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Von Hans Hofmann-Reinecke Es wird berichtet, Israel hätte bei der Abwehr feindlicher Drohnen, Raketen oder Mörsern-Granaten den neuartigen „Iron Beam“ erfolgreich eingesetzt. Wie könnte so ein System funktionieren?   Die Eiserne Kuppel Gegenwärtig und in der Vergangenheit wurde Israel vom „Iron Dome“, der eisernen Kuppel, zuverlässig, wenn auch nicht hundertprozentig gegen angreifende Drohnen, Raketen oder … „Iron Beam – der eiserne Strahl“ weiterlesen

Von Hans Hofmann-Reinecke In letzter Zeit wurden traditionelle Veranstaltungen abgesagt, die seit Jahrzehnten fester Bestandteil des Brauchtums von Gemeinden oder Vereinen waren.  Der Grund: Die Organisatoren können die hohen Kosten für Anti-Terror Schutz nicht aufbringen. Warum gab es diese Probleme in der Vergangenheit nicht? Da waren Volksfeste, Umzüge und Flohmärkte eine harmlose und erfreuliche Selbstverständlichkeit. … „Willkommen im Hotel 1984“ weiterlesen

Ich habe einen Teil meines Lebens in den Jahren verbracht, da Martin Luthers Traum wahr zu werden schien, dass Menschen nicht mehr nach ihrer Hautfarbe beurteilt werden, sondern nach ihrem Charakter und ihrem Handeln. Schon als Kind in der DDR sang ich: „Froh und glücklich will doch spielen auf der Erde jedes Kind, ob nun … „Meloni: Der Rassismus des Fortschritts“ weiterlesen

The recent Opinion of Advocate General (AG) Ćapeta in Case C‑769/22 European Commission v Hungary marks a key moment in the evolving case law on Article 2 TEU. The case concerns Hungary’s controversial 2021 legislation restricting access to content portraying or promoting LGBTI identities. Ćapeta argues that Article 2 TEU can serve as a stand-alone legal basis to challenge national measures.

Although the Opinion’s legal reasoning has faced criticism, I find it convincing and welcome its clear stance that Member States cannot use national identity to justify discriminatory measures violating common Union values. While Ćapeta’s position on Article 2 TEU is unprecedented, I believe it reflects a broader shift in the Court’s jurisprudence. Building upon previous contributions on Verfassungsblog (here and here), this post situates the Opinion within that development and assesses its implications for future value-based interventions.

Overview

AG Ćapeta’s opinion addresses Hungary’s 2021 “Amending Law,” (para. 20 of the Opinion) which imposed restrictions on content portraying or promoting LGBTI identities under the guise of protecting minors, by restricting access to such content that portrays or promotes gender identities that do not correspond to the sex assigned at birth, sex reassignment or homosexuality (para. 2). Following an extensive analysis, the AG concludes that Hungary’s legislation breaches EU law on three fronts: fundamental rights, internal market freedoms, and core EU values under Article 2 TEU.

In particular, AG Ćapeta supports the Commission’s pioneering argument that Hungary’s law violates Article 2 TEU, which safeguards the core EU values (para. 247). The AG further asserts that Article 2 TEU is justiciable as a stand-alone basis (paras 189-197). Hungary’s legislation, she argues, institutionalizes discrimination against LGBTI communities (paras 257-264), thereby “negating” EU values and posing a systemic threat to the EU’s constitutional identity, crossing a “red line” for EU membership (paras 155-158 and 212).

National identity and EU values: red lines in constitutional dialogue

At the centre of AG Ćapeta’s Opinion lies the interpretation of Article 2 TEU, which enumerates the EU’s foundational values. The novelty of this case is that it marks the first instance where the ECJ is asked to rule on a self-standing infringement of Article 2 TEU, independent of breaches of specific Charter rights or secondary legislation. The AG’s Opinion sheds light on the ongoing discourse regarding the limitations of national identity argumentation as well as the justiciability of the normative core of EU’s constitutional identity, meaning Article 2 TEU values.

A key point in the Opinion is that while Member States may interpret how to apply EU values, they cannot negate the values themselves (paras 237-238). In this sense, the AG argues that Hungary’s legislation crosses this boundary by institutionalizing the unequal treatment of LGBTI individuals, contravening the EU’s commitment to equality and human dignity under Article 2 TEU (paras 268-269 and 271). This conclusion aligns with broader scholarly discourse (see here, here and here) on European identity, which suggests that national and EU identities can coexist only if Member States affirm these shared core values, rather than contradict them.

The AG also draws on two recent key ECJ judgments, establishing a connection between the concept of mutual trust, which is fundamental to European cooperation, and the adherence to these shared values (C-156/21 Hungary v Parliament and Council and C-157/21 Poland v Parliament and Council). In these cases, the Court linked the concept of mutual trust to Member States’ adherence to the rule of law under Article 2 TEU. More specifically, the Court asserted that mutual trust is not merely assumed but is contingent upon compliance with Article 2 TEU, which defines the EU’s identity as a legal system. The Court noted that while Member States maintain the protection of their national identities, they also share and must uphold the rule of law, as a shared EU value enshrined in Article 2 TEU, constituting the normative core of EU constitutionalism.

Thus, further endorsing the AG’s argumentation at hand regarding the direct justiciability of this provision, the ECJ concluded that it authorised to intervene when EU values are jeopardized under the guise of national identity, thereby balancing national sovereignty with the principle of absolute primacy of EU law. Expanding on this claim, the AG proposes given that upholding EU values is essential for the EU legal order, that these values can be applied directly and irrespectively of other violations of EU treaties’ provisions, according to Article 258 TFEU that enables the Court to safeguard the upholding of EU law by the Member States (paras 191-194).

In an analogous manner, in the recent golden passport judgment, the ECJ further clarified that the EU citizenship is a fundamental component in the progress of EU integration, embodying solidarity and trust among Member States. In this sense, citizenship extends beyond mere national affiliation, encompassing adherence to the shared values outlined in Article 2 TEU (para. 95). Consequently, Member States are required to confer nationality in a manner consistent with EU citizenship and these shared values. These judgments thus reveal an increasing judicial reliance on Article 2 TEU, raising the question of why it should not function as an independent legal basis. In essence, the central prominence of EU values within the EU’s constitutional framework as well as the recent case law of the Court, seem to favor the AG’s argumentation, thereby positioning Article 2 TEU at the apex of the Union’s constitutional hierarchy.

Justiciability of Article 2 TEU: a new frontier in EU law

The ECJ’s evolving case law suggests broad acceptance of invoking Article 2 TEU. However, its justiciability as a standalone legal basis remains contested (see here and here). So far, the ECJ has not ruled on Article 2 TEU as a sole justiciable ground, while progressively embracing the justiciability of this provision. This perspective was evident in the Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses judgment, where the Court invoked Article 2 TEU for the first time as a legal foundation. The Court asserted that Article 19(1) TEU embodies the rule of law as articulated in Article 2 TEU. Furthermore, the Court elucidated the relationship between Articles 2 and 10 TEU (here and here), stating that Article 10(1) TEU reflects the Union’s commitment to representative democracy, a value enshrined in Article 2 TEU. This interpretation implies that Article 2 TEU requires the support of other Treaty provisions for its application, as it lacks standalone normative value, since, in previous case law of the Court, Article 2 TEU has been invoked alongside breaches of specific Charter rights or EU legislation.

Contrary to that, AG Ćapeta’s Opinion breaks new ground by arguing the direct justiciability of Article 2 TEU as a standalone provision. AG Ćapeta, following the Commission’s line of reasoning (paras 26, 31–32), presents Hungary’s law as a rejection of LGBTI equality. Thereby she positions Article 2 TEU as a tool to address structural threats to the EU’s constitutional order. The AG distinguishes between permissible divergences in applying rights (e.g., through varying standards) and impermissible attacks on the values underpinning those rights.

Further, the AG draws a crucial distinction: occasional violations of specific rights do not suffice to invoke Article 2 TEU. What is required is the negation of EU values—a systemic level of breach (paras 248, 253). It is not the quantity, but the intensity of the violation that matters (for the opposite view see here). As for the exact level of deficit needed to be considered systemic, this requires widespread, fundamental flaws within a Member State’s legal system. Hence, it is for the Court to determine in concreto whether these prerequisites are fulfilled.

The ECJ, she argues, can determine on a case-by-case basis where that line lies (para.212). In doing so, the AG strengthens the ECJ’s role as the ultimate arbiter of what constitutes a breach of the EU’s “red lines,” the values in Article 2 TEU. These are not merely political guidelines but the foundational legal principles of the Union. In the words of the AG (para. 215):

“The Court of Justice is a constitutional court, and basic constitutional principles are often, at the same time, political and legal. Inasmuch as Article 2 TEU expresses the choice for a constitutional democracy which respects human rights, the Court of Justice’s defence of those values is not its political choice, but its constitutional task.”

Finally, I incline towards the opinion (contrary to Kaiser) that the AG’s use of the term “good society” (paras 157 and 177), though uncommon in legal reasoning, is not out of place. The Treaties were drafted with the vision of a European society based on these shared values. The selection of these values is primarily an ethical assessment of what constitutes a good society. Therefore, referencing the ethical foundation of the Union’s values does not diminish but rather substantiates their invocation as an independent legal basis.

Implications for national sovereignty and EU integration

The implication of AG Ćapeta’s Opinion for delineating the boundaries of national sovereignty within the EU legal framework of multilevel constitutionalism are far-reaching. Hungary defended its legislation as a legitimate exercise of its right to protect minors and uphold parental rights, which is a domain traditionally regulated by national law. AG Ćapeta, however, rejects this justification, noting that the law targets “ordinary lives of LGBTI people” rather than explicit or harmful content (paras 88-92 and 110-114). She underscores that Member States cannot implement measures undermining EU values, especially when such measures lack any empirical evidence of harm (paras 118, 283-284).

This reasoning, building upon previous case law of the ECJ (Case C-808/18, Commission v Hungary; Joined Cases C-715/17, C-718/17, C-719/17, Commission v Poland and others; Case C‑156/21, European Parliament and Council v Hungary; Case C‑157/21, European Parliament and Council v Poland), rejects the perception that national identity can be unrestrainedly invoked to circumvent EU obligations. While the principle of subsidiarity allows Member States to tailor policies to local contexts, AG Ćapeta clarifies that the erosion of the fundamental values of the Union is, in any case, not permitted. The Opinion thus reaffirms that EU membership entails an irrevocable commitment to upholding the EU’s constitutional identity, as enshrined primarily in Article 2 TEU, even in areas of shared competence (paras 180, 223).

AG Ćapeta’s Opinion also has far-reaching consequences for the EU’s evolving legal and political landscape. By embracing Article 2 TEU as a stand-alone, justiciable standard, the Opinion strengthens the Court’s ability to hold Member States accountable for systemic violations of democratic norms. This is particularly relevant in light of ongoing disputes with Poland and Hungary over judicial independence and media freedom (see here for Poland and Hungary), where Article 2 TEU could serve as a basis for future litigation. The Court’s emerging case law thus signals a shift from a primarily economic union to a Union of values.

Conclusion

AG Ćapeta’s Opinion in Commission v Hungary represents a pivotal moment in the discourse on EU values and constitutional identity. It advances a European identity that complements national identities, provided those identities operate within the framework of shared values.

Despite that, this approach raises questions about the limits of utilizing EU values’ legal armory in resolving cultural and political conflicts. As the EU grapples with illiberal trends, the ECJ’s willingness to enforce Article 2 TEU will test its constitutional order’s resilience. AG Ćapeta’s Opinion charts a path for the EU to assert its values as non-negotiable pillars of EU membership, ensuring pluralism does not compromise fundamental principles agreed upon by Member States. Thus, the upcoming ruling will determine whether this vision becomes a binding precedent.

The post Rethinking Article 2 TEU appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

On May 22, 2025, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) held a hearing in Ramos Durand et al. v. Peru, a case that could redefine state responsibility for forced sterilizations and strengthen standards on reproductive autonomy. This is only the second forced sterilization case before the Court (after I.V. v. Bolivia) and the first addressing a widespread, state-led policy of coercion like Peru’s.

A central issue in the hearing was whether Celia gave free and informed consent to her sterilization, and how to assess it within a broader context of structural coercion. The victims’ expert described the procedure as part of a systematic and bureaucratized policy targeting vulnerable women. In contrast, the State’s expert argued that Celia had given valid consent according to Peruvian civil law, framing sterilization as a public health measure.

As the Court weighs these opposing positions, this commentary situates Celia Ramos’s case within the broader historical and structural context of Peru’s sterilization policies. It outlines international human rights standards that should guide the Court’s analysis and argues that understanding the full scope of violations requires addressing the underlying inequalities and institutional violence that enabled them.

A Systemic Policy of Reproductive Violence in Peru

Between 1980 and 2000, Peru experienced an internal armed conflict that, according to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“Truth Commission”), constituted “the most intense, extensive, and prolonged episode of violence in the country’s republican history.” The Truth Commission documented a strong link between poverty, social exclusion, and the likelihood of victimization, noting that most victims were rural subsistence farmers.

This context of structural violence and marginalization laid the foundation for public policies that deepened inequalities, particularly in reproductive health. In 1996, President Alberto Fujimori launched the National Reproductive Health and Family Planning Program (1996–2000) (NRHFPP). Official records report at least 265,824 sterilizations, while other experts estimate the number exceeds 300,000. While no definitive count exists, the program led in practice to the mass sterilization of hundreds of thousands of women.

The program aimed to expand contraceptive coverage to between 50% and 70% of women of reproductive age, and to ensure that all patients receiving institutional care for childbirth or abortion were discharged using a contraceptive method after counseling. A key strategy to achieve these objectives was the promotion of surgical sterilization, particularly tubal ligation.

Though national in scope, the program prioritized women of reproductive age, pregnant women, and those at risk of unintended pregnancy, predominantly low-income populations. Amid post-conflict inequality, the program framed its objectives within a discourse of a “war on poverty”, marginalization, and lack of family planning information. It justified the policy by pointing out that low-income women had higher fertility rates and less access to contraceptive methods. Rooted in neo-Malthusian logic, the policy was presented as a means to reduce poverty.

Human rights organizations began documenting abuses as early as 1996. The Ombudsperson’s Office received its first formal complaints in 1997 and published a 1998 report highlighting the absence of safeguards to guarantee free and informed choice. Researchers and civil society groups uncovered systemic violations, including mandatory quotas for surgical contraception in health centers and among medical personnel.

A system of incentives and sanctions reinforced the policy: healthcare providers received cash or in-kind payments for each sterilized woman, while promotions, demotions, and the allocation of medical equipment were tied to the fulfillment of sterilization targets and quotas. The program was also implemented through mass campaigns. DEMUS reported large-scale operations aimed at recruiting women for tubal ligation, including so-called “ligation festivals,” which promoted sterilization as a path to happiness and often offered food or money as incentives.

Deceptive practices were widespread. Many women were misinformed about the nature of the procedure or told it was minor. In other cases, they were offered debt forgiveness related to childbirth or abortion in exchange for agreeing to be sterilized. Within a broader context of poverty and exclusion, sterilization often became a transactional means of accessing healthcare or food, services the state was already obligated to provide.

The program operated in an authoritarian and militarized environment. In certain areas, military doctors participated in procedures, and soldiers were stationed outside operating rooms, reinforcing the coercive and state-driven character of the interventions.

Celia Ramos Durand’s Case

Within this broader pattern, the case of Celia Ramos is paradigmatic. A 34-year-old mother of three from a rural village in Piura, Celia fit the target profile of the program. A local nurse repeatedly pressured her to undergo tubal ligation. Her daughter testified that women were told the procedure was “as simple as pulling a tooth” and were not fully informed of the risks. On July 3, 1997, Celia underwent surgery and died from complications, as the health center lacked the equipment and medication to perform it safely.

In this case, the Inter-American Commission argues that the sterilization was rooted in gender stereotypes and structural discrimination, violating Celia’s rights to health and reproductive autonomy. The procedure, carried out without her informed consent, amounted to arbitrary interference with her private life.

Her death was never properly investigated, and the persistent impunity has caused deep harm to her family.

Forced Sterilizations in the Inter-American System

Although this is not the first forced sterilization case brought before the Inter-American system, it will be the first time the Court rules on the Peruvian case and a massive, state-sponsored policy of this kind. In 1999, the Inter-American Commission received the case of María Mamérita Mestanza, a Peruvian woman who, like Celia, was forcibly sterilized under the NRHFPP (Peru’s National Reproductive Health and Family Planning Program) and died from complications. That case concluded in 2003 with a friendly settlement, in which Peru acknowledged international responsibility and agreed to provide reparations.

Years later, in I.V. v. Bolivia, the Court addressed forced sterilization and developed key standards on informed consent. I.V., a Peruvian woman living in Bolivia, was sterilized without her knowledge during childbirth, learning only the next day of her permanent loss of reproductive capacity. The Court affirmed that informed consent before a medical intervention with permanent consequences on reproductive capacity is part of the rights to autonomy and private life (para. 162). It emphasized that every person must be able to make free decisions about their life plan, including whether to have children, how many, and when (para. 162).

The Court held that informed consent must be prior, free, full, and informed, interrelated elements that require a cumulative process, not a one-time acceptance (para. 166). Consent must be given without threats, coercion, inducement, or improper incentives, and only after receiving adequate, complete, reliable, and accessible information (para. 165). That information must be effectively understood, enabling an autonomous and informed decision. Health providers must explain the diagnosis, procedure, associated risks and benefits, alternatives, side effects, and the consequences of the treatment (para. 189). The IACHR also recognized that gender stereotypes and inequality deepen power imbalances in medical settings (paras. 186-7).

However, in I.V., the Court found that the facts did not reflect a state policy or a context of systematic violence (para. 297). This makes Ramos Durand a unique opportunity for the Court to rule on a state’s international responsibility for implementing a widespread, structural, and coercive policy of forced sterilization.

International Standards on Forced Sterilization

Within the UN system, the CEDAW Committee (CEDAW), the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) have classified forced sterilization as a form of gender-based violence that violates women’s physical integrity and security. The Special Rapporteur has noted that the practice disproportionately affects women due to entrenched stereotypes about their reproductive role (see Report, para. 21). Non-consensual sterilizations are often justified by assumptions that women are incapable of making responsible decisions about their reproductive health, are unworthy of contraception, unfit to be “good mothers,” or that their children are undesirable.

The CERD, CEDAW, and the Special Rapporteurs on Torture and Violence Against Women have also underscored that such practices often target ethnic and racial minorities, constituting intersectional discrimination. Depending on the circumstances, these practices may also constitute torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The Special Rapporteur on Torture and the CEDAW Committee have both stressed that forced sterilization is a form of violence and social control, violating the right to be free from ill-treatment. The mandate on torture specifically notes that coercive sterilizations under state-run family planning policies may amount to torture.

As UN bodies have emphasized, individuals must have the right to choose or refuse sterilization. Respecting autonomy means that any counseling or information provided by healthcare workers must be non-directive, empowering individuals to make the best decisions for themselves. It also requires that patients be fully aware that sterilization is a permanent procedure and of reversible alternatives. Consent must always come from the patient herself and can never be overridden by arguments of medical necessity or emergency if consent is still possible.

This issue has also been addressed in the Peruvian context. In October 2024, the CEDAW Committee ruled on a complaint by five victims of forced sterilizations under Peru’s national program. It concluded that the violations constituted gender-based and intersectional discrimination based on sex, gender, rural origin, and socioeconomic status (para. 8.6). The Committee recommended reparations, continued investigation, and broader reparative measures (para. 9).

Finally, under the Rome Statute, enforced sterilization is classified as a crime against humanity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians. The IACHR has previously qualified acts under its jurisdiction as crimes against humanity, such as in Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile (para. 104). Given the widespread, and large-scale nature of Peru’s sterilization program, the Court could also address this in its ruling and whether it will include references to the principle of non-applicability of statutory limitations.

Conclusion

The upcoming Ramos Durand judgment represents a critical opportunity to address a long-standing chapter of impunity in Peru. It could also redefine regional legal standards on structural reproductive violence and set a powerful precedent for Latin American women subjected to such practices. For the first time, the IACHR may explicitly characterize forced sterilizations as reproductive violence and thus as a form of gender-based violence, contributing to a broader and more inclusive understanding of reproductive rights violations within the regional human rights framework.

Central to this analysis is the question of how structural conditions affect autonomy and undermine informed consent. How does decision-making unfold in militarized and coercive environments? In what ways do state-run campaigns distort or suppress individual agency? What are the implications of transactional dynamics in contexts of poverty and exclusion? The Court’s reasoning on how factors such as militarization, institutional coercion, poverty, and gendered stereotypes converge to erode autonomy will be essential for understanding how reproductive injustice operates, and for defining the legal contours of state responsibility in preventing and remedying such violations.

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“We do not subscribe to the widely-held belief that the affairs of nations can be successfully conducted on a military level. In the world’s recent history there is abundant evidence to prove that neither threats of superior force nor displays of armed might have been able to create the climate in which peace can take root. The great malady which affects humanity today is fear, born of tensions following the armaments race. Fear is a bad counsellor and reduces those who fall within its grasp to a state in which no positive action is possible.”¹⁾

With these timeless lines, the famous diplomat, politician and Indian freedom fighter Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (née Swarupa Kumari Nehru) described India’s outlook on foreign policy during the 20^th century. Her role in international politics and relations as well as in shaping the development of the United Nations is often overshadowed by her familial ties to her brother Jawharlal Nehru, the first president of independent post-colonial India, and Mahatma Ghandi, with whom she fought for an Indian state free from British imperial rule.

The early years in colonial India

Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit was born as Swarupa Kumari Nehru in the city of Allahābād, India, on August 18^th 1900 into a wealthy Kashmiri family. Her father, Motilal Pandit – a successful Oxford-educated lawyer, politician and Ghandian nationalist – put particular emphasis on ensuring that Pandit would become the educated woman needed by the Indian nationalist movement at the time.²⁾ She became literate in English before she learned how to read and write Hindi and was home-schooled by an English governess and tutors, in line with the Western way of life only accessible to the privileged classes in Colonial India.³⁾ Motilal Pandit believed that Indians, in the 20^th-century world order, had to become English people if they wanted to succeed globally.⁴⁾

Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit’s fluent command of the English language alongside her Anglophile education certainly paved the way for her later career in international relations.

In 1921, she married lawyer Ranjit Sitaram Pandit. His family picked the name Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit for her, replacing her birthname Swarupa Kumari Nehru; a procedure customary in Hindu circles at the time.⁵⁾ They had three daughters before Ranjit Pandit passed away in 1944 while serving a prison sentence for his acts of civil disobedience against British imperial rule. As they had no sons and Ranjit left no will guaranteeing her a share of his inheritance, Hindu communal law transferred the family’s money and property to the closest male relative in her husband’s family.⁶⁾ Pandit was offered minimal widow maintenance alongside payments for their daughters until they were married by the Pandit family. She accepted this offer, relying on the support of her brother Nehru – who was himself serving a prison sentence for his nationalist activism – and Mahatma Ghandi, who urged her not to pursue a legal case against her in-laws as they ‘had more important things to do’ in pursuit of an independent post-colonial India.⁷⁾

Pandit’s contribution to the fight against British colonialism and securing Indian independence

Alongside her male relatives Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit herself became a prominent figure in the fight against the British colonial rule in India. She followed the Ghandian line of Indian nationalism and was imprisoned three times following acts of civil disobedience such as sit-ins.⁸⁾ In the Nehru family, challenging British imperialism became a family affair – Pandit served her final prison sentence in India in 1942 alongside her then 20-year-old daughter.⁹⁾

Following her national activism, Pandit was approached by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, then President of the Indian Council for World Affairs, to speak on behalf of India to the United States. To assert control over her following her civil disobedience, the British had confiscated Pandit’s passport to heavily restrict her international mobility. However, after meeting the chief of the Allied Air Command in the Eastern region at a consulate dinner, Pandit secured a US visa and arrived in the United States aboard a US army plane in 1944.¹⁰⁾

In the United States, Pandit attended an Allied-led conference in Virginia on post-war developments in Asia as a member of an Indian observer delegation. The following year, she used every opportunity to demand Indian independence and called for an indictment of the colonial system, especially in lectures all over the country.¹¹⁾ She attended the United Nations Conference in International Organization in San Francisco in 1945 as an unofficial representative of India (which was officially represented by three cabinet members of the British Indian government). There, she emphasised the historic importance of the UN’s stance on colonialism and imperialism – challenging the very principles of the nascent organisation.¹²⁾

Representing a newly independent nation

When India finally gained independence in 1947, Pandit’s brother Nehru became the first Indian prime minister. Having proved herself on the international stage campaigning for Indian Independence in the United States, Pandit was sent to the USSR as the first ambassador for India (1947 – 49), followed by postings to the United States, Mexico, Spain and as High Commissioner to the United Kingdom.¹³⁾

A first in history

In 1953, Pandit was elected President of the UN General Assembly for the eighth session. She was the first woman to be elected as president of the Assembly and remains the only Indian person to hold this position to this day.

Pandit continued to use her voice in the United Nations to draw attention to ongoing colonialism worldwide and to demand equal rights and freedom for the oppressed everywhere. In a speech at a UN plenary meeting in 1948, she stated that the

“Indian delegation, believing in the freedom of all peoples, wished to see the early termination of colonial system, and the speedy attainment of self government by all peoples inhabiting colonial or Trust Territories. It insisted on the strict observance of Chapters XI and XII [of the UN Charter], both in spirit and letter. In particular, it urged the colonial Powers to realize that the two hundred million people inhabiting the Non-Self-Governing Territories read into the provisions of the Charter relating to such territories far more than the colonial Powers were inclined to do so.”¹⁴⁾

Her passionate commitment to human rights all over the world made her a commendable Indian representative to the UN Human Rights Commission in the later years of her life in 1979.

Legacy

After her diplomatic career, Pandit continued to serve the Indian people as a national politician. She died in 1990. Despite her challenges as both Indian and a woman in the Western and male-dominated international arena during the first half of the 20^th century¹⁵⁾, Pandit set the tone against colonialism in the newly established United Nations. In India, she is fondly remembered for her courageous stance against British colonialism.

Further sources:

• Lecture by Prof. Manu Bhagavan on his book ‘Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit’ at the Asian American / Asian Research Institute – City University of New York on October 4, 2024
• ‘The Scope of Happiness – A Personal Memoir’ by Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Crown Publishers 1979
• ‘Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit – A Biography’ by Prof. Manu Bhagavan, Penguin 2023

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