Vorbild fĂŒr die Vereinheitlichung dienen könnte.

Jedoch ist dabei zu bedenken, dass starke ImmunitĂ€tsvorschriften das Parlament als Institution, mittelbar aber natĂŒrlich auch seine Abgeordneten schĂŒtzen. Diese werden dadurch insbesondere vor mutmaßlich politisch motivierten Ermittlungen geschĂŒtzt, sog. fumus persecutionis. Der Verdacht auf einen solchen Fall wurde sowohl im Verfahren Niebler als auch im Verfahren Kyuchyuk geltend gemacht. Allerdings liegen beide Fallkonstellationen durchaus unterschiedlich.

Die Unterschiede der Verfahren

Im Fall der Abgeordneten Angelika Niebler kommen die VorwĂŒrfe von einer ehemaligen Mitarbeiterin, die, sollte sich Niebler beispielsweise wegen des öffentlichen Drucks zum RĂŒcktritt gezwungen sehen, aufgrund ihres Listenplatzes fĂŒr Niebler in das Parlament nachrĂŒcken könnte. Der Verdacht eines politischen Hintergrundes der VorwĂŒrfe rĂŒhrt also daher, dass die ehemalige Mitarbeiterin selbst von einem Ausscheiden Nieblers profitieren könnte. Allerdings richteten sich die Argumente von Rechtsausschuss und Parlament gegen die Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t Nieblers vor dem Hintergrund des fumus persecutionis nicht gegen die EuStA selbst. Lediglich einer der genannten GrĂŒnde fĂŒr die Ablehnung des ImmunitĂ€tsgesuchs, nĂ€mlich angebliche Unstimmigkeiten „einschließlich eines offensichtlichen Mangels an Genauigkeit in Bezug auf die genauen in Rede stehenden finanziellen BetrĂ€ge“ bezog sich auf den Antrag der EuStA. Die deutschen ImmunitĂ€tsvorschriften des Grundgesetzes greifen bereits frĂŒh im Ermittlungsverfahren (s.o.) und verhindern damit bereits die Aufnahme vertiefter Ermittlungen und damit detaillierte Ermittlungsergebnisse. In einem solchen Fall, in dem die EuStA den Fall geprĂŒft hat und zu dem Schluss gekommen ist, dass vertiefte Ermittlungen aufzunehmen sind, muss der Weg fĂŒr diese PrĂŒfung vom EP freigemacht werden. FĂŒr das Misstrauen, das die Abstimmung im Fall Niebler der EuStA gegenĂŒber ausgedrĂŒckt hat, gibt es in dem Verfahren keinen ersichtlichen Anlass. Ein Schaden fĂŒr das Ansehen des EP ist durch die Abstimmung jedenfalls bereits entstanden. Sie wurde in deutschen Medien als „rufschĂ€digend“ fĂŒr das Parlament bezeichnet, von Lobby Control im Vorfeld als „Schaden der LegitimitĂ€t“.

Anders liegt der Fall Ilhan Kyuchyuk. Auch hier stammen die VorwĂŒrfe Berichten zufolge von einem seiner Mitarbeitenden und auch im Fall von Kyuchyuk wurde mit der Figur des fumus persecutionis argumentiert, aber mit einer Besonderheit: In diesem Fall richtet sich die Kritik einer mutmaßlichen politischen Ermittlung auch gegen die EuStA selbst. Hintergrund ist, dass Teodora Georgieva, die bulgarische Delegierte EuropĂ€ische StaatsanwĂ€ltin, suspendiert worden war und durch das Kollegium der EuStA ein schweres Fehlverhalten festgestellt wurde. Daher argumentierten Rechtsausschuss und EP mit „grave doubts raised by the finding of serious misconduct on the part of the Bulgarian European Prosecutor – under whose supervision the investigation giving rise to the request for the waiver of immunity was made“, was, neben anderen Argumenten, zur Annahme eines fumus persecutionis fĂŒhrte.

Die EuStA hat sich nicht offiziell zu den VorwĂŒrfen gegen Georgieva geĂ€ußert, vgl. jedoch die Berichte hierGeorgieva selbst gab an, unter Druck gesetzt zu werden sich bedroht zu fĂŒhlen, dazu hier und hier, und erhob wiederum selbst VorwĂŒrfe gegen wichtige bulgarische Politiker, vgl. hier. Klar ist jedenfalls: Die internen Untersuchungen der EuStA gegen Georgieva haben schwerwiegendes Fehlverhalten festgestellt, sie bleibt suspendiert.

Die UnabhÀngigkeit der EuropÀischen Staatsanwaltschaft

Die EuStA hat eine hybride Struktur: Sie besteht gemĂ€ĂŸ der Verordnung 2017/1939 auf zentraler Ebene neben dem Kollegium (Art. 9) aus der EuropĂ€ischen Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Art. 11), den EuropĂ€ischen StaatsanwĂ€lten (Art. 12) und den StĂ€ndigen Kammern (Art. 10). Auf dezentraler Ebene besteht sie aus den Delegierten EuropĂ€ischen StaatsanwĂ€lten (Art. 13), die in den Mitgliedsstaaten angesiedelt sind und dort im Namen der EuStA handeln. Diese Struktur und insbesondere die Rolle der Delegierten EuropĂ€ischen StaatsanwĂ€lte kann man durchaus fĂŒr verbesserungswĂŒrdig halten, vertiefend bspw. hier, zu Bulgarien vgl. hier auf dem Verfassungsblog.

Die suspendierte Teodora Georgieva war die EuropĂ€ische StaatsanwĂ€ltin fĂŒr Bulgarien. Sie beaufsichtigte somit die in Bulgarien mit den Verfahren betrauten Delegierten EuropĂ€ischen StaatsanwĂ€lte und konnte diese anweisen (vgl. Art. 12 Abs. 1, Abs. 3). Die VorwĂŒrfe gegen Georgieva stellen daher eine schwerwiegende Herausforderung fĂŒr die EuStA dar und haben in der Ablehnung des Antrags auf Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t des Abgeordneten Kyuchyuk nun ihren Höhepunkt gefunden. Deutlich wird die FragilitĂ€t der EuStA und die Schwierigkeiten, die mit ihrer Struktur einhergehen. Um Bulgarien ist es dabei nicht ruhiger geworden. Kontroversen gab es jĂŒngst um die Vorschlagslisten fĂŒr die Nachfolge der suspendierten Teodora Georgieva, deren Amtszeit Ende Juli endet, vgl. vertiefend hier und hier, sowie eine aktuelle bulgarische Gerichtsentscheidung vom 07.07.2026. Das bulgarische Rechtssystem weist erhebliche Probleme auf, vgl. dazu auch diese Analyse auf dem Verfassungsblog.

Allerdings kann deshalb nicht unbedingt davon ausgegangen werden, dass die Entscheidung des EP zur Ablehnung des Antrags auf Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t ĂŒberzeugt. Die Ermittlungen in Bulgarien wurden nicht von Teodora Georgieva selbst, sondern von den Delegierten EuropĂ€ischen StaatsanwĂ€lten gefĂŒhrt. Diese werden zwar durch die EuropĂ€ischen StaatsanwĂ€lte beaufsichtigt und angewiesen (vgl. Art. 12 Abs. 1, Abs. 3). Die EuropĂ€ischen StaatsanwĂ€lte beaufsichtigen nach diesen Vorschriften allerdings „fĂŒr die StĂ€ndige Kammer und im Einklang mit etwaigen von dieser gemĂ€ĂŸ Artikel 10 AbsĂ€tze 3, 4 und 5 erteilten Weisungen“; sie können den Delegierten EuropĂ€ischen Staatsanwalt zwar selbst anweisen, aber „im Einklang (
) mit den Weisungen der zustĂ€ndigen StĂ€ndigen Kammer“. Die StĂ€ndigen Kammern bestehen aus drei Mitgliedern, die gerade nicht aus dem jeweiligen Staat des EuropĂ€ischen Staatsanwaltes stammen (vgl. auch Art. 19 Abs. 2 der GeschĂ€ftsordnung der EuStA). Letztlich sind es also die StĂ€ndigen Kammern, die die wichtigen Verfahrensentscheidungen treffen, vgl. Art. 10 Abs. 3-5. Zwar ist der jeweilige EuropĂ€ische Staatsanwalt gem. Art. 10 Abs. 9 in vielen dieser Entscheidungen stimmberechtigt – was sinnvoll ist, da die Mitglieder der StĂ€ndigen Kammern das nationale Recht nicht kennen (vertiefend hier S. 60). Er kann aber von den drei Mitgliedern aus jeweils einem anderen Mitgliedsstaat ĂŒberstimmt werden und durch diese Struktur wird eine UnabhĂ€ngigkeit der Entscheidungen gewĂ€hrleistet. Den Antrag auf Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t stellt im Übrigen nicht der nationale EuropĂ€ische Staatsanwalt, sondern ihn kann gem. Art. 29 Abs. 2 allein der EuropĂ€ische Generalstaatsanwalt stellen.

Im konkreten Fall Ilhan Kyuchyuk ist zudem zu beachten, dass es, soweit ersichtlich, keine konkreten Hinweise zu einem Zusammenhang zwischen der Suspendierung von Georgieva und den Ermittlungen gegen Kyuchyuk gibt. Zudem wurden am 26.03.2025 erste Ermittlungen gegen Georgieva eingeleitet, ab diesem Zeitpunkt wurde sie suspendiert. Georgieva war somit zum Zeitpunkt des Antrags auf Aufhebung der ImmunitÀt am 24.11.2025 bereits seit mehreren Monaten suspendiert.

So schwerwiegend die VorwĂŒrfe gegen Teodora Georgieva auch sein mögen, die Struktur der EuStA durch die StĂ€ndigen Kammern gewĂ€hrleistet grundsĂ€tzlich ihre UnabhĂ€ngigkeit und es existieren effektive interne Kontrollmechanismen der EuStA, was auch die Suspendierung zeigt. Stellt die EuropĂ€ische GeneralstaatsanwĂ€ltin in Kenntnis der Geschehnisse und der Suspendierung Monate spĂ€ter dennoch den Antrag auf Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t, sollte der Weg fĂŒr weitere Ermittlungen der EuStA auch in einem solchen Fall frei gemacht werden. Dass dies nicht getan wurde, ĂŒberrascht allerdings nicht: Wenn die Parlamentarier schon im Verfahren von Angelika Niebler gegen die Aufhebung der ImmunitĂ€t Nieblers stimmten, lag es nahe, dass sie es im Verfahren gegen Ilhan Kyuchyuk vor dem Hintergrund der VorwĂŒrfe gegen Teodora Georgieva ebenso wenig taten.

Fazit und Ausblick

Berichten zufolge fordern Stimmen des gesamten politischen Spektrums eine grundsĂ€tzliche ÜberprĂŒfung der ImmunitĂ€tsverfahren des EP. Änderungen des Protokolls Nr. 7 wĂ€ren theoretisch denkbar. Allerdings wĂ€re eine solche Änderung des PrimĂ€rrechts (Art. 48 EUV) vor dem Hintergrund des Einstimmigkeitsprinzips kompliziert und langwierig. Kurzfristig sollte das EP seine Abstimmungspraxis in ImmunitĂ€tsangelegenheiten ĂŒberdenken, wenn die AntrĂ€ge von der EuStA ausgehen und sich in diesen FĂ€llen der DurchfĂŒhrung von Ermittlungsverfahren nicht entgegenstellen. Es ist fĂŒr die IntegritĂ€t des Parlaments als Institution von hoher Bedeutung, dass nicht der Eindruck entsteht, Ermittlungen wegen Veruntreuung von EU-Geldern verhindern zu wollen. Aktuell scheint es dafĂŒr jedoch am Vertrauen der Parlamentarier gegenĂŒber der EuStA zu fehlen. Dieses Vertrauen muss wiederhergestellt werden. Auf den designierten EuropĂ€ischen Generalstaatsanwalt, AndrĂ©as Ritter, dessen Amtszeit am 01.11.2026 beginnt, wird viel Arbeit zukommen.

The post SchÀdlicher Schutz? appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Dignity Without Autonomy

In Prajwala v. Union of India, the Supreme Court held that victims of trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation (“CSE”) have a right to rehabilitation under Article 23 read with the right to dignity under Article 21.

While the judgment has been celebrated for its three-dimensional dignity framework, it is a missed opportunity to articulate a constitutional basis for protecting the rights of sex workers. The Court’s dignity framework – calibrated against objectification in trafficking – is insufficient alone to address persons who assert agency over their work. I argue that reading it alongside decisional autonomy fills the gap: it grounds the Court’s procedural safeguards for sex workers in enforceable constitutional rights while respecting the institutional boundary between judicial protection of persons and legislative determination of sex work policy.

The Limits of Dignity in Prajwala

In Prajwala, the Court observed that human trafficking law has traditionally been framed from a crime-control perspective: one that prioritises punishment of the perpetrator over the rights and needs of victims. In this view, since trafficking is a crime against society at large, the victim’s interests are subsumed within society’s interest in accurate prosecution. The victim, their rights, and their special needs are only incidentally, if at all, addressed.

Against this backdrop, the Court adopted a human rights approach: victims are rights-holders independent of the criminal justice system’s goals, and their rehabilitation is constitutionally mandated alongside punishment of the perpetrator. The Court relied primarily on the right to dignity under Article 21 to elaborate on the rights of trafficking victims. It held that while dignity is a malleable concept capable of supporting contrary positions, there exists a minimum content that cannot be derogated from.

Building on earlier jurisprudence, the Court identified three dimensions of dignity guaranteed to every person [para. 264]. First, inherent dignity: the intrinsic worth of every human being as an end in themselves. Second, dignity in its material dimension: access to the basic conditions necessary for a dignified life. Third, dignity as recognition: protection against the concrete harms caused by pervasive stigmatisation and social exclusion.

The Court held that trafficking violates inherent dignity by objectifying persons: the trafficked individual is reduced to their value to the buyer, stripped of intrinsic worth [para. 265]. The material dimension is implicated because the absence of basic conditions – shelter, livelihood, safety – creates the vulnerability that trafficking exploits [para. 272]. Finally, trafficking victims are particularly disadvantaged along the recognition dimension: their suffering is frequently treated as self-inflicted or undeserving of concern, resulting in social isolation and inaccessibility of legal assistance.

Reading Article 21 alongside the prohibition on trafficking under Article 23, the Court held that trafficking victims have a right to rehabilitation enforceable against the State, a right that extends beyond punishment and rescue. This framework informed the binding guidelines the Court laid down, exercising its jurisdiction under Article 142, which empowers it to pass orders necessary to do “complete justice”, covering the full spectrum from rescue to reintegration.

The Court did not, however, extend this framework to voluntary sex workers despite making two observations that closely track its own dignity analysis. First, it noted that the law fails to address the conditions of vulnerability and abuse in which sex work takes place: an observation that maps onto dignity in its material dimension [paras. 407, 408]. Second, it observed that society’s moral condemnation of sex workers as willing participants in indecent work produces concrete harms – isolation and inaccessibility of legal assistance – which is precisely what dignity as recognition is designed to address [para. 409].

This omission is especially curious given the Court’s own holding that the rights of sex workers can be protected independently of a right to sex work. The Court could have recognised sex workers’ right to dignity, particularly in its material and recognition dimensions, while leaving the status of sex work itself to the Legislature.

Autonomy as the Missing Constitutional Principle

The Court likely refrained from grounding sex workers’ claims in the right to dignity because its inherent dignity formulation was specifically calibrated to trafficking: it targets objectification – the reduction of a person to their value to the buyer. Applying that formulation to sex work as such would risk treating it as inherently involving self-commodification, without acknowledging the agency of persons who engage in it voluntarily. This would effectively endorse the abolitionist position – one the Court deliberately declined to take [para. 314].

Autonomy, an analytically distinct principle developed in Puttaswamy (9J) remedies this. Where inherent dignity concerns a person’s intrinsic worth as an end in themselves (a quality that exists independently of their relationships), autonomy is relational: it protects the individual’s choices from interference by the State or third parties. I argue that the two principles can coexist and, together, cover what neither covers alone.

In Puttaswamy, the judges converged on the autonomy principle as the basis of privacy. Chandrachud J. and Nariman J. both held that the right to privacy protects decisional autonomy over fundamental personal choices. Most significantly for present purposes, Chelameswar J. held that this autonomy encompasses “the freedom to choose either to work or not and the freedom to choose the nature of the work” – a formulation that applies directly to sex workers’ claims [para. 38].

The Puttaswamy court also addressed the relationship between privacy and dignity. Nariman J. held that privacy of choice is a prerequisite for the self-development encompassed by the right to dignity [para. 85]. Bobde J. went further, holding that the two rights are inextricably intertwined under Article 21 [para. 30].

In the context of sex work, however, dignity and decisional autonomy can pull in opposite directions. The Puttaswamy court leaves this tension unresolved. The question is therefore how courts should approach it – and the Prajwala judgment itself offers a framework.

The Prajwala Court observed [para. 317]:

“In all of us, agency and vulnerability coexist. What varies is the extent to which one bears upon the other, and this is determined largely by the circumstances of our lives. For a person who faces poverty, social exclusion, and the absence of livelihood alternatives, their vulnerability may significantly narrow the range of choices available to them. But it does not extinguish choice altogether. Acknowledging this co-existence has two important implications when it comes to those who engage in prostitution. First, viewing a woman who has entered prostitution voluntarily as an ‘agent’ does not mean that one becomes blind to the vulnerabilities that shaped and constrained her decision. Understanding her agency requires understanding the circumstances in which it was exercised, thereby necessitating measures in cases where agency is severely constrained. Secondly, viewing a trafficked or coerced woman as a ‘victim’ does not mean she is without agency. Even within conditions of exploitation and coercion, she retains the capacity to make decisions about her present and her future.”

This passage yields a workable constitutional test. The default position must be that where a person asserts voluntary engagement in sex work, their decisional autonomy is engaged and the State bears the burden of establishing that agency-diminishing circumstances were so severe as to negate meaningful choice. Only where that burden is discharged should inherent dignity override autonomy.

In this inquiry, the person’s own statement about voluntariness carries presumptive weight – rebuttable only where there is objective evidence of coercion or third-party control, assessed by a Magistrate rather than the police. The burden of producing such individualised evidence lies on the State; it may include documentary records or indicators of third-party control. This is grounded in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, where the Court held that under Article 21, any procedure affecting life or liberty must be fair, just, and reasonable. Where the State proposes to restrict liberty on the ground that a person’s apparent consent is not real, due process consequently requires that the person be heard on whether their agency was compromised. The right to be heard requires that the person’s account be genuinely weighed – it cannot be nullified by a blanket presumption that persons in sex work lack agency.

A possible objection is that recognising decisional autonomy in relation to sex work effectively endorses decriminalisation, resolving a contested legislative policy question by judicial fiat. This objection misreads the argument. First, the ITPA already permits sex work for personal benefit without third-party involvement (subject to the limited exceptions in Sections 7 and 8); the constitutional right operates within that existing legal space, not beyond it. Second, and more fundamentally, the right would attach to sex workers as persons – not to the activity of sex work – in line with the Court’s own framing. Recognising that a person has a constitutional right to make choices about their work is categorically different from recognising a right to sex work; the former constrains how the State may treat individuals, while the latter would constrain legislative authority over the activity itself.

It may be argued that decisional autonomy presupposes a choosing subject who is free from structural coercion – yet sex work in the Indian context takes place within conditions of extreme poverty, caste subordination, and patriarchal constraint. However, relational autonomy theory, which analyses how autonomy operates under conditions of structural constraint, holds that the presence of such conditions does not extinguish autonomy altogether.

Diana Meyers distinguishes three forms of autonomy. Programmatic autonomy – the most demanding – involves ownership of one’s major life decisions and overall life plan. Narrowly programmatic autonomy is the capacity to make autonomous decisions within a particular significant domain of one’s life. Episodic autonomy is the ability to identify one’s immediate wants and act on them in a specific situation. While programmatic autonomy may be systematically diminished by structural oppression, Meyers argues that narrowly programmatic and episodic autonomy survive because they depend on skills such as emotional perceptiveness and self-awareness that oppressive conditions do not necessarily destroy. The choice to engage in sex work reflects narrowly programmatic autonomy, as it involves evaluating economic options, assessing risk, and comparing alternatives within a significant but bounded domain of one’s life, which is precisely the kind of decision that Meyers’ framework is designed to recognise.

Constitutional Foundations and Future Challenges

Without a constitutional foundation in dignity and autonomy, the procedural safeguards in the Victim Protection Plan rest on the Court’s Article 142 directions alone – giving rise to the compliance problem that has historically plagued such directions. Two safeguards are particularly significant. First, citing Budhadev Karmaskar v. State of West Bengal (2022), the Court held that the non-interference principle requires police to determine whether a person is a voluntary sex worker before removing them during a rescue operation under Section 15 of the ITPA [para. 362 c.(iii)].

Second, the Court acknowledged that rescue operations are often conducted in time-sensitive conditions, making it likely that voluntary sex workers will be taken into custody. When such persons are produced before a Magistrate under Section 17, the Court held that a threshold determination must be made at the outset as to whether they are voluntary sex workers who do not wish to be subjected to further custody – if so, they should not be subjected to the more intrusive inquiry under Section 17(2) [para. 335].

As matters stand, these safeguards depend on compliance with Article 142 directions – a mechanism with a poor track record. Had the Court grounded sex workers’ claims in the right to dignity and decisional autonomy under Article 21, violations of these safeguards would be directly enforceable: sex workers could challenge non-compliance through writ petitions before the High Courts under Article 226 or the Supreme Court under Article 32. The constitutional foundation would convert the Court’s directions from aspirational guidelines into justiciable rights.

Recognition of dignity and decisional autonomy would also enable incremental constitutional challenges to the ITPA’s most problematic provisions. In Shakti Vahini v. Union of India (2018), the Court extended the decisional autonomy principle from Puttaswamy to intimate association, holding that an adult’s choice of life partner is constitutionally protected. The ITPA raises analogous concerns.

Section 4(1) penalises adults financially dependent on a sex worker, potentially criminalising dependent family members; Section 4(2) punishes persons who live with or habitually keep the company of a sex worker. Both provisions burden the relationships that surround a sex worker’s choices without distinguishing exploitative third-party control from legitimate supportive association – the same defect that led the Supreme Court of Canada in Bedford (2013) to strike down a comparable prohibition on living off the avails of prostitution, and one that the decisional autonomy principle, read through Shakti Vahini, equally condemns. Section 20, which enables the removal of sex workers from a locality on the sole basis of their occupation, raises a distinct but related concern: as Bhatia has argued, it targets persons for conduct that Article 21 protects.

Conclusion

The Prajwala judgment developed a powerful dignity framework for victims of trafficking but stopped short of articulating a constitutional basis for protecting sex workers. Reading dignity alongside decisional autonomy fills that gap: it grounds the Court’s procedural safeguards in enforceable constitutional rights and provides the foundation for incremental challenges to the ITPA’s most problematic provisions. More broadly, it demonstrates that the rights of sex workers can be constitutionally secured – as the Court itself affirmed – without the Court having to take a position on the right to sex work.

The post Dignity Without Autonomy appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Erfurt Shines

Last weekend I was in Erfurt, the place where the authoritarian-populist AfD party held its annual federal convention. On Friday, I sat on a panel with my colleague Janos Richter at the conference “Before It Is Too Late: Scholarly Perspectives on the Fascist Danger”. And on Saturday I got up at the crack of dawn to help block the AfD delegates from reaching the assembly hall. I sat on Gothaer Platz, surrounded by police in black helmets, together with researchers of all disciplines and levels of seniority, as part of the refreshingly well-attended “science bloc”, and along with thousands of other protesters – to place my body in the path of this party hostile to the constitution.

Was I supposed to do that? As managing director of a legal-scholarly discourse platform on which this intellectual contest is supposed to be able to take place, should I not have remained neutral? Do I not thereby alienate the pole of the debate that simply sees things differently, that may well identify with one or another of such identitarian projects, and that will then no longer feel comfortable and welcome at Verfassungsblog? Do I not thereby damage the very thing I want to defend – the free contest of ideas among the free and equal, which has been regarded for seventy years as nothing less than constitutive of the Federal Republic’s constitutional order?

If one believes what could be read last week in all sorts of liberal centrist media, my behaviour was at any rate one thing: undemocratic. The AfD, the argument ran, has not been banned for the time being, and all democrats are therefore duty-bound to let it hold its party conference in peace, as if it were a party like any other. What unsettles me about this criticism is above all the breadth with which it is shared in a German public whose faith in the state appears unbroken. The addressee of the prohibition on discriminating between parties that have not been banned is the state – which in return holds the monopoly on initiating proceedings to ban a party hostile to the constitution. A monopoly it has so far, for whatever reasons, declined to use. That this should oblige civil society to regard and treat a party hostile to the constitution, such as the AfD, as a perfectly normal, legitimate participant in democratic competition seems to me, to put it cautiously, in need of justification.

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The demand to forbid oneself from discriminating between non-banned parties loyal to the constitution and non-banned parties hostile to it is questionable not only insofar as it is addressed to democratic civil society, but also and especially insofar as it is addressed to scholarship. Anyone who cares about free scholarship must emphatically reject it. For one, because the freedom of scholarship itself sits squarely in the crosshairs already. There is more than enough evidence for that; anyone who doubts it can look up the chapter on science and scholarship in the AfD’s manifesto for Saxony-Anhalt, or briefly recall the infamous affair of the former Federal Minister of Research, Bettina Stark-Watzinger. For another, because scholarship, if it submits to this presumption, blinds itself. It then loses the very capacity to know a party hostile to the constitution for what it is. And if there is one thing that scholarship must not allow itself to be prevented from doing – for its own sake, as the epistemic enterprise it is – it is this: to know.

This demand’s inherent hostility to scholarship could also be felt in the unbelievable hate campaign – the most hideous death threats included – that scholars such as Ralf Michaels and Anne Graefe have had to endure in recent days, after they defended, in the run-up to the Erfurt protests, the legitimacy of civil disobedience against the AfD party conference. The aim of this campaign is clear: whoever takes a stand is to be made untenable as a scholar, ad personam, through the destruction of their academic reputation and, ultimately, their professional existence. Parts of the formerly respectable liberal-conservative press are not above rolling up their shirtsleeves and piling in with the greatest relish. (A salute, at this point, to JĂŒrgen Kaube, co-publisher of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Niklas Luhmann’s erstwhile student, who has now enriched the discipline with the sociological term of art “unwashed subjectivity”. Hello, Herr Kaube! Love everything about your performative contribution to the field.) What this means for scholarship is equally clear: it must place itself between the attackers and those under attack. Whoever fails to do so, whoever slinks off into the bushes muttering “neutrality”, whoever, worse still, yields to the pressure and sanctions those under attack – to say nothing of those who, as supposed scholars, actively participate in the campaign – had better not come to me ever again with their academic freedom.

Ceterum censeo: it is not as if the ethnocultural fantasies of purity and purification, of norming and normalisation harboured by the authoritarian populists of the AfD were the only identitarian grand project that democrats and scholars have reason to oppose with their bodies these days. Today the Bundesrat – the federal chamber representing the governments of the LĂ€nder – adopted a legislative initiative, launched by Hesse’s CDU-led state government, that aims at an authoritarian carve-out from freedom of opinion in favour of a new mythical founding narrative for our country. The “denial of Israel’s right to exist” is to be made a criminal offence – not for the purpose of protecting any legal good, however pretextual, but quite unabashedly as a piece of special legislation discriminating on the basis of viewpoint. What this bill is about, and why I consider it a caesura of constitutional-historical magnitude, I have set out at length for the Berlin Review. The essay appeared last Tuesday and can be read here without a paywall. I wish you a stimulating read!

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Back to Erfurt and to the hate campaign: That should have collapsed under its own weight at the latest after it had become clear that the Erfurt blockade had in fact remained what it had claimed to be from the outset: peaceful. Had the fantasies of violence in which some indulged beforehand actually come true, that might have provided for some pretext to pin the blame on some supposed academic instigators. But they did not.

That is probably owed above all to the astonishingly good and careful organisation of the protests. The organisers had not only defined a shrewdly crafted, peaceful action consensus under which literally everyone, black-clad anarchist or bespectacled granny, could gather. Above all, they seemed to have managed to win much of the city’s population over to their side. It was the city itself that took to the streets. People waved to us from balconies and windows as we set off towards the conference hall in the early morning. Small children. Old people. Everywhere, people had hung golden emergency blankets in their windows as a sign: Erfurt glĂ€nzt (Erfurt shines). There it was, the famous civil society. Mobilised. Ready for conflict. Ready to resist.

There is no place for civil society in the authoritarian grand projects of the AfD and the CDU. Whatever is not the state is family or business – private, either way. That is precisely why they need these identitarian myths: to allow something like collective identity to emerge at all in a depoliticised society. What could be felt in Erfurt is the opposite of that. What could be felt there was a society that identifies itself through collective action, through the shared experience of collective political efficacy. That is the society I want to live in.

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Editor’s Pick

by JANOS RICHTER

Copyright: BiM Distribuzione

“Prometti, per sempre sarà” – “Promise me, it will be forever” – sings Ambra Angiolini in the song “T’appartengo”, which the young protagonists of the film “The Wonders” (Alice Rohrwacher, 2014) sing and hum again and again, sometimes dancing along. The film follows twelve-year-old Gelsomina as the end of her childhood teaches her that nothing lasts forever – a realization that unsettles her at first, but which she gradually comes to see as holding its own kind of freedom. She grows up with her siblings in rural Italy, under the harsh hand of her taciturn, weathered father, who seems to have forgotten the liberating power of change. Gelsomina handles her newfound freedom so responsibly that we feel the injustice sharply when her father responds with rejection and hurt. Alice Rohrwacher stages these conflicts and Gelsomina’s growth so authentically and enchantingly that it’s hard not to feel sad realizing the film doesn’t last forever, but only 111 minutes.

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The Week on Verfassungsblog

summarised by EVA MARIA BREDLER

France has historically been a country of vigorous civil society – from the storming of the Bastille to the stormy Gilets Jaunes, young and old alike take to the streets to defend their rights, preferably with fiery fervour. How much room will be left for that? Marine Le Pen leads the polls for the 2027 presidential election. And now she may run again: on 7 July, the Paris Court of Appeal upheld her conviction for misappropriating public funds but eased the loss of her civil rights just enough to make her eligible once more. CHARLOTTE SCHMITT-LEONARDY (GER) explains what has changed and maps possible scenarios.

In Erfurt, civil society is shining. But if we want to act politically as a collective, we need, first of all, information. That’s about to get harder. The German government wants to fundamentally overhaul the Freedom of Information Act – with a narrower circle of applicants, higher fees and new exemptions. CHIARA LANG, ROBIN LENZ, MAXIMILIAN PICHL and HANNAH VOS (GER) argue: this turns a right of everyone into a privilege for the few.

Private actors make access to information harder too – especially US tech companies, which hand us the dark wand entirely unregulated: deepfakes are flooding our feeds and are barely recognisable as such anymore. And they are not the only AI-generated content creating regulatory headaches. The EU’s new “Code of Practice on Transparency of AI-Generated Content” is an attempt to regulate such synthetic media. For PAUL FRIEDL (ENG), it offers sensible answers to several open questions – but it cannot escape a structural shortcoming: AI-content detection is not a “fixable” technical problem but a context-dependent, political one that demands iterative, multi-actor coordination.

AI is not only distorting our informational ecosystem but also chopping down old trees, quite literally: AI companies buy up used books, scan them, and discard them to feed their models. This roundabout method exists because it’s expected to fall under the fair use provision of U.S. copyright law. JANNIS LENNARTZ (ENG) locates the real problem elsewhere, though: not that Americans are buying unwanted books, but that books are increasingly unwanted in Europe.

Much more unwanted in the US are real human beings who happen to be born on US soil without the privilege of a certain piece of paper. In one of his many Executive Orders targeting immigrants, Trump denied American citizenship to children born on U.S. soil to immigrant parents who are undocumented or present on certain visas. Last Tuesday, the Supreme Court deemed this attempt unconstitutional in Trump v Barbara. ANJA BOSSOW (ENG) considers it a rare and important win but cautions that Barbara should not be remembered as an example of principled judicial resistance against gross executive overreach.

European institutions are testing another route for excluding migrants: amid ECtHR proceedings over pushbacks, the Chișinău Declaration frames migration as a security issue. CAMELIA-CLAUDIA MURESAN (ENG) rejects the instrumentalisation of the Court and explains why migrants invoking their human rights cannot be seen as a threat to democracy.

What is indeed a threat to European democracy are parties that violate the values of the European Union. For the first time, a breach of Article 2 TEU could get a European party struck from the register and cut off from EU funding. Whether this fate awaits the Europe of Sovereign Nations, which includes the AfD, will not only hinge on political majorities alone, but on the dogmatic elaboration of Article 2 TEU. The CJEU has developed standards for this over the past years, which could now become practically relevant for the first time. JOHANNA MITTROP (GER) sketches out possible scenarios.

Another real threat to democracy plays out online: TikTok is not just for trends – it’s also a space for political provocation and criticism. How far can that go under Article 10 ECHR when directed at public officials? GIONATA BOUCHÉ (ENG) criticises the ECtHR’s narrow answer in Miladze v Georgia.

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Offline, the space for political action is narrowing too: in the Palestine Action case, the defendants broke into an Israeli defence company in the UK, causing millions in damage. FREDERICK ATTENBOROUGH (ENG) explains how the judge, rather than a jury, declared their actions to be terrorist acts.

Israel is also at the centre of a different debate, playing out in Brussels: at the next European Council meeting on 13 July, the European Commission is expected to finally propose measures to restrict EU trade with illegal Israeli settlements. PEDRO R. BORGES DE CARVALHO (ENG) contextualises the discussed proposals.

Meanwhile, the German government coalition wants to ban the federal states from socialising private rental housing stock. Would that be compatible with the Basic Law’s allocation of competences? TIMO LAVEN (GER) shows that the plans are unconstitutional for several reasons at once.

And the Bundestag debated, say, private organ stocks: once again, the question was whether the current “opt-in” system for organ donation should be replaced by the more effective “opt-out” system. KARSTEN WITT (GER) analyses the dispute from an ethical perspective.

Also, our symposium “European Society After Commission v Hungary” (ENG) came to an end – after no fewer than 23 contributions! At this year’s Academy of EU at the EUI, the concept of European society was heavily debated. CHIARA RIMKUS reflects on these discussions and explains what they mean for the future direction of EU legal scholarship. MARLENE TIEDE shows how EU private international law knits diverse national legal orders into one legal community. HANS W. MICKLITZ examines the potential impact of the concept of European society on private law relations in Europe. Article 2 TEU contains the operative legal category of solidarity. Yet, as TERESA VIOLANTE critically explains, this concept has not entered the CJEU’s reasoning.

Well, solidarity is best when it’s not a legal category but a collective reality, anyway. And gold foil doesn’t just look good in Erfurt’s windows. It reflects back, brilliantly, whatever stands opposite it. And however dark that might be.

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That’s it for this week. Take care and all the best!

Yours,

the Verfassungsblog Team

 

 

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